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ABSTRACT
The present thesis aims to the examination of the relationship between the media and the foreign 
policy formulation in the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey, beginning from 2004 until 2011. 
By analyzing the theoretical framework of media – state relations and conducting a research in the 
archives of two mainstream Greek and two mainstream Turkish newspapers in three different cases, 
which show different aspects of the bilateral relations of the two countries, this study seeks to find if 
influence on foreign policy formulation, regarding the relations of the two countries, can be traced 
and explained. The issues of pressure by the media, current situation of media companies in Greece 
and Turkey, and similarities, as well as differences between the functioning of these companies and 
their relation to the state, are also met.
Key Words: Greek – Turkish relations, foreign policy formulation, media, influence
Özet
Bu tez,  medya ve dış politika  yapımı  arasındaki  ilişki  bağlamında  2004-2011 yılları arasındaki 
dönemde Türk-Yunanilişkilerinde dış politikan oluşturulması  sürecini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. 
Bu çalışma ana görüşü temsil eden iki Yunan ve iki Türk gazetesinin arşivlerinde ikili ilişkilerin 
farklı taraflarını öne çıkaran üç ayrı konuyu baz alan bir araştırma ile   medyanın dış politika yapımı 
sürecindeki etkilerinin ortaya çıkarılıp, analiz edilerek açıklanabilmesinin olasılığını tartışmaktadır . 
Bu  çerçevede,   medya  baskısı,  Türkiye  ve  Yunanistan’daki  medya  şirketleri,  bu  şirketlerin 
işleyişlerindeki  benzer  yönler  ve  farklılıklar  ile   bu  şirketlerin  devletler  ile  olan  ilişkileri 
incelenecektir.   
Anahtar kelimeler: Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, dış politika yapımı, medya, etki 
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PREFACE
Working on this dissertation has been a valuable experience for me. I have always been interested in 
both Greek – Turkish relations, as have most Greeks and Turks I suppose, and the way media 
function. In my mind, the media are an inseparable part of the everyday life of all citizens of a 
country – whether they like it, or not. They are our main source of information about the world, 
about the news, policies followed and reactions appearing in any part of the world. Thinking of 
those facts made me want to study this field more. If the media are our “window to the world”, they 
should have some relationship with the way we act and think; they must have some relationship 
with the way our society functions.
It was not easy going through literature I had never come across before, or work with news reports 
that are not always easy to be found. The difficulties I met had mainly to do with the electronic 
archives of the newspapers examined here – there was always a part missing, an article removed 
and so on – and my limited knowledge of the Turkish language, practically forcing me to become 
best friends with my dictionary for a long time. However, the subject of the influence of media on 
foreign policy formulation in the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey, was chosen because of 
the questions raised on the matter in both countries and the limited literature existing on the field for 
the subject.
Even though I pursued to have the opinion of the media workers on the matter, my efforts were not 
met by the professionals of the field; I take it they were too busy, or that the matter of influence is 
one they do not easily and openly discuss. It is not easy for a journalist to admit that their workings 
are being influenced by someone else, if they are, nor for an official to admit that they keep in mind 
the media and their reactions when designing a policy, if they do.
v
This dissertation has been an effort to give insight on media – state relations in Greece and Turkey 
and to shed light on the aspect of the decision making process as far as the relations of the two 
countries are concerned. The literature reviewed was mainly provoked and written for the US or the 
UK, since such a literature is yet to be found in Greece and Turkey. The circumstances existing in 
the US and the Mediterranean area in general seem to share only a few common characteristics. 
This left me with no choice, but to adapt the theories I have studied to the realities of the two 
countries.
My hope is that this thesis will address the questions of others, as it has mine, and contribute to a 
different aspect in Greek – Turkish relation; an aspect that has been understudied. Keeping in mind 
that this is only a Master Thesis with its own inevitable flaws and shortcomings, I have tried to 
examine the subject in the most accurate possible way.  
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Introduction
Greece and Turkey are two neighboring countries, in a region that has caused their people to have 
many differences in the past. Even though they share a common mentality in everyday life, and 
many common characteristics in the ways they live, think, react and express themselves, it would 
seem that in the past there was little, if any, effort to get to know the way the members of those 
countries think and act. It would almost always seem that somehow the two countries would find 
ways to show they had more to split than to share with their neighbor. 
In the past two decades, Greece and Turkey have come across some serious chances to get bilateral 
relations completely cut or utterly improved. For instance, the 1996 Imia / Kardak crisis, which 
brought the two states very close to war; or the Öcalan crisis in the dawn of 1997, which was a very 
serious one. The change of heart on behalf of both countries during the earthquakes of 1999 was 
also  experienced,  when lots  of  lives  got  lost  and  disastrous  damages  had  to  be  faced  in  both 
countries. There were waves of compassion and people helping their neighbors, their friends, the 
human beings across the Aegean, who, after all, had to face the same disaster as they did. 
In all cases mentioned, there was a wide covering of the events by the media of both countries. In 
fact, the Imia / Kardak crisis is supposed to be an “artificial” one, created by the media in both 
countries,  in an era when the bilateral  relations between Greece and Turkey were more or less 
stagnant1. The climate produced after the earthquakes, on the other hand, was completely different – 
1 Since the Imia / Kardak crisis will be referred to often in this thesis, a few words about what it was are in order. In 
December  1995,  a  Turkish  ship  under  the  name  “Figen  Agat”  run  aground  to  the  Imia/  Kardak  islet.  In  the 
announcement of the Greek navy that Greek boats would come to help, the Captain of the ship denies the help and 
claims that the islet is in Turkish territory. Two days later, the Turkish ship is rescued by Greek ship. Throughout the 
whole month there was an exchange of information between Athens, Ankara and their embassies in both countries 
and a dispute about the sovereignty of the islet.  In  January 1996, the Greek TV channel Antenna refers to the 
incident extensively, and it becomes a big issue in Greece. The following day, four residents of Kalimnos island put 
the Greek flag on the islet; following that, a helicopter with a crew from Turkish newspaper Hürriyet lands on the 
islet and raises the Turkish flag, after removing the Greek one. The event is being broadcast on Turkish television. 
The crisis was escalated after this incident, since army groups from both countries move towards the area of the 
islets. US government sends non-papers to both countries, the main idea of which is the prevention of concentration 
of more naval and army forces in the area. Turks occupy the smaller islet of Imia/Kardak, a Greek helicopter flying 
over the area is knocked down (three men died) and both administrations follow a step-by-step procedure for the 
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a  climate  of  friendship  and  common  fate,  accompanied  by  a  sentiment  of  sympathy  and 
responsibility to help the suffering neighbor. And so the story went – through the media, to the 
people's conscience; or was it the other way round? Or was a third party involved, that of the ruling 
elite? In any case, those cases have been a clear media “show”; sometimes a “freak-show” (as in the 
Imia / Kardak crisis, or the Öçalan crisis), focusing on one scary aspect of the bilateral relations at a 
time, others a “soap opera”, keeping people's interest at high levels, informing and carrying out the 
service of calling them to help in any way they could – as in the cases of the earthquakes of 1999 in 
both countries.
The point being that media have always been where foreign policy formulates, this thesis deals with 
its role in the procedure of the formulation of foreign policy in Greece and Turkey. Even though the 
above mentioned cases are not to be examined thoroughly, since they have been examined by many 
in the past, they were only mentioned here for being valid examples of the strong messages media 
are able to send to those following them. 
This thesis will focus on what happened after 2004, when Cyprus became full member of the EU; 
how the media were involved – if they were at all - in the foreign policy formulation concerning the 
bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU will be 
serving as the starting point of this research, since Cyprus, even though cannot be thought of as 
being a concern in bilateral relations of the two states, since it involves a third party, has, however, 
triggered  conflict  between  the  two  countries  many  times  in  the  past,  because  of  its  strategic 
importance to both Greece and Turkey. 
withdrawal of their naval forces from the area. What should be kept in mind, is that it was not the incident of the 
Turkish  ship  refusing  to  get  help  by the  Greek  navy itself  that  created  the  tension  in  the  first  place,  but  the 
involvement of the media of both countries on the matter that escalated the crisis. In both countries, media reacted 
with strong disapproval (to say the least) towards the neighboring country, using a strong vocabulary (the words 
“treason”and “threat” were very commonly used by the media at  the time),  refusing basically to be a mean of 
resolution of the crisis. The media are described by most students of the crisis as the “trigger” that caused it in the 
first place.
10
The subject under study in this thesis is the media in the formulation of foreign policy when it 
comes  to  bilateral  relations;  especially  regarding  the  case  of  Greece  and  Turkey.  Media  have 
become part of our daily lives everywhere in this world. It is our basic source of information about 
the world, along with education. How far the media have come to be part of our lives is a different 
matter. Media are obviously there to inform and entertain us, to set  the public in motion about 
certain things upon which it might need to react, and to be a common platform for social issues, one 
upon which we shall all – at least theoretically – be able to take a stand on matters that concern us. 
But is there a different function of the media as well?
It  has  been  suggested  that  the  media  serve  as  the  Fourth  Estate  or  the  Fourth  Branch  of 
government2; both terms suggest that the media are there to make sure the other three branches of 
government are doing their job properly, keeping away from mischief and corruption. The media 
are also considered as the organ responsible to keep people informed about any malfunction in the 
political system3, so that they decide (to react, vote and so on) accordingly. The role of the media as 
“watchdog” has been largely acknowledged4. But is that all the media do?
This thesis is also an effort to give insight on certain aspects of media:  how the media in both 
Greece and Turkey function when it comes to the bilateral relations of the two countries; the impact 
they might have on the foreign policy formulation; the information they share with the public and 
how they are found and investigated; their relationship with the governments of the countries within 
which they operate.
We are to be faced with a broader belief of the public and some journalists, which will be met in the 
2 Fourth Estate notion refers to the idea, developed by John Locke, that the best guarantee of good governance was 
that elected legislators should be scrutinized by an independent media – ie. the media should be regarded as an 
autonomous “fourth estate” within the political system, whose job it was to continually monitor the other estates so 
that bad policy making and corruption would be immediately exposed. The media therefore needed to be granted the 
right to access all the necessary information to make their monitoring task possible. Independent media and the right 
to uncensored flow of information is a central idea of functioning democracies.
3 When it comes to democratic societies at least.
4 See Chapter 1
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following section when media theories will be examined, that the media have more to offer than just 
being there to inform us. In both countries, media are sometimes thought of as manipulative and 
organizing public life, or being directly involved in it, instead of being strictly informative organs. 
Being a medium through which people are informed of the world, and the moves of their state 
toward their neighbor, is one thing; being an actor in the decision-making process is another. Just 
like having media covering events taking place that affect the foreign policy designed by a country 
is rather different than having media instigating improvements or fall – backs in bilateral relations.
Since the media have been the main source of information, it is only natural that their impact on the 
policies designed to affect our lives should be studied. Such is not the case, however, in this part of 
the world,  where there is  a  small,  if  any,  bibliography to  connect  media with decision-making 
process.  This  dissertation  will  be  an  effort  to  contribute  some insight  on  the  Greek  –  Turkish 
relations, within a different framework, other than history or international relations.
In the first chapter a presentation of the main media theories concerning media and their relations to 
foreign policy making will be made; it shall not be focused in the Greek – Turkish relations alone, 
since the subject is, as already mentioned, understudied. Instead, this presentation shall focus on 
what  the  scholars  have  observed  about  media  –  foreign  policy  formulation  around  the  world, 
especially in the USA, where most media theories were formed.
After presenting the existing general theoretical framework, the mass media situation in Greece and 
Turkey will be examined, while “mix and matching” the theories mentioned in the first chapter to 
make one that suits this case better; in other words, which characteristics of the theories apply to 
this case and which do not will be shown, in order to then make more accurate observations about 
the way the media influence, if they do, the foreign policy formulation in both countries.
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The third chapter will focus on press reports, from both countries, on three, rather different to each 
other, situations: Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU, since May 1st, 2004; the “dogfight” 
over the Aegean that resulted in the collision of a Greek and a Turkish aircraft, that in turn led to a 
Greek  pilot  losing  his  life  in  May  2006;  and  the  ongoing,  since  2008,  procedure  of  the 
conversations between Erdoğan – Papandreou, mainly focusing on the Papandreou visit in Erzurum 
in January 2011. 
The reason why these three situations have been chosen to be examined is that they represent three 
different phases that are usually met in Greek – Turkish relations: the international organization 
notion, especially as far as the EU is concerned, is always in the picture. Since Greece is already a 
full member of the EU, while Turkey is not, even though it has been seeking to be one for many 
years, the EU 'backing up' Greece in every dispute concept is always there. The “dogfight” incidents 
have become a part of the everyday life in both countries; especially in the Greek society, since 
these “dogfights” have become a subject the media seem to be very fond of, more than in Turkey, 
where  those  incidents  are  mentioned only in  the  case  of  accidents  or  collisions;  this  'distorted 
routine', and the media response, the official line on the matter, along with how the media and the 
state influence each other under this perspective should be examined. Last, the ongoing procedure 
of discussions on the level of state leaders and their denial, if not in all cases, then in most of them, 
to disclose to the media what is being said during those meetings, as well as the media's reactions 
and their outcome, are all to be examined in the third chapter.
The  three  aforementioned cases  shall  be  examined within  the  framework drawn in  the  second 
chapter, and some conclusions about the way the media can be involved in the bilateral relation of 
Greece and Turkey, and whether they can influence the foreign policy being designed by the official 
states, will have been reached by the time this thesis reaches its final chapter. 
13
It shall be observed by the reader that, throughout this research, the public opinion factor is not 
being examined. Even though the public is, at the end of the day, all the media and the foreign 
policy  makers  care  about  (since  the  audience  is  the  receiver  of  the  media's  message,  and  the 
officials certainly seek for legitimization of their actions from it), it has, however, been thought of 
as  not  participating  in  policy  formulation5  -  as  far  as  both  internal  and  foreign  affairs  are 
considered. Moreover, putting one more factor under consideration in this already complex subject 
would, in my opinion, lead to the addition of more questions instead of being helpful to the effort of 
reaching a conclusion.
5 Barbrook, 1995, p. 5. The same concept of not participating audience appears also in Louw (2005, p. 18): The 
citizens / electorate are political “outsiders”, passive consumers of the myths, hype and images disseminated by the 
mass media. The public consumes what “semi-insiders” (such as journalists)  and “insiders” (such as officials) 
construct.
14
I. Media Connection to Foreign Policy Formulation 
Basic Theoretical Framework
Introduction
The relationship between the media and foreign policy formulation, especially in times of crises, 
has  began being  more  thoroughly studied  under  new insight  since  the  beginning  of  the  1990s 
onwards, after the end of the Cold War and the appearance of new technologies in mass media. 
However, the question of influence -its existence as well as its direction- between the media and the 
government  has  been  a  subject  under  study for  more  than  three  centuries  in  the  West.6 In  the 
absence of an explicit theory about how this influence functions, the debate of the directionality of 
this influence -Who is pressuring whom? Media or government?- , and the question of whether it is 
a “bi-directional” or “mutually influential” game, is an ongoing one.
You are soon to realize that in this media and foreign policy equation, the result of which we seek to 
find, there is one factor missing, and that is the public, the audience, or the public opinion. This has 
on purpose been left out, for many reasons. First, the obvious lack of space and the complexity of 
the matter in question when one tries to apply more than two factors to it. Even though the media's 
immediate  receiver  is  the  public,  and  there  have  been  too  many  people  worrying  about  the 
“corrupting” impact a new media of mass communication might have on the audience7, the “lack of 
participation”  by  the  public8,  especially,  it  might  be  added,  when  it  comes  to  foreign  policy 
formulation (except, maybe, of the cases in which people feel they are being lied to, manipulated, or 
otherwise discredited), is rarely questioned within the temporary literature about media and foreign 
policy.  Whereas,  at  the end of  the  day,  journalists  and policymakers  check out  the  effect  their 
6 Even though the limited space of this essay does not leave room for thorough reference to such studies, for more 
information please see Miller's Media Pressure on Foreign Policy – The Evolving Theoretical Framework, New 
York: Palgrave – Macmillan, 2007.
7 Williams, Kevin, Understanding Media Theory, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2003, p. 168
8 Barbrook, Richard, Media Freedom: The Contradictions and Communications in the Age of Modernity, London: 
Pluto Press, 1995, p. 4
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practices have had on the public, the subject of this study is whether there is an interaction between 
media and foreign policy formulation, what that interaction means, how it functions – and this is 
why the public has been left out. 
Returning back to media in relation to foreign policy formulation, two main structuring questions 
can be found in the literature concerning media and foreign policy making, in a literature which is 
not characterized by its implicit or well – standing theories. We cannot deny that some kind of 
relationship between the two entities  does  exist.  Therefore,  we have to  set  the question of  the 
means, or tools, the media use to influence the decision making process. The other question we 
have to set is what proof do we have that the influence indeed exists and is working in the manner 
that many researchers of the field, as shall be seen as this chapter goes on, have suspected it to be 
working9,    The questions the research been done in this field has evoked, and which will be come 
across, are connected to the aforementioned general questions and mostly have to do with whether 
the media affect the decision making process in a way that the government takes decisions reacting 
to  this  influence,  whether  the influence  is  mirrored  in  the  decisions,  whether  the government's 
reaction to media influence indeed exists, and, if it does, how it can be traced, and, finally, what the 
definition of the pressure / influence by the media to the government is.  
Even though those two questions seem to be quite important in examining the relationship between 
media and foreign policy, there seems to be a problem in defining the “pressure” and the causality 
of  the  influence.  In  between  the  public  opinion  research,  which  shall  in  this  study  only  be 
mentioned,  and agenda – setting theory,  which tries to explain the kind of existing relationship 
between media  and foreign  policy making,  and is  one of  the  most  respected ones,  the  current 
literature is yet to find direct linkage between the government and the media and how they interact. 
Before proceeding to address some of the most well-known theories on media – foreign policy 
9 Miller, 2007, p. 4
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relation, we should first define what mass communication is, and how it functions, in order to begin 
with a clean slate and make sure the definitions are quite clear.
What Mass Communication is and How It Functions 
According  to  Baran  and  Davis,  Mass  Communication  occurs  “when  a  source,  typically  an 
organization,  employs a technology as a medium to communicate with a large audience”.10 For 
example,  Eleftherotipia, which is a Greek organization, uses printing presses and the newspaper, 
which  are  technology and medium,  to  address  to  its  readers,  which  is  a  large  audience.  Same 
philosophy exists in all kinds of media: television, radio, internet, film making, and so on. Media 
are all means of communication; differently put, they are communication channels promoting all 
kinds of information.
The classic four functions of the media are the following: First, surveillance of the environment, 
which refers to the media collecting and distributing information. The second classic function is the 
correlation of the parts of society in responding to the environment. This means that the media 
interpret or analyze the information we get. Then, there is the transmission of the social heritage 
from one generation to the next, relating to the mass media being able to communicate different 
values, social norms across different groups and throughout long periods of time. The last function 
of media is to entertain.11
Having seen what the media “do”, some theories that have been trying to link media with foreign 
policy formulation should be mentioned.
10 Baran, Stanley and Dennis K. Davis, Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and Future, California: 
Thomson Wadsworth, 2006, p. 6
11 Ibid., pp. 265 - 266
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Media Theories on Foreign Policy
Direct studies on the media effects on the decision making process are quite recent – beginning in 
the 1990s. Due to the increased involvement of peacekeeping forces in complex situations during 
the 1990s, as well as the developments in communication technologies, there has been a subsequent 
increase of interest in the field of the relation of media and foreign policy formulation relationship.12
Media soon became a part of the changing international environment by being the “eyes” for their 
audiences in every part of the planet. Under these circumstances, the first theory we are about to 
examine was born.
The CNN Effect
The  theory  of  “CNN  Effect”,  supports  that  there  is  an  impact  of  worldwide  television  news 
broadcasts on government decision making process, especially in crises and wars. The theory is 
advocating that the television pictures have a certain power on both the public watching them and 
the elites, that drives governments to make important decisions on military or political field, based 
more  on  the  emotions  the  media  manage  to  impose  through  those  pictures,  rather  than  well-
reasoned policy considerations has been studied thoroughly.13 However, this theory supports that it 
is the media and the media alone are “showing the way” of action to the government, whereas it is 
the  journalists  themselves  who  claim  that  their  main  sources  in  such  matters  are  government 
officials.  
The CNN Effect theory was triggered in 1992, when the U.S.A intervened in Somalia with military 
personnel in Operation Restore Hope to help feeding starving people after the government collapsed 
and the state fell into anarchy. U.S.A. intervened right after the situation in Somalia had been vastly 
12 Miller, 2007, pp. 2 - 3 
13 For more information, please see the First Chapter in Miller, 2007
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exposed to the public by the media, and many thought that the immediate response by the U.S. had 
been an immediate response to what had been projected through the media. “Foreign policy 'experts' 
were dismayed by what they saw as unwarranted intrusion by the Fourth Estate into the policy 
process”14 - meaning that the officials involved in the decision – making process observed the media 
were affecting those decisions by what they chose to project (to the public). Supporting this exact 
point of view, George Kennan published an editorial in The New York Times, in September 1993, 
called, “Somalia, through a Glass Darkly”. In it he argued that American foreign policy was being 
led by  the media, and, specifically, television.15 Not an actual supporter of the intervention itself, 
Kennan was very concerned of the idea that elite control of the foreign policy decision making 
process had been lost to the media. 
Andrew Natsios argued that this so-called CNN Effect “suggests that policy-makers only respond 
when there are scenes of mass starvation on the evening news. It also suggests that policy-makers 
obtain most  of their  information about  ongoing disasters  from media reports.”  16 Kennan's  and 
Natsios's articles soon initiated a crowd of editorials and books arguing about the CNN Effect, 
especially  regarding  the  “OOTWs”  (Operations  Other  Than  War)  or  humanitarian  relief 
operations.17 
The CNN Effect was supposedly and quite arguably a theory about media “taking over” and go on 
to set the agenda of American foreign policy; in other words, doing the government's “job”. Even 
though  many  supported  that  the  press  had  historically  been  of  assistance  to  the  democratic 
government, they saw this CNN Effect Theory as something scarily plausible – the idea of media 
14 Robinson, Piers, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention, London: Routledge, 2002, 
p.10
15 Miller, 2007, p. 10
16 Cited in Miller, 2007, p. 10
17 OOTW or MOOTW: (Military) Operations Other Than War focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting 
peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. The phrase and acronym has been popularized 
by the USA military in the 1990s, but it has since fallen out of use and has been replaced by the equivalent term 
“Peace  Support  Operations”  (PSO),  by  the  UK  military.  Both  MOOTW  and  PSO  encompass  peacekeeping, 
peacemaking,  peace  enforcement  and  peace  building.  For  more  information,  please  see:  Segal,  Hugh,  (2004) 
Geopolitical Integrity, Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy and Morris Taw, Jennifer, “Planning for 
MOOTW: Lessons from US Army Efforts”, Australian Defense Force Journal, No. 134. Jan/Feb 1999, pp. 57 - 68
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evolving in such a way that could initiate foreign policy strategics by undermining democratically 
selected officials, who were supposed to be planning the foreign policy themselves. “By the mid-
1990s,  it  had  become  conventional  wisdom,  and  hence  axiomatic,  to  speak  of  media-inspired 
foreign policy initiatives”. 18 It was not suggested that every aspect of foreign policy was driven by 
the media, but there were not many who would not believe that this could be the case, as Miller 
suggests.   
 
Apart from the fact, which is dissolving this theory on its own, that no journalist ever came around 
to admit that they actually initiated the realization of a certain policy by what they had publicized, 
and that most journalists dealing with international affairs admit that their sources are members of 
the government19, the CNN effect theory seems to be applicable only in certain case studies, such as 
those initiating it, like the Somalia operation by the USA in 1992, and, even then, there cannot be 
proof that the course of the decision making process was changed because of the media. However, 
the CNN Effect theory caused a domino of research which gave ground to more theories that tried 
to explain the relationship between media and foreign policy decision making process and taking 
action, which wandered away from it. Such a theory is the “Indexing Hypothesis” theory, examined 
next.
Still the question of the causality  and the direction of the influence remains unanswered.
The Indexing Hypothesis
It was no sooner than 1995 that Livingston and Eachus questioned the CNN effect theory, which 
was formulated in the beginning of the 1990s. They described the CNN effect as the theory of the 
loss of policy control by elite decision makers to the news media. Studying the CNN effect through 
the case study of Somalia, they come to find that it was not the pressure by the media about the 
18 Miller, 2007, p. 3
19 This meaning that the information the journalists get come from officials, and thus cannot be initiating action on the 
behalf of the media, since the information had not been first met by the government after being publicized.
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situation  in  the country that  made the Bush Administration intervene.  They concluded that  the 
intervention was “a result of diplomatic and bureaucratic operations, with news coverage coming in  
response to those decisions” 20 They used the method of content analysis of news accounts in a wide 
selection of media that had been employed with the subject between 1991 and 1992, along with 
interviewing both officials and journalists connected with the events that took place, so that they 
could have a whole picture of both the information the journalists that were interviewed had access 
to and to what they did with it, and the officials initial plans and reaction to the Somalia crisis and 
the publicized materials.
The result of their research complied mainly with Bennett's theory of “News Indexing”, first met in 
his  article  in  the  Journal  of  Communication  in  199021,  which  suggests  that  news  is  "indexed" 
implicitly to the range and dynamics of governmental debate, but has little relation to expressed 
public opinion. In Bennett's words  “Mass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the 
beat, tend to 'index' the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the  
range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic. (…) This working  
hypothesis implies that 'other'  (i.e. non – official) voices filling out the potential universe of news  
sources are included in news stories and editorials, when those voices express opinions already  
emerging  in  official  circles”22.  Bennett  also  argues  that  indexing  is  the  result  of  journalists' 
collecting the news, through “the collective structures of the newsroom as an organization,  and 
business  pressures  on  the  boardroom”.  The  degree  of  indexing  varies  according  to  the  issue, 
“depending  on  the  degree  to  which  the  three  different  dynamics  behind  it  (individual, 
organizational, and economic) coincide, and that it might be expected to be particularly important 
when it comes to military decisions, foreign affairs, trade, and macroeconomic policy-areas.”23 
20 Miller, 2007, pp. 10 - 11
21 Bennett, Lance W., “Toward a Theory of Press – State Relations in the United States”, Journal of Communication, 
Vol. 40, Issue 2, June 1990, pp. 103 - 127
22 Ibid., p. 106
23The Media Research Hub: Social Science Research Council: http://mediaresearchhub.ssrc.org/icdc-content-
folder/indexing/  (accessed December 10, 2010)
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One can meet the Indexing Hypothesis to almost every theory about media and their relation  or 
their  effects  on  foreign  policy  decision  making  process.  To  make  it  more  clear,  the  indexing 
hypothesis suggests that the media coverage of an event is bonded with official information, or 
statements of officials about a current event concerning foreign (or other)  policy and dominant 
assumptions about this very same event. 24  This theory mainly has been applied to cases that involve 
policies or initials taken by officials regarding international relations and different aspects of them 
(decisions  for  war  or  MOOTW)  or  economic  policies  (trade,  economic  transactions  involving 
another party); in different words, it mainly builds itself upon cases which relate the policy making 
with a second party / country / economic factor.
If the indexing hypothesis seems to hold up, then what must be distinguished, and which generally 
appears overlooked, is whether indexing rules out the possibility of influence. It is understood that 
the media are being faced as “bonded” with official information. But in what ways it is not clear. 
Also, the question of pressure is not being addressed. Clearly, the government seems to be holding 
on and 'handing over' the information about crucial issues, hence having the “upper hand” in this 
relationship, but could it be that the influence is bi-directional? After all, the government might be 
giving the information, but who and why decides which of those information gets publicized? 
Media – Policy Interaction Model
Another  model  involving  media  and foreign  policy decision  making process,  presented  among 
others,  is  Robinson's  Media  –  Policy  Interaction  Model.  In  his  study  about  the  CNN  effect, 
Robinson searches where the initiative that “triggered” action on behalf of the government came 
from,  the  media  or  the  administration  itself,  and  the  answer  supports  Livingston  and  Eachus 
research's result. Robinson's article of 200025 provides us with a clarifying table of his paradigm:
24 Miller, 2007, p. 11
25 Robinson, Piers, “The Policy – Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power During Humanitarian Crisis”, 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5, September 2000, pp. 613-633
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The Policy – Media Interaction Model26
Government 
Policy Line
Direction 
of 
Influence
News 
Media 
Coverage
Policy – Media Relationship
Media 
Influence
Uncertain ← Extensive 
and critical
In this scenario media influence occurs. In the absence of a clear, well – 
articulated policy line, the government is vulnerable to critical and extensive 
media attention. If news reports are critically framed, advocating a particular 
course of action, the government is forced to do something or face a public 
relations disaster. Here, media can significantly influence the policy process.
No Media 
Influence 
Certain → Indexed to 
“official 
agenda”
When the government has clear and well-articulated objectives it tends to set 
the news agenda. Coverage might become critical if there is elite dissensus. 
With the executive decided on a particular course of action, media coverage 
is unlikely to influence policy.
Robinson's analysis reaches the issue of media pressure itself by suggesting that certain arguments 
are “loose speculations about 'complex systems', 'fluid interplay' and a 'rich and diverse relationship' 
between media coverage and policy outcomes – all of which sounds reasonable enough but does 
little to clarify things or prove a direct casual  relationship between media coverage and policy 
outcomes”27. 
However, there is no outcome in Robinson’s work answering to the question of what pressure is and 
how  it  is  observed.  So,  without  trying  to  avoid  doing  so,  Robinson  highlights  the  key 
epistemological problem of this field. “Unfortunately, influence cannot be observed in any obvious 
or straightforward fashion. We cannot see inside the minds of policy – makers and directly observe 
media influence at  work”, he writes.  However true that might be,  there must be a way to see, 
identify and even measure pressure and influence, argues Miller – and suggests that indeed there is; 
“to do so however, requires that we build an assumptive base, offer a theory about media pressure, 
and then devise a coding system to make that theory testable. We can do all this by listening in a 
very particular way to what people say, and how it evidently affects others”. 
Supporting traces of evidence can be found in the very actions of officials on a matter that has been 
publicized, or of journalists toward a certain policy. By that I mean that, if we can see a shift of 
position on a planned action of foreign affairs by the officials after a certain point of view or new 
26 Table taken from Robinson, 2000, p. 615
27 Miller, 2007, p. 12
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clues on the case have been publicized, we can assume, having no other action that would evoke 
such a shift,  that this was an act of influence by the media towards the government. Robinson 
suggests  that  this  model  shows the possibility of media 'taking sides'  during elite  debates  over 
policy formulation28 . Thus, the media can only play a significant role when the members of the 
government are on a debate or disagree about the policy that is being drawn. He suggests that by 
promoting one of the options suggested (by some officials) to be followed, the media can cause a 
shift in policy. We can only speculate that, of course, Miller argues, for there is no actual proof that 
any other initiatives have been taken on behalf of the government, that the media workers might 
have not been informed of. 
The  media  –  government  interaction  model  has  also  been  studied  by Linsky and O'Heffernan. 
O'Heffernan's main argument is that whereas in the beginning the relationship between the (USA) 
government and the media used to be “symbiotic” or “mutually beneficial”, the relationship has 
now been changed into a relationship of “interdependent mutual exploitation”. So “from the policy 
– maker's perspective, a significant element of policy making involves using and influencing the 
media; policy making cannot be done without the media, nor can the media cover international 
affairs  without government cooperation”.  The logic of this  theory results  in a model of mutual 
exploitation. Thus, both the administration and the media affect one another, because they need 
each other  to  function.  “This  influence stems from policy – maker's  perception of  the  media's 
importance and utility, especially of the importance of the broadcast media, and from the media's 
injection of certain biases into the policy – making process. The combination of these two media 
forces results in a new foreign policy that is media – influenced”,  he claims. He also writes that 
“the media's power results from their ability to locate and reveal positive and negative information, 
which  under  certain  circumstances,  can  severely  damage  policies  and  careers  or  increase  the 
likelihood of success. Insiders perceive that both positive and negative information could increase 
the visibility -and thus the vulnerability- of policy officials, but that negative media coverage had 
28 Robinson, 2000, pp. 615 - 616
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the strongest effect”. 29
The Positioning Theory
Miller, on the other hand, suggests that if in all above-mentioned theories using the term “pressure” 
to identify how the media affect the decision – making process, was to be replaced with the idea of 
threat to reputation (he does that by examining the seditious libel laws etc, from old days to ours), 
all the arguments become more explicit, he suggests, and maintain the logic of their outcomes.
Miller  engages  in  formulating  a  Positioning  Theory.  He  starts  by  giving  media  pressure  and 
influence operational definitions, decides to examine communication itself under the prism of actual 
“dialogue”  (verbal  or  not)  between  the  media  and  the  policymakers.  Following  Harré  and 
Langenhove's work30, he uses their words to define the positioning theory as:  “the study of local  
moral  orders  as  ever  –  shifting  patterns  of  mutual  and  contestable  rights  and  obligations  of  
speaking  and  acting”31.  Generally  put,  positions are  “relational”  -  so,  for  one  party  to  be 
“positioned” as, for instance, powerful, other parties must be “positioned” as powerless.32
Miller  presents  his  theory  of  media  pressure,  based  on  the  Positioning  Theory,  calling  it  the 
Positioning Hypothesis, in two different parts. In  Part A, Miller presents media pressure as “the 
perlocutionary impact of the media's communicative acts that demonstrably defame the reputation 
of the executive, or the executive's policy, as defined by the local moral order”33. The significance 
of defamation is its function as an “instrument of faction”, which leads to difficulties in governing. 
Media pressure can, Miller suggests, actually be observed “in the executive acts of rhetorical re-
description  or  repositioning  in  response  to  the  media's  communicative  acts  as  they  regard  the 
29 Miller, 2007, pp. 17 -18
30 For more information, please see Harré, Rom and Luk van Langenhove, Positioning Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999
31 Ibid., p. 1
32 Ibid., pp. 1-2
33 Miller, 2007, p. 43
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reputation of the executive or the executive's policy”34. In Part B of his theory, Miller suggests that 
influence itself is easily conceivable “by deliberate changes in executive policy intended to function 
as verbal or non – verbal forms of rhetorical re-description and/or repositioning, that defend or 
recover the executive's authority, so that superordinate strategic objectives can be maintained or 
advanced”. The policy shifts observed aim to end rhetorical challenges by or through the media, 
thus potentially bringing threats to the executive's authority to a resolution35. 
In simpler terms, Miller's Positioning Hypothesis supports that the media can publish things that 
could hurt or damage the reputation of officials in the eyes of the public, whose support they need 
in order to design and follow a policy. The kind of damage the media are able to cause to an official 
depends on the moral and ethical values of the community interested on this very discourse (the 
official  and  the  policies  they follow).  Reputation  damage can  cause  an  executive  to  lose  their 
partners' support, and , consequently, their power.
Miller also suggests that we are actually able to observe when the reputation of an executive is 
under threat, by observing what the media has published and how the executive has responded to 
the  published  material.  Hence,  the  media  have,  according  to  Positioning  Theory,  the  power  to 
influence, or even shift, policies, by defaming, or 'threatening' to do so, the executives designing 
those policies. By accepting this theory, he seems determined to come up with an answer on the two 
questions put before him – the questions raised are being mentioned in the beginning of this chapter 
– by examining the actual “conversations” between the two factors, verbal or written, and their 
actual effect on the formulation of policy.
As shall be observed in the second and third chapter of this thesis, this theory does not seem to be 
applicable to Greece and Turkey, since, even though the officials have been under the “media's 
34 Miller, 2007, p. 43
35 Miller, 2007, p. 44
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defamation capacity concept”, if it should be called, for years (in Greece more than in Turkey), the 
officials seem to be following their policies, not shifting away from them. What might be true and 
shall be examined further down this research, is that the executives tend to rephrase, reposition, or 
change the rhetoric followed in foreign policy matters, after the media have published something 
that could cause damage of reputation; by doing so, the executives avoid losing support.
The Agenda – Setting Theory
The agenda – setting theory refers to the idea that media do not tell people what or how to think, but 
they give them the stimulus on what to think. 
The first to have come up with the idea of agenda – setting, without naming it as such though, was 
Lippmann, in his work Public Opinion, in 1922. He argued that people cannot possibly deal with 
the reality, their environments, but respond to “pictures” of the environments in their head – i.e. 
mental images of their environments. “For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex,  
and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so many subtlety, so  
much  variety,  so  many  permutations  and  combinations.  And  although  we  have  to  act  in  that  
environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it”.36 He 
came to the result that everyday people cannot be left to make important political decisions based 
on  simplified  “pictures”  and  that  they  had  to  be  protected,  and  the  more  important  political 
decisions have to be made by “technocrats” who use better models to guide their actions.37
Cohen  refined  Lippmann's  ideas  into  theory,  which  survives  up  to  our  days,  and  with  all  the 
technological advancements, it seems to be totally current and up to date. “The press is significantly  
more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in  
telling people what  to think,  but  it  is  stunningly  successful  in telling its  readers  what  to  think 
36 Lippmann, Walter, Public Opinion, New York: Macmillan, 1992, p. 16
37 Baran and Davis, 2006, p. 316
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about.”,  he  wrote,  “And it  follows from this  that  the world looks different  to  different  people,  
depending not only on their personal interests, but also on the map that is drawn for them by the  
writers, editors and publishers of the papers they read”.38
These writings are the basis of what has come to be known as the fifth function of the mass media, 
the agenda – setting function.39
McCombs and Shaw empirically tested this theory, and the results of their research were published 
in 1972. They interpreted agenda – setting as such:  “In choosing and displaying news, editors,  
newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn  
not only about a given issue, but how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of  
information in a news story or its position... The mass media may well determine the important  
issues – that is the media may set the 'agenda' of the campaign”. 40 That means that the spot where a 
piece of information is fit, for example, on a newspaper (is it headlines-front page news? Is it last 
page?) and the amount of words and the information it carries, is decisive for the people to think of 
it as crucial news or not. Same way with television or radio – the news that are being broadcast 
earliest on the news, are the most important. Media people are deciding, though, what comes first. 
Thus the media succeed in putting on the “picture” of our environments what we, after reading or 
viewing or listening to, think is more important than other news.  
An example of the agenda – setting function of the media that is often seen in Greek – Turkish 
relations  reality  is  the  “dogfights”  over  the  Aegean.  While  in  Greece  the  “dogfight”  can  be 
presented as a major issue through the media, most Turks have no idea what a “dogfight” is, since 
the  Turkish  media  do  not  attach  the  same  important  on  that  matter.  Although  in  Greece  the 
38 Cohen, Bernard C., The Press and Foreign Policy, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 13
39 Baran and Davis, 2006, p. 317
40 McCombs, Maxwell and Donald Shaw, “The Agenda – Setting Function of the Media”, Public Opinion Quarterly, 
Vol. 36, 1972, p. 176
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“dogfights” are being reported on with much importance attached to them every time, in Turkey it 
takes an accident – a fatal one – for a “dogfight” to make an appearance on the news.
Iyengar and Kinder offered a testable “agenda – setting hypothesis: those problems that receive 
prominent attention on the national news become the problems the viewing public regards as the 
nation's most important”.41 They examined agenda – setting itself,  as it  had been interpreted by 
McCombs and Shaw, only to demonstrate causality. Like most early agenda – setting research, a 
direction of influence from the media to the audience is implied – causality is implied through this 
exact finding.42 They also examined vividness of presentation, and found out that dramatic news 
accounts undermined, rather than increased, television's agenda – setting power; position of a story 
– they showed that lead stories had a greater agenda – setting effect; finally, they inserted a new 
term in the literature and examined it: Priming. Priming, in agenda – setting theory, is the idea that 
media draw attention to some aspects of political life at the expense of others.43
This research brought about a new term in media – foreign policy literature, agenda – building. 
Agenda – building is a collective process in which media, government and the citizenry reciprocally 
influence one another in areas of public policy.44 This new term is no more than an attempt to 
explain what we empirically experience in everyday life. Government gives information which get 
publicized, through a procedure followed by media - you could even imagine it being a special filter 
(which pieces of information get excluded or why those which are included are making it to the first 
or to the last page is not a matter of inquiry of this essay), then affecting the citizens, who then 
promote or demand or press for the solution, by the government, of those certain issues they have in 
mind as being the most crucial. Agenda – building presumes cognitive effects, an active audience 
(which influences and is being influenced by the media and the government), and societal level – 
41 Iyengar, Shanto and Donald Kinder, News that Matter: Television and American Opinion, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1987, p. 16
42 On the other hand, one could easily argue that the media are simply responding to what their audiences actually 
think is more important an issue, or what they want or like to read about or watch or listen to.
43 Baran and Davis, 2006, p. 318
44 Ibid., p. 319
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effects. Its basic premise can be found in the belief that media can profoundly affect how a society 
decides which are its concerns and is able to mobilize its various institutions toward meeting those 
concerns. 
Propaganda
The term 'propaganda' originally descents from the Roman Catholic 'Congregatio de Propaganda 
Fide' (Committee for the Propagation of the Faith), an order of the church established by a papal 
bull in 1622 in an effort to suppress the Protestant Reformation. The term has ever since come to 
mean the no-holds-barred use of communication to propagate specific beliefs and expectations. The 
objective of a propagandist is to alter the way people act and make them actually believe that their 
new behavior is a product of their own free thinking.45 To manage this task, the propagandists try to 
change the way people conceive themselves and their social world.46 Communication techniques are 
used for guiding and transforming those personal beliefs.
Fritz Hippler, head of Nazi Germany's film propaganda division, said that in order for propaganda 
to be effective, it needs to simplify a complex issue and repeat that simplification over and over 
again. The propagandist believes in the old saying “the end justifies the means”. Therefore, half – 
truths and outright lies are put in use in order for people to be convinced to adopt the propaganda's 
manifesto. 47 
In their 1994 book, Manufacturing Consent, Herman and Chomsky lay out the propaganda model to 
explain media's relationship with government and decision – making process.48 According to them, 
the mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to a wide population. 
Along with their other functions, lies the function of infusing “values, beliefs and codes of behavior  
45 Pratkanis, Anthony R. and Elliot Aronson, Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion, New 
York: W. H. Freedman, 1992, p. 9
46 Baran and Davis, 2006, p. 74
47 Ibid., p. 75
48 Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, 
London: Vintage 1994, p.1
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that  will  integrate  them  into  the  institutional  structures  of  the  larger  society”  to  individuals. 
Systematic  propaganda is  a  prerequisite  element  for  the  individual's  “fitting  in”  in  a  world  of 
concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interests.49 Systematic propaganda can be easily 
identified in countries where the power is concentrated in state bureaucracy and the censorship is 
official  –  that  is  not  the  case,  however,  in  a  system of  private  media  and no  trace  of  official 
censorship to be found.
Hence, as society has come to be today, there are both government interests and mass – media 
interests projected through the media; searching for more power or money (in this model power and 
money are equal).  The dominant class, consisting of not only the executive, but other powerful 
people of economics, media, and other fields, seeks to propagate its interests by spreading a certain 
“code” of behavior or beliefs to the wide public. “A propaganda model focuses on the equality of 
wealth and power and its multilevel effects on mass media interests and choices”, they claim.50 In 
such an environment, the news are filtered to fit the effort of the privileged few get their message 
across to the unprivileged wide public. They analyze the essential ingredients, or “filters”, of the 
propaganda model.51 
The “filters” Herman and Chomsky referred to are as such:  First, there is the size, concentrated 
ownership, owner wealth and profit orientation of the dominant mass media firms. The mass media 
firms have got implicated in business other than media as well, and non – media companies have 
now got interests in the media field. Thus, business interests are going to be communicated through 
propaganda, with the help of the business itself,  the media. This is interrelated with the second 
“filter”, stating that advertising is the primary income source of the business of mass media. The 
third  one is  the  reliance of  the media on information  provided by government,  businesses  and 
'experts' funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power. Since the mass media 
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 2
51 Ibid., pp. 12 - 28
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and such sources  of  information are  bound to  a symbiotic  relationship,  due to  economical  and 
mutual interests, and since the media need a steady flow of information to survive, the “principle of 
bureaucratic affinity” prevails, which states that only other bureaucracies can satisfy the input needs 
of  a  news  bureaucracy.52 Cooperating  with  recognizable  and  credible  partners,  such  as  the 
government or corporations is quite important for the news media,  since they never run dry of 
information – their sources provide with them constantly. Moreover, the information coming from a 
credible factor can be thought of as presumptively accurate, helping the media to keep thinking of 
themselves as objective. However, Herman and Chomsky suggest that powerful sources are able to 
and easily and regularly do exploit media routines and their dependency, by the aforementioned 
factors, and they manipulate the media into following a special agenda – a propaganda. Another 
“filter” is the use of 'flak' as a means of disciplining the media. A 'flak' is a negative response to a 
media statement or program. If 'flak' is produced on a large scale, or by individuals or groups with 
substantial resources, it can be uncomfortable and costly for the media and, therefore, probability of 
it being used can be a deterrent for the media to be objective. The final criterion for the existence of 
propaganda is the “anticommunism” as a national religion and control  mechanism used by the 
government to keep the population monitored.
Theoreticians  have  focused  on  liberal  states,  especially  the  USA,  UK  or  France,  their 
administrations in different time periods and those administrations' relations with media. However, 
there is no literature for smaller or less “powerful” countries, and how the media affect the decision 
– making process when it comes to bilateral (troubled or not) relations. Having been in the past or 
being in the present a superpower, those states' relations with the media, and the media's effect and 
impact on the decision – making process seems to be a rather different situation. Given that one's 
decisions in the international arena might affect half the planet, or more, (when this decision is 
being made by the USA for example), it is only natural that one has to face the global mass media 
and be affected by their initiative on a matter or their reaction on a policy. Yes, the influence cannot 
52 Fishman, Mark, Manufacturing the News, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980, p. 143
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be measured, or even observed, when we are talking about global “interests” or global mass media. 
However,  how  can  one  be  sure  that  this  very  same  thing  happens  with  bilateral  relations  in 
countries, in which the decision – making process affects none other than their own population? 
This thesis focuses on the Greek and Turkish cases, how decision making process concerning their 
bilateral relations is taking place, and what the effect of the media is on the procedure under this 
scope. 
Media Power
In  order  for  the  media  to  be  in  the  position  to  have  some  kind  of  influence,  there  is  the 
presupposition of them having some kind of power. What kind of power could that be, since no 
politician of our days can imagine getting elected, or designing a policy, without managing to gain 
support from the media? Before proceeding to the situation of the media in Greece and Turkey, it 
would be useful to think about media power, its sources and its expressions.
When examining the mass media as a power resource, Louw defines power as “the capacity to get 
one's own way when interacting with other human beings”.53 “Media power”, Couldry says, “is 
generally too obvious to be articulated and criticized”.54 However, when we ask ourselves what we 
know about media power, the answers that will come up shall be rather vague. It shall obviously 
have to do something with their ability to inform the public and make it react upon the information 
they gain, but put that aside, what else comes to mind?
The  power  of  the  media,  this  vague  thing  many  have  tried  to  give  specific  meaning  to,  has 
concerned this world since the birth of mass communication through the advances of technology – 
and with every new media being born, the same old questions and fears rise once more: what about 
53 Louw, The Media and Political Process, London: Sage Publications, 2005, p. 24
54 Couldry, The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses of the Media Age, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 5
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the “corrupting influence (this medium) might have on the audience?”55 
The media, through the functions analyzed earlier in this chapter, can act in many ways that show 
that they are powerful. For one, through the transmission of cultural legacy and ideas, they can act 
as  “agencies  of  socialization”56 for  the  society.  They  also  assist,  through  the  function  of 
entertainment, Williams suggests, the maintenance the social order and the enforcement of social 
norms, while mobilizing the parts of society, the people, to participate in social development and 
change.57
The power to push people into thinking about specific kind of issues became known as agenda – 
setting58, a matter we have much talked about already, since it has become a main point in  media 
theory. “But”, Williams claims, “the media's agenda is being discussed to be shaped by others –  
interplay between interest groups, government officials, citizens and politicians amongst others in  
trying to influence what the media reports as important”59 – this in itself shows the power of the 
media. Thus, it is not only the profit the owner thinks of before acquiring a media company, but the 
power this media company will give them to transmit messages to a wide range of people, the 
public. Since most media companies, or, to put it differently, the income of most media companies 
(especially in Greece and Turkey) does not seem to be rather promising, there must be some other 
reason many are so eager to obtain a media company, or access to the media. The power of the 
media lies in their popularity, in society, as means of obtaining information. Those who manage to 
control them, manage to control a lot more than just them; and, to put this in terms of the ownership 
pattern followed in Greece and Turkey, where most media companies are owned by cross groups or 
conglomerates60, a media company owner has the power to protect their interests and their other 
companies as well.
55 Williams, 2003, p. 168
56 Williams, 2003, p. 49
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 181
59 Ibid.
60 See chapter 2 of this thesis.
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Power in every society can result to three outcomes: people either accept the workings of power as 
legitimate, or they resist them, or they think of themselves being powerless to do anything about 
them.61 The  power  of  the  media  lies  in  their  ability  to  pressure  the  government  by making  it 
acknowledge that they have the ability to legitimize the policies followed by the state in the eyes of 
the public opinion, or that they can make the public resist; in democracies, resistance to a certain 
policy can be a destructive force (for the policy itself) that might lead to it not being implemented. 
If we think about it more closely, the media have the power to “blackmail” politicians because of 
their ability to influence the public in such ways – in other words, they have the power to legitimize 
the official state's actions, or do the exact opposite, and make any policy, of which they might not 
be very fond, collapse.62
Pluralism suggests that every member of the society has some amount and kind of power, but no 
one can have too much of it (too much however cannot be counted. Too much could be the power to 
alter someone else's power, to become the prevailing powerful group and so on). The competition 
between groups and interests makes power diffused, distributed among the members of society, the 
theory of pluralism goes on.
As Dahl puts it “all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard  
at some crucial stage in the process of decision – making”63; and media are there to ensure that the 
diversity of  society,  which needs  to be maintained,  is  expressed through them.64 But  can those 
groups  make  themselves  be  heard  indeed?  The  power  of  the  media  lies  within  this  factor  of 
diversity in societies as well. The media are supposed to be giving the chance to all members or 
groups or interests of society be heard. But maybe a group is not interested in being heard. Within 
the contemporary analytical framework of the media, the audiences' lack of participation “is rarely 
61 Bennett in Curan and Park (eds), De-Westernizing Media Studies, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 204
62 So why do they not use that power? The answer must be the relations the media have with the official state itself. 
One way or the other, if the media come after a politician, who just so happens to be their source of information as 
well, or the policy that very person designs, guess who is not going to get any information next time they need it...
63 Dahl quoted in Miliband, 1973, p. 4
64 Williams, 2003, p. 50
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questioned”65; and what else could the audiences be characterized as, if not groups of the society?
Thus, then, the power of the media lies in their ability to force, through the information they choose 
to expose, those groups to speak up and claim their interests, or to choose which group's interests 
they are going to support by publishing its views and opinions. That is something directly linked 
with the agenda – setting function of the media, since the members of society will not react to a 
policy been drawn, when we speak of Greece and Turkey at least, unless they feel their interests are 
being threatened. Whether the media are thought of as able to do that,  as having this power to 
influence the masses in such ways, or not, has been the question of the discussions about the media, 
ever since their appearance. 
Another form of power the media have is that they have come to become parts of our lives, without 
which it is rather difficult for us to imagine the world nowadays. To ignore them is out of the 
question, both for us and for the foreign policy formulators. Besides especially for the governing 
elites of this world, which have been basing the legitimation of their actions on the media coverage, 
or, to put it differently, on how the media covered their actions and how the public interpreted them: 
“To  have  ignored  them (the  media)  would  have  meant  being  left  behind  in  a  world  that  was 
developing new applications of the power of publicity and advertising thanks to advancements in 
the discipline of psychology, and therefore  new opportunities to use the media for political and 
diplomatic purposes. Instead, therefore, of being reactive, there was a growing recognition for the 
need  on  the  part  of  government  for  proactivity,  which  gave  rise  to  ever  –  increasing  state  – 
sponsored media activity – press relations, information departments and the like – in an attempt to 
ensure that official versions of events prevailed over possible privatized media speculation. This 
resulted in the practice by government of, if not shaping the media's agenda, then influencing it 
rather than allowing the reverse to happen.”, Taylor writes.66 
65 Barbrook, Media Freedom: The Contradictions of Communications in the Age of Modernity, London: Pluto Press, 
1995, p. 4
66 Taylor, Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 61
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Leaving the agenda – setting and its complex relationship with both state and media for a minute, 
and  examining more  closely the statement  mentioned right  above,  one  can understand that  the 
media  and  what  they  publish  has  become  of  great  importance  through  the  technological 
advancements of the past years, and has thus caused the media to gain more and more power over 
our daily lives day by day. The power of the media is the result of our inability to separate the 
realities of the world from the media themselves. Our dependence on them to obtain information, 
and the way we react to them, helps the foreign policy designers' programming their next move, and 
then announce, present and legitimize it through the media. The media have gained the power to be 
the inter-mediator between any policy being designed and then applied  to reality.
Lukes proposes that it is easy to see how media are involved in the production and re-production of 
power in society, when power itself is viewed through the three-level perspective he suggests in the 
typology he offers us. The three levels of power in society are as such: 
• organized coercion through which various agents force others to do things,
• level of the established regimes, rituals and institutions that shape public decisions (they 
define whose concerns about what issues matter),
• distribution of consciousness in society about the acceptability of naturalness of the first two 
levels.67
Using  Lukes's  framework,  Bennett  states  that  media  are  involved  in  the  production  and 
reproduction of power in the three following ways: the first being, their ability to  frame coercive 
power within societies in ways that can “encourage, discourage, hide or expose” power; secondly, 
the media “select and represent” political actors and policy problems in “formal political settings” 
(the media are able to, for instance, emphasize some actors and their workings, while they choose to 
assign less importance to others); and, last, they “transmit values, problem definitions, and images 
67 For more on the power in society, see Lukes, Power, A Radical View, London: Macmillan, 1974. This abstract has 
been taken from Bennett in Curran and Park (eds), 2000, pp. 204 - 205
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of people in society that provide resources for people in thinking about their lives and their relations 
to government, politics, and society”.68
What Bennett says, in different words, is that the power of the media is rooted in their functions; 
which is only normal, since the power of all factors lies within their actions, their abilities, what 
they are able to  do.  The media are  in position to hide or show who has the power in society, 
emphasize or de-emphasize their workings, give meaning or comment on their actions, transmit 
their values or not, provoke the public into reacting to those in power or accepting it. Once more, 
this  is  an expression of  media power which is  strongly interrelated and is  interacting with the 
influence it has over the public and the power the state has over the media.
Political power in contemporary democracies has a great deal to do with the legitimization of the 
actions  of  the  government  in  the  eyes  of  the  public,  their  voters.  And  legitimization  is  the 
“dimension of the (political) process most obviously involving the media”, notes Louw.69 He goes 
on stating that the “media's  impact on political  process has become much wider than simply a 
legitimization mechanism”.70
Whereas their power has indeed expanded over other fields than that of influencing the way the 
public will react upon policies being realized by the government, the fact that the political elites 
perceive of media as being capable of providing legitimization for their actions, has made the media 
gain yet another power. This too originating mostly from the agenda – setting function of the media, 
thus embracing all the restrictions of this function, which we have already discussed, still remains a 
power of the media widely acknowledged, as seen by Louw's statement. 
The elected representatives composing the government, or the parliament, are spending their time 
68 Bennett in Curran and Park (eds), 2000, p. 205
69 Louw, 2005, p. 14
70 Ibid.
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giving interviews, monitoring the mass media to see what coverage they and their opponents get, 
which matters are being placed onto the public agenda, while deploying media to communicate with 
voters. Why they choose the media to defend their actions has been stated may times in this thesis: 
because of their power to influence the electorate. Most voters nowadays depend mostly upon the 
mass media to offer them information about the political process, the candidates and the political 
issues  that  they will  or  already have  to  face.  Given their  reliance on mass  media  for  political 
information,  Louw says,  they become passive consumers of what journalists  (semi – insiders71) 
choose to  report72.  And this  passive characteristic  of the society is  what  gives  mass media the 
chance to become powerful in terms of both legitimization of the acts made by the political elites 
and their promotion in the eyes of the public during election periods, since the politicians spend 
considerable amounts of time and energy trying to influence mass media agendas to generate stories 
useful for their cause.
The mass media have been characterized as “sites of impression management” and “king makers” 
from the second half of the 20th century onwards73; a label they have fought to gain. After all, being 
in  a  position  to  criticize,  promote  and  interpret  the  state's  workings,  to  influence  and change 
people's minds is not a small thing. This is exactly the reason why media companies and institutions 
became such a desirable possession for those in seek of power – should that be power itself, or 
power to influence others in power. The ability to make or break leaders and to affect policies, to 
spread the ideas and information you choose would seem like a superpower coming out of a comic 
book. However, as the old saying goes, “with great power comes great responsibility”, so we might 
want to give our hero, the media, the chance to prove that they do not have that kind of power, so 
71 Louw, 2005, pp. 17 – 18: suggests that people can relate to the (liberal) democratic process in 3 ways – as insiders, 
semi  –  insiders  or  outsiders.  Insiders  are  engaged  in  all  dimensions  of  the  political  game  and  include 
parliamentarians,  policy – staffers,  bureaucrats, political party insiders,  advisers and so on. Semi – insiders are 
aware of the political game and the policy issues on the agenda; they are involved in “mass politics” as informed 
spectators of the political game. This group includes journalists,  public opinion pollsters,  analysts and the like. 
Outsiders are the citizens / electorate, passive consumers of the images disseminated by the media; they consume 
what the semi – insiders and insiders construct for them.
72 Ibid., p. 23
73 Louw, 2005, p. 25
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that they decline the responsibility as well.
In mass societies the circulation of information a central point in to “turning worldviews into a mass 
phenomenon, and / or making worldviews hegemonically dominant”74. The mass media's capacity 
to work their way into doing that is not an outcome of their power to affect the public's views in a 
“stimulus – response way”75. Many researchers have denied media's “directive” powers76. Gerbner 
has tried to show that the media's power to influence has been the effect of “repeated, long-term 
exposure  to  media  story  –  telling,  because  embedded  in  these  stories  are  worldviews”,  a 
phenomenon which he calls the “cultivation effect”77. This slow process of influencing the public 
comes to an outcome after the public has been drawn into the worldviews the media have been 
presenting through their stories and the message has been absorbed78. Obviously this effect of the 
media cannot be neglected by those in power; so the political players “necessarily must either find 
ways to develop symbiotic relationships with the media, or find other ways to influence or control 
media workers”79. Nonetheless, it would seem again that the power to promote certain worldviews 
while they leave others behind, is one expression of media power as well.
Couldry used the term “symbolic power”80, wanting to describe the media's “power of constructing 
reality”81.  What  or  who  gave  them this  power?  People  believe  in  the  authority  of  the  media 
discourse in many local contexts, Couldry supports; we believe “that most others believe the same, 
and because we act on the basis of these beliefs on countless specific occasions”82. And that is the 
basis of the media power; that people believe them, count on media to give them information upon 
74 Ibid., p. 205
75 Ibid.
76 Severin and Tankard, Communication Theories: Origins, Methods and Uses, White Plains, NY: Longman, 1988, pp. 
323 - 324
77 Gerbner et al., 1984, pp. 118 - 130
78 Reep and Dambrot, “Effects of frequent television viewing on stereotypes: 'drip – drip' or 'drench'?”, Journalism 
Quarterly, Vol. 66 (3), 1989, p. 556
79 Louw, 2005, p. 205
80 Couldry, The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses of the Media Age, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 4
81 Bourdieu, translated by G. Raymond and M. Adamson, Language and Symbolic Power, Cambridge: Polity, 1991, 
p. 166
82 Couldry, 2000, p. 205
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which they will discuss, act and react, within the framework the society provides us with. And the 
very same fact is what makes mass media powerful in the eyes of the governing elites, what makes 
them being unable to ignore them.
Conclusions
In this chapter the main theoretical framework about media – state relations, media pressure and 
media functioning has been given. The literature reviewed covers the main ideas that have evolved 
on the matter after it started drawing attention in the early 1990s. Partly because of the evolution of 
technology,  which  gave  way to  new  media  and  new  approaches  as  to  how  information  were 
circulated; partly due to the general debate on communication evoked through the 1970s and 1980s, 
media and their relation to both the policies designed and followed, as well as their impact on their 
audience has been examined.
As far  as  Greek – Turkish relations  are  concerned,  the  formulation  of  foreign policy designed 
regarding the other party, and its relation with the media are concerned, the theories presented in 
this chapter provide the framework within which this research is conducted.
 
Most of the current literature on media – state relations was formed within the US political reality, 
which does not necessarily make it suitable for this part of the world as well. This is mainly because 
in Greece and Turkey the idea of  national interest, the set of economic, military or cultural goals 
and ambitions of a country,  plays an important part in the way the media are presenting news, 
especially when it comes to news on Greek – Turkish relations. The fact that the two countries have 
conflicting  national  interests  in  several  matters,  mainly  as  far  as  the  Aegean  is  concerned,  is 
prominent as to the way the news stories are reported. Such is not the case, as we saw, in the US 
pattern, which was the political and executive model taken under consideration for the formulation 
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of the theories linking media with the state, the pressure the media can bring upon the executive and 
the like – in none of the theories has national interest been mentioned. However, certain aspects of 
each theory mentioned seem to apply to the case under study on this thesis.
The media coverage of an event bonded with official information is one aspect of the indexing 
hypothesis that appears to be true for Greece and Turkey, so is the possibility of the media 'taking 
sides' on a matter of policy when the way that will be followed is still debatable, a part of the media 
– policy interaction model, or the concentrated ownership status of the propaganda model. Such 
elements of each theory shall be applied to the case of Greek – Turkish relations and the influence 
the media might have on them, but none of the theories discussed can be fully applied to this case, 
since the realities of Greece and Turkey are rather different than the ones of the US; since those 
theories were formulated to fit the US model, only some main aspects of them, mostly the ones 
fitting the media concept all around the world, can be applied here as well.
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II. Media in Greece and Turkey
Introduction
Media as a concept include all means of communication; in other words all means that transfer 
information to the public. Media include newspaper, radio, television, magazines and a relatively 
new medium of transferring information, widely popular over the past fifteen years: internet; these 
communication  channels  promote  information  having  to  do  with  news,  education  and 
entertainment. Having already examined the functions of media as theoreticians have defined them 
in the First Chapter, we shall now proceed to another matter which has raised a whole conversation, 
of which the results are yet to be clarified: the function of media as an organ of influence in the 
foreign policy formulation.  
When we speak of media,  and especially about the influence they might  have in – foreign,  or 
internal -  policy formulation, we must take several facts under consideration. First, we have to 
think of the kind of regime under which the media function. Speaking of regime in our days, one 
does not only mean the political framework under which the media function, but also the set of 
structuring factors in economy or law.83 Second, we have to take under consideration the ownership 
status of the newspapers, magazines, television channels and so on. The first and second factors are 
of course interrelated in our societies, especially regarding the matter in question, since it is widely 
acknowledged that the media function not only under the political framework of the country they 
act within, but also within the framework of several interest groups as well.84 Third, one must not 
forget the relationship between the media, their owners and the government.85 Some might ask why 
this relationship is important enough to be examined; the answer shall be given if when examining a 
83 Miller, Derek, Media Pressure on Foreign Policy: The Evolving Theoretical Framework, New York: Palgrave – 
Macmillan, 2007, pp. 14 – 15 
84 Williams,Kevin, Understanding Media Theory, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2003, p. 183
85 Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of  the Mass Media, 
London: Vintage 1994, p. 13
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model of media ownership and media influence was to be born, regarding bilateral relations. This 
shall be more profoundly examined as we go along this thesis.
In this chapter the realities of the everyday function of the media in Greece and Turkey will be 
examined, such as the ownership patterns existing in both countries, the kind of power media obtain 
and their relation to the state. The examination of those patterns and their linkage to the theories 
presented on the first chapter shall be providing the framework for the case studies examined on the 
next stage.
  
Describing media in Greece and Turkey
GREECE
In Greece there are approximately 6.500 newspapers and magazines published86.  That is  a vast 
number for a population of about 11 million people. 
The  composition  of  the  Greek  printed  media  is  as  follows:  there  are  94  national  newspapers 
circulated. This total circulation can be categorized per genre; therefore, there are 10 morning, 12 
evening, 22 Sunday, 19 weekly, 6 financial and 25 sports and Monday sports87 newspapers.88 The 
most  popular  newspapers  are  the  free  press  City  Press  (271.000  readers),  followed  by  Metro 
(250.000  readers).  Among  the  daily  newspapers,  the  market  leaders  are  Kathimerini  (47.700 
copies), To Vima (44.140  copies), while the most popular in terms of readership seem to be Ta Nea 
(55.000 copies), Eleftherotypia (40.850 copies) and Ethnos (39.840 copies).89 
86 See full list on the website:  http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/index/mme_gr/list.htm and http://www.minpress.gr/e-
pasithea/Default.aspx  (accessed March 10, 2011)
87 13 and 12 respectively
88 Athens  Daily  Newspapers  Publishers  Association,  2010,  website  http://www.eihea.gr/default_en.htm     (accessed 
March 10, 2011). Also, a comparison to the 2006 circulation of newspapers in Greece is available in Sunar, 2007, 
pp. 52 - 53
89 For more information on the Greek media landscape, please visit the European Journalism Center Website: 
http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/greece/#l3  (accessed March 10, 2011)
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Lambrakis Press S.A. is the largest publishing company in Greece. The Lambrakis Group owns To 
Vima (Sunday Edition), Ta Nea and Ta Nea Sunday Edition, as well as the sport newspaper Exedra. 
Lambrakis Group owned another newspaper, To Vima Daily Edition, which was shut down due to 
the existing, since 2009, economic crisis in Greece, and was turned to a news website. To Vima, as 
well as the majority of the Lambrakis Press SA publications, is considered to be expressing center – 
left  political  stance  in  Greece.  Newspaper  publication  is  only  one  field  of  Lambrakis  Group's 
activities. It also deals with magazine publications (few of which are:  Tahidromos, Mommy, Vita,  
Marie Claire, Cosmopolitan and others); with printing with Multimedia S.A. and Iris Printing S.A., 
the second being one of the biggest printing companies in Greece; with tourism agencies; with 
terrestrial television stations: again, one of the largest and most popular television channels of the 
country, MEGA Channel, and a radio station VIMA F.M. belong to the Group; with other activities, 
like production studios90, press distribution agencies91, and internet portals – the www.in.gr website 
was  the  first  news  portal  in  Greece,  as  well  as  being  the  owner  of  a  share  of  Papasotiriou 
Bookstores.92 
Another  major  publishing  company  of  publishing  is  Pegasus  Publishing  S.A.  The  Pegasus 
Publishing  Group  publishes  five  newspapers,  Ethnos Daily  Edition,  Ethnos  Sunday  Edition, 
Aggelioforos Daily Edition, Imerisia financial newspaper and Goal News sports newspaper. Ethnos 
is representing a center – left political tendency. It also publishes several magazines such as Elle,  
Max, Astra ke Orama, Car and Driver, Idaniko Spiti, and so on – the total of magazines published 
by this group is 14. Like the Lambrakis Group, the Pegasus group as well runs an internet portal: 
www.e-go.gr.93  ,and has a share of stocks of MEGA TV channel. Under Pegasus Publishing SA 
publishing and printing companies function as well. The main stockholders of the company, the 
Bobolas family, run also corporations in different fields. The Attiki Odos SA, operating on a private 
90 Studio ATA S.A., which produces many TV series (among others) belongs to the Lambrakis Group S.A.
91 ARGOS S.A. is one of the two biggest distribution agencies in the country, this too belonging to the Group.
92 All information come from the official Lambrakis Group S.A. website: http://www.dol.gr/group.htm (accessed 
March 10, 2011)
93 All information come from the official Pegasus Publishing S.A. website: http://www.pegasus.gr (accessed March 10, 
2011)
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road network in Greece, as well as AKTOR SA, which takes up the building of major road networks 
in Greece and in the Balkans (currently in Albania and Bulgaria).
Another  publishing  group  in  Greek  media  life  is  the  Ch.  K.  Tegopoulos  Publications  S.A. 
publishing the daily Eleftherotypia, the Eleftherotypia Sunday edition (Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia), 
as well as some magazines (Epsilon, 9, Geotropio and others). Even though Eleftherotypia editors 
adopt a social – democratic stance on a number of issues, more radical viewpoints are frequently 
represented on the newspaper. Under the Tegopoulos Group also operate the affiliated companies 
PLANATECH Shipping Company (with 86,91% participation),  Mediatel Telecommunications S.A. 
(44%  participation),  Argos  S.A. press  distribution  agency  (24%  participation),  Chrisi  Efkeria 
Publications S.A. (9% participation), Fotoekdotiki Printing Company S.A. (90% participation). 94 In 
other words, apart from the publication, the Tegopoulos Group deals with industrial printing sector 
covering all stages of printing with or without paper. It is also a strategic participant in companies 
of sectors as free-to-air television, book publishing and call centers.
The SKAI - Alafouzos Media Group consists of a television channel (SKAI TV), 3 radio stations 
(SKAI 100,3 , RED 96,3 , Freedom 88,9), news website  www.skai.gr , a books publishing house 
and recently obtained95 the Kathimerini daily and Sunday edition newspaper96. Kathimerini follows 
a  more  conservative  political  line,  mainly  supporting  the  center  –  right  wing  in  Greece.  The 
Alafouzos Group runs also a shipping company. 
The Eleftheros Typos Press Institution S.A., which owns the daily Eleftheros Typos and its Sunday 
edition  Typos tis  Kyriakis,  politically affiliated with  the center  –  right  wing;  the  Apogevmatini 
Publishing Group, owning the daily Apogevmatini and its Sunday edition Apogevmatini tis Kyriakis, 
94 All information come from the Annual Financial Report 2010 of Ch. K. Tegopoulos Publications S.A., taken by 
http://www.enet.gr/ (accessed March 10, 2011)
95 Obtained Kathimerini in 2009.
96 Information by http://www.skai.gr/skai-group/ and http://portal.kathimerini.gr (accessed March 10, 2011)
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also representing the center – right wing; the Real Media S.A., which has the Real News Sunday and 
the Real FM Radio, and Proto Thema S.A. which runs the  Proto Thema Sunday newspaper are 
some of the other owners of newspapers in Greece. 
In Greece, the press is considered to be the second most preferred source of information at present, 
the  first  being  television.97 Internet  has  also  begun gaining  ground as  a  source  of  information; 
especially after the economic crisis that has hit Greece after 2009, that lead to almost all newspapers 
have internet pages displaying the content of the newspaper itself, as well as readers' opinions and 
bloggers' websites.
 
TURKEY
In  Turkey there are  currently 2.459 currently circulating  newspapers  and magazines,  a  number 
rather low compared to the population of the country. Among these, the number of national ones is 
55,  the  number of  regional  is  23 and the number of  locals  is  2.381.98 The  most  popular  daily 
newspapers  with  the  highest  circulation  are:  Zaman (800.000  copies),  Posta (510.000  copies), 
Hürriyet (450.000  copies),  Sabah (350.000  copies),  Milliyet (250.000  copies)  and  Habertürk 
(210.000 copies) 99.
Major daily newspapers are owned by conglomerates or cross media groups in Turkey; as a result 
the mass media are considered to be monopolized in a large degree.100
The Doğan Yayın Holding, Turkey's “leader in media”, as it is described in the official corporate 
profile, is the largest media group of the country. Apart from its activities in the sectors of energy, 
97 Sunar, Burcu, Meanings Beyond Words: How Turkish Media Reflect the Greek Media – A Study of News Reports, 
Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2007, p. 53
98 Sunar, 2007, p. 48
99 For more information on circulation http://dorduncukuvvetmedya.com and 
http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/turkey/#l3 (accessed March 11, 2011)
100 Sunar, 2007, p. 48
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industry, trade, financial services and tourism, the Doğan Group deals also with the publication of 
many well – known and popular newspapers in Turkey,  such as  Hürriyet,  Hürriyet Daily News 
(English edition), nationalist leaning, the liberal Radikal, Posta, Fanatik sports newspaper and has 
expanded its enterprise beyond Turkey, since it runs newspapers in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Hungary and Croatia.  Doğan Burda Dergi  Yayıncılık  ve  Pazarlama S.A.,  which  belongs  to  the 
Group, plays a leading role in magazine publication since 25 magazines are being published under 
its umbrella. This company is not the only one acting at the magazine publication; there is also 
Doğan Egmont publishes magazines for children and the Doğan Kitap publishes books. Under its 
label, the Group owns national TV channels Kanal D and Star TV and has co-operated with Time 
Warner Group in a joint venture that founded CNN Türk, TNT and Cartoon Network. Moreover, the 
Group owns 4 radio stations: Radio D, CNN Türk Radyo, Slow Türk and Radyo Moda, produces 
television  shows  and  music,  runs  a  News  Agency  (Doğan  Haber  Ajansı),  several  websites, 
distribution and retail organizations and a printing company.101
Çukurova Group is another industrial and commercial conglomerate engaged in a wide range of 
sectors such as industry,  construction,  communications,  energy,  transportation,  financial  services 
and finally, media. This group manages its newspapers, magazines, TV channels and radio stations 
under its affiliated company TurkMedya. TurkMedya S.A. owns  the nationalist Akşam and Güneş 
dailies102, several magazines, Alem FM and Lig Radyo radio stations, SkyTürk TV channel, as well 
as the Digitürk digital platform, production and media marketing companies.103
Çalık  Holding  Group is  yet  another  conglomerate  dealing  with  media,  among other  sectors  of 
activity,  such  as  textile,  energy,  construction,  finance,  telecommunications  and  mining.  Under 
Turkuvaz  Medya  Grubu  four  newspapers  operate: Sabah,  Takvim,  Yeni  Asır  and  the  sports 
newspaper  Fotomaç. Turkuvaz also manages the printing, publishing and distribution of about 25 
101 DYH official website http://www.doganholding.com.tr (accessed March 11, 2011)
102 Used to own Tercüman daily newspaper, but it was closed in June 2010.
103 TurkMedya official website www.turkmedya.com.tr (accessed March 11, 2011)
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magazines.  The  Group  also  manages  ATV  channel.  It  provides  digital  and  mobile  services, 
production, distribution and promotion agencies and a news agency.104
The next company group that has undertaken media sector along with its other activities is the Ciner 
Group. Just  like the conglomerates mentioned before,  this  Group too deals  with the sectors  of 
energy,  industry,  finance  and  trade.  Entering  the  media  sector  in  2002,  it  now  manages  the 
Habertürk newspaper, TV channel and radio station, magazines such as  Marie Claire and  Süper 
Dergi, owns the cable TV channel Bloomberg HT, a production company and a printing company.105
The Ipek Medya Grubu owns  Bugün daily newspaper, Bugün TV channel and recently obtained 
Kanaltürk TV channel, radio station and website from Ciner Group. It also runs a huge printing 
company.106 
After Demirören Company S.A., with activities in the sectors of industry, energy, construction and 
education, and Karacan's Number One Medya Grubu, mainly dealing with radio and internet media, 
joined  forces,  a  new company emerged:  DK Gazetecilik  ve  Yayıncılık  S.A.  This  joint  venture 
obtained Doğan Media Group's, nationalist leaning,  Vatan and  Milliyet daily newspapers in April 
2011.107
Ihlas Holding Medya – Ihlas Gazetecilik S.A. owns the pro-Islamic daily  Türkiye,  along with a 
news agency, Ihlas Haber Ajansı (IHA), TGRT News TV channel and publishes several magazines, 
while at the same time specializes in construction, education, packaging and trade.108
104 For more information on this group, please check http://www.calik.com and http://www.turkuvazyayin.com.tr/ 
(accessed March 11, 2011)
105 Information from the website http://www.cinergroup.com.tr (accessed March 11, 2011)
106 For more information, check http://ipekmedya.com.tr/ (accessed March 11, 2011)
107 Information from the websites http://www.demiroren.com.tr  and http://www.numberone.com.tr/nr1 (accessed 
March 11, 2011)
108 Taken from the website http://www.ihlas.com.tr (accessed March 11, 2011)
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Feza  Gazetecilik  S.A.  publishes  the  liberal  /  moderate  Islamic  Zaman and  Today's  Zaman 
newspapers109; Samanyolu Yayın Grubu  owns a news agency, three radio stations, a TV channel 
and a television program production company110. The two groups are interrelated thus creating a 
small cross media group standing for pro-Islamic tendencies.111
As opposed  to  the  aforementioned  newspapers,  which  belong  to  either  cross  media  groups  or 
conglomerates, or even joint ventures, Birgün daily newspaper is supposed to have been founded by 
journalists opposing to the monopoly of the media by conglomerates.112 Other newspapers are Yeni  
Şafak, Yeni Akit  and Milli Gazete, Cumhuriyet – known as the voice of the Kemalists and  Özgür 
Gündem – known to be the voice of the Kurdish nationalists of Turkey.113
But why are those facts important? Why is it important to whom the newspapers we gather our 
information from belong? As observed from the facts mentioned in this chapter, a new ownership 
pattern has occurred in both Greece and Turkey, as it has also occurred all around the world since 
the 1980s. This pattern, the concentration of the media companies on the hands that have or had 
little to do with media, affect both the quality and the way of presentation of the information the 
public has access to. Which, in turn, plays an important role in terms of influence. It should not be 
forgotten, and shall also be discussed later on, that the media gain their power by their capacity to 
influence  the  public  opinion.  The  fact  that  people  other  than  media  professionals,  protecting 
different kinds of interests (that are mostly connected to profit), have access to what and how is 
being published, can work as a leverage on behalf of the media owners towards the state officials. 
The same pattern, though in different terms, can be seen in the propaganda model of Herman and 
Chomsky. They proposed that concentrated ownership is the first “filter” of their model; the non-
media  companies  having  interests  in  the  media  field  are  propagating  those  interests,  and  the 
109 For more information, see http://www.zaman.com.tr/ and http://www.todayszaman.com (accessed March 11, 2011)
110 See http://www.samanyolu.com.tr (accessed March 11, 2011)
111 Sunar, 2007, pp. 48 - 49
112 Baris, 2006 cited in Sunar, 2007, p.49 and official website of the newspaper http://www.birgun.net/ (accessed March 
11, 2011)
113 Sunar, 2007, p. 49
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possibility of them actually being able to influence certain policies to the benefit of their non – 
media companies, is present.
The Impact of Media in Foreign Policy Formulation
A. The Ownership Pattern in Greece and Turkey
Ownership status of the mass media can really affect the way, as well as the kind of information the 
public gets to obtain. In any theory of mass media observed however, the ownership status of the 
mass media tends either to be neglected, or  to be treated as the “bully” who shakes the government 
using its company and the influence it exercises to the public to get what they want, to turn the 
public's attention away from the real problems, or to be the “watchdog” the state must take into 
consideration or even fear, or even to propagate certain ideas that the public embraces after it has 
fallen in the propagandist “trap” the government and owners of the mass media have set for it.
Partly true, partly not, the fact is that the mass media are thought of influencing the public much, 
and even though the influence itself we cannot count, the mainstream belief of the mass media 
being able to shake the government, to change policies or to be the one “authority” politicians do 
not want to mess up with, unless it suits their purposes, remains. But when we talk of the power of 
the mass media to influence, we have to put a face to what we call mass media. In Greece and 
Turkey what is being published on the media is decided after a top-down procedure taking place, 
during which the suggestions of the owner of the communication channel are taken under serious 
consideration, then the chief – editor's or the ideas of other people strongly interrelated with the 
media organization, and then the rest of the stuff's (journalists') suggestions.114 
114 Tılıç, Doğan, Η Δημοσιογραφία στην Ελλάδα και στην Τουρκία “Ντρέπομαι, αλλά είμαι δημοσιογράφος” , 
Μετάφραση Ηλίας Κολοβός, Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Παπαζήση, 2000, pp. 326 – 328 (Journalism in Greece and Turkey “I 
am embarrassed to be a journalist”)
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Given that in Greece and Turkey the mass media organizations, or at least most of them, as we have 
seen in the first part of this chapter, are since the 1980s owned by conglomerates, the main financial 
source of which is not the media sector115, or by cross groups; and adding to that fact that most of 
Greek and Turkish journalists know that the medium they are working at follows a very specific 
political belief (usually the one the media owner embraces), the boundaries of which are not to be 
crossed by the journalists working for the medium116, it would seem that the face, upon which the 
influence the media might have on what is being published and what is not, can be ascribed to none 
other than the owner(s) of the medium.117 
Whereas the agenda of every medium can be  – but not necessarily is – influenced by its owner 
(among others  –  such as the chief  – editor,  the commercial  department  of  the medium, or  the 
journalists), we are yet to examine if the same thing happens to the agenda of the government of a 
country; and, more specifically, if the same thing could happen when we speak of foreign policy 
formulation in the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey.  
The mass media function in the four ways that have already been discussed in the first chapter of 
this thesis, that is, the three major social functions of the media: surveillance, through which the 
media give society the ability to observe changes happening around it and  provides individuals 
with the opportunity to identify threats and opportunities; correlation, a function of interpretation of 
events and changes, bringing individuals of the society together to respond to the observed changes; 
and transmission, which leads to the passing from one generation to the next of cultural and social 
heritage118 – also known as the educational function of the media. Wright added the function of 
115 Ibid., p. 387
116 Ibid., pp. 331 - 335
117 The owner's influence begins from within the media organization they run. For instance, a journalist that has 
discovered a scandal in one of the companies owned by the same owner of the medium they are working at, cannot 
publish it without facing the consequences. Tılıç, p. 331
118 See Lasswell, 1948, “The Structure and Function of Communication in Society” in Schramm and Roberts (eds.)
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entertainment119.  A fifth function has been added to  those,  the agenda – setting function of the 
media120, which began as a theory, but was later generally accepted as a function of the media. It is 
also expected from the media to be functioning as “watchdogs” as well. This idea holds that the 
media work as a “safeguard” or the correct functioning of the policies in a state, revealing any 
mischief conducted by the executives, exposing them in such cases, thus 'making things right'. The 
“watchdog”, being the eyes of the public opinion, can work prohibitively for the members of the 
executive who might feel tempted by the power they gained when they came in office and might 
decide to manipulate this power. 
In these functions lies the widespread belief that the media can influence the public, by presenting 
and interpreting news and facts which the individuals are called on to accept or react, by spreading 
common values to a society, while entertaining it and telling it “not what to think, but what to think 
about”121;  and the  government,  mainly by setting the agenda and transmitting the reactions and 
opinions of the public, serving as a social platform for dialogue among the pressure groups and the 
government. We must not forget that the members of the government, or the parliament, or the 
opposition parties in Greece and Turkey should be conceived as the public as well, since they obtain 
a lot of the information they use by the media. This same group is the provider / source of the 
information the media share (or do not share) with the public.       
But the media do not only serve as agenda – setters, do not just suggest to the public to what kind of 
news they need to attach importance to, they are not here to play merely the role of informing, 
entertaining  and transmitting  values,  nor  is  the  influence  they might  have  directed  only to  the 
public. The media have become interrelated with both the way the designers of policy make their 
decisions and the way the public gets to know of them. It is not easy for a government official that 
119 For more information check Wright, Mass Communication: A Sociological Perspective, New York: Random House, 
1959
120 McCombs and Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media”, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.36, 1972
121 Lippman quoted in Cohen, 1963, The Press and Foreign Policy, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 13
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needs to make a decision to ignore the media; after all, they are whom he shall get help from to get 
re-elected. For instance, for a Greek or Turkish Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
design a policy that would bring the two countries closer, while the media would choose to transmit 
stereotypes  or  opinions  opposed to  this  policy,  might  actually jeopardize  the  realization  of  the 
policy, or, at least, the rhetoric followed by the administrative as the policy in question is concerned. 
In 2004, when the population of Cyprus had to vote for or against the Annan Plan, Prime Minister 
of Greece, Karamanlis, had at first declared his support to the Plan as a solution for the Cyprus 
issue. After the Greek – Cypriots voted against the Annan Plan, and while media had shown little, if 
any, support to the Prime Minister's decision to support the Plan, the executives utterly changed the 
rhetoric, stopped supporting the Annan Plan as a solution for the Cyprus issue and showed their 
respect to the decision of the Greek – Cypriots in any possible way, involving public declarations of 
support and the like. I am not suggesting of course that the media were the only factor playing a role 
on  this  shift  in  the  Greek  government's  rhetoric,  it  was,  however,  a  factor  that  should  not  be 
overlooked.  Ever  since  the  technology  of  the  media  started  evolving,  the  politicians  in  every 
country understood the influence they might have on people. To ignore them would mean to lose 
any opportunity to use them for political and diplomatic purposes. The media can affect the public 
in many ways, especially by letting people know what goes on behind closed doors.
The owners of conglomerates understood the impact the control of the media could have on their 
businesses  and,  without  having  a  clue  about  the  media  world,  decided  to  enter  the  sector  and 
managed  it  by acquiring  large  newspapers  and  television  channels,  radio  stations  and  internet 
portals, thus managing to influence both the agenda, and the policies that could harm or give a boost 
to their other operations. Sönmez suggests that the entrance of conglomerates in the media sector 
cannot be explained, if we speak in financial terms alone, since the other sectors they are already 
employed in bring in more profit122; thus, getting involved with a sector which brings solid profit, 
such as construction or shipping, makes sense; getting involved with a sector lacking this potential, 
122 Sönmez, 1996, p. 79
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such as media, cannot be out of concern for the financial upgrade of the firm. The owners of the 
corporations  use  the  media  to  serve  their  best  interests123,  by  exercising  pressure  upon  their 
antagonists or those who have the power to keep them from maximizing their profit.
This  situation  clearly  has  an  effect  on  the  media's  relationship  with  the  state.  This  is  easily 
understood  because  when  the  government  collaborates  with,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  a 
construction company which is building a bridge for it, and after a while this same company enters 
the media sector, it is only normal that the construction company used as an example, will use the 
connections it might have in the government to retrieve information sources, or to put pressure on it 
to get a new project.
We shall now dive deeper into the relations between the media and the state, in order to understand 
better the relationship they have and how this serves our purpose to search for the influence the 
media might have in the foreign policy formulation,  as far as the two neighboring countries of 
Greece and Turkey are concerned.
B. Relations of the media with the state
According to the research Tılıç conducted with interviews to members of the media in Greece and 
Turkey, in both countries the relationship of the media with the state seems to apply to “the carrot 
and the stick” policy.124  Tılıç  supports  that  ever  since journalism was born,  its  representatives 
always had to connect with state officials, since the bureaucracy of the state is one of the most 
important sources of information for the media. Both Greeks and Turks agree, when they are asked 
to name few of their sources, that the state is their primary source of information.125 This carrot and 
stick policy followed by the state can easily be identified: it comes in the form of cheap loans to the 
media, or by financial support, subventions and the like. The stick however, is a little less obvious, 
123 Tılıç, 2000, p. 360
124 Ibid., chapter 10, pp. 394 - 442
125 Ibid., pp. 394 - 395
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in times of democratic rule anyway126. It is easier to identify censorship, than it is to identify every 
single law that leaves out of the touch of media a category of news; as was for instance the law of 
Turkey which  prevented  journalists  to  write  anything  that  could be thought  of  as  “secessionist 
propaganda”127.
Even though in Greece journalists do not feel threatened by the state at all (in fact, most of the 
journalists Tılıç interviewed supported that there is no form of state control on the media field), the 
“stick” can be conceived as the officials excluding journalists from the access on information.128 In 
Turkey,  the  “stick” policy involves  imprisonment,  among other  practices,  especially during the 
1990s.129 As Turkish journalists suggest, there is also indirect pressure from the legislation regarding 
the media; direct recommendations by officials as to what shall be published and what should not; 
the communication channels supporting opposition are being silenced, basically by financial means 
and exclusion from the access to information.130
The huge conglomerates which the most well-known media belong to  (in  Greece and Turkey), 
systematically support the political regime (or the opposition party, hoping that one day it shall 
come to power) and the system itself. Certainly, the political parties, once they rise to power, are to 
return the “favor”, to support their political friends by any means available to them – those being 
mainly financial support, cheap loans and the like.131 However, the relationship does not seize to 
exist,  once  the  favor  is  returned.  The  access  of  information,  or  even  the  speed  on  access  of 
information, is an evidence of this on-going relationship. For instance, the political party which was 
supported by a communication channel comes to power, and, even though it shares information 
126 Emphasizing this part “in times of democratic rule anyway”, due to the past of both Greek and Turkey political 
reality, since they both had to face juntas at some point of their history, when censorship was a common practice, as 
well as other “stick” policies – at times when the “carrot” policy seemed to be nowhere to be found.
127 Ibid., p. 398
128 Tılıç, 2000, p. 437
129 In 1996 Turkey had 79 journalists imprisoned, while the total number for imprisoned journalists around the world 
was 185. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, at least 57 journalists are currently 
imprisoned in Turkey, while 10 more are awaiting trial. This is more jailed journalists than any other country at the 
moment.
130 Tılıç, 2000, pp. 439 - 440
131 Tılıç, p. 404
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with all other communication channels, it has the ability to pass on the information earlier to its 
supporters.
Herman and Chomsky suggest that in the world, as we know it today, the role of the media cannot 
be fulfilled, unless they work as organs of systematic propaganda, that serves the purposes of a 
dominant elite132.  There is a structural  relationship between the media companies and the state, 
which, we could say, supports the above statement: the media networks, stations, channels, press 
organizations  need  to  acquire  government  licenses,  thus  being  subjected  to  state  control.  This 
“technical legal dependency”, as Herman and Chomsky call it133, can be used as a leverage in the 
agenda – setting function of the media and the revelation of “inconvenient” truth to the public. And 
this is how the state takes advantage of the media to create certain ideas about identity, the “enemy” 
of the country, and so on, thus propagating instead of being bearers of facts and events. 
The constitutional basis of media ownership in Greece derives from paragraph no. 9 of Article 19. 
This  paragraph  outlines  the  obligations  for  media  outlets  to  register  ownership  status  and 
information regarding the financing of the outlet. Concentration of ownership is directly prohibited. 
Moreover,  the  National  Council  for  Radio  and  Television  (NCRTV)  was  established  by  law 
(1866/1989)  as  the  main  regulatory  body in  broadcast  sector.  The  Council  is  involved  in  the 
procedure  of  granting  licenses,  making  sure  that  license  –  holders  respect  relevant  laws  and 
imposing penalties for violations. In some cases, it even has the power to suspend / cancel licenses. 
Still, even after NCRTV was established, problems continued to emerge. For example, as far as 
television is concerned, 8 private national and 3 regional and local TV stations have official license, 
while another 123 have applied for it. Some of those 123 TV channels operate without license.134 In 
Turkey, the situation is somewhat worse in that field. While an organ similar in function with the 
132 Herman and Chomsky, 1994, p. 1
133 Ibid., p. 13
134 For more information please visit: http://ejc.net/media   and http://ejc.net/media_landscape/article/greece/#I3 
(accessed March 17, 2011)
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NCRTV, the RTÜK (Radio Television Supreme Council) was established in Turkey in 1994135,still 
all terrestrial radio and TV stations continue operating without licenses136. Hence, in both cases, the 
state has the capacity to put pressure on the media on the grounds of them not having obtained the 
official license and are operating illegally, or can withdraw the license, or force the communication 
channels to seizing to exist by applying penalties.
On the other hand, the media need “a steady, reliable flow of raw material of news”137 in order to 
survive. Having seen that the main body of information for the media comes from official (state) 
sources,  the  mass  media  are  “drawn  into  a  symbiotic  relationship  with  powerful  sources  of 
information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest”138. Which brings us to the question of 
how the media acquire the information they publish, especially information that have to do with 
foreign policy. 
C. Access to information
In both Greece and Turkey, the information on  matters of foreign policy come mainly from the 
state; which is only normal, since the state itself is the one responsible for it. What is not, however, 
responding to what journalism in general, and functions of the media stand for, is the fact that in 
both countries, the journalists writing about “national matters” think it to be impossible to write 
something different than the official government position on a specific matter.139 Examining the 
propaganda model, which is based on the relation between power and state, supporting that the 
media are being used by the dominant elite (in this case the state), to support its interests and get its 
messages across to the public140, one can observe this pattern of identification of the sources of 
135 The responsibilities  of  RTÜK included  assigning frequencies  and  issuing broadcasting permits  and licenses  to 
private companies, as well as giving penalties to the broadcasters. 
136 For more information please visit: http://ejc.net/media and http://ejc.net/media_landscape/article/turkey/#I3 
(accessed March 11, 2011)
137 Herman and Chomsky, 1994, p. 18
138 Ibid.
139 Tılıç, 2000, p. 415
140 Herman and Chomsky, 1994, pp. 1-2
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information with officials, who have the power to share the information they have access to, or even 
suppress them, when they believe it to be necessary. This leads to certain ideas reaching the public, 
and others not to, thus creating a specific climate, specific concepts in the minds of the people.141 
For instance, the fact that Greeks and Turks perceive each other as an enemy, or did so in the not so 
distant past, is the result of years of them being “fed” this idea, through media and education. It is 
unimaginable for a Greek or a Turk journalist to follow a line different than the one that has been 
drawn from the main state ideology. Under these circumstances, the journalist seizes to speak out 
the truth, or even to search for it, and their job applies to the rules of propaganda.142
According to  Tılıç, the most important criterion to identify acts of propaganda taking place is to 
search if an effort to spread official ideas and official data, in a very systematic way, is taking place; 
so that certain concepts are created in the minds of people, their way of thinking is manipulated and 
the results from the propaganda are positive to the propagandist. Also, Tılıç suggests, in media the 
concept of propaganda means the production and transmission of news in a top – down procedure 
and within a patronizing relationship143.
Within this “where do I get the information I need to have my news?” framework, the journalists do 
not  only think of the official  line they will  not  deviate from; they also have to think of the – 
sometimes rather vague - “national interest” concept they feel they have to defend, as well as the 
taboos existing in a society. The belief that “one must not write about an issue that would harm the 
national interests of their country, even if it is true” is rather common in Greece and Turkey.144 
In addition to all these, the contemporary debate on media – state relations and decision – making 
process commands that the media maintains the power to shape the agenda through the influence 
141 Herman, Beyond Hypocrisy – Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda, Boston, MA: South End Press, 1992, 
p. 5
142 Tılıç, 2000, p. 415 and p. 417
143 Tılıç, 2000, p. 416
144 Ibid., p. 420
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they sustain over the public opinion.145 
 D. The Role of Media in the Formulation of Foreign Policy
After having presented the ownership status of the mass media in Greece and Turkey, their relations 
with  the  state  and  how  they  obtain  information  and  create  news,  the  time  has  come  for  the 
framework of the media's influence on the formulation of foreign policy to be examined, more 
appropriate for Greece and Turkey. Several models have been created to explain the influence the 
media can have upon foreign policy formulation, what it is, how it works and so on. Here, only few 
of  them are  presented,  the  ones  whose  application  upon  Greek  and  Turkish  realities  shall  be 
examined in the following chapter. 
 
Robinson  has  described  media  as  “consent  manufacturers”146.  The  mass  media  are  simply,  he 
suggests, promoting government foreign policy. He goes on by stating that the extent to which the 
media have any effect on foreign policy formulation – or internal policy formulation, for that matter 
– depends upon three variables:  how united the governing elite are;  the extent of controversies 
within the policy elite; and the extent to which the executive has a firm policy147. Consequently, if 
the governing elites are united over the policy that is being designed, the media show the tendency 
to help them “manufacture consent”, so that these policies be implemented. In such cases, the media 
do not have any influence on foreign policy formulation. If, on the other hand, controversies within 
the elite exist, the media will reflect these; but, should, as opposed to their differences, the elites 
come to the formulation of a policy, the media can, again, not influence the policy formulation148. 
145 Miller, 2007, p. 21
146 Robinson, 2002, p. 31. “Manufacturing consent” is a term firstly used by Walter Lippmann. This phrase was then 
taken to the title of Herman and Chomsky “Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media” 
(1998). Summing the argument being made, it refers to the media's serving to mobilize support for the special 
interests that dominate the state activity.
147 Ibid.
148 Bennett, “Towards a Theory of Press – State Relations in the United States”, Journal of Communication, Vol. 40 (2) 
1990, pp. 103 – 125 – same opinion reflected on Hallin, The Uncensored War. The Media and Vietnam., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986
60
When these conditions apply, adds Louw, the media balance them by affirming government foreign 
policy directions, “largely because there exists a policy direction which the government promotes 
through its publicity machinery”149. Therefore, this role of the media suggests that they are merely 
the helpers of the governing elites to “manufacture consent”.
The “carrot and stick” policy followed in Greece and Turkey, as far as media are concerned150, along 
with  the  acknowledgment  by journalists  in  both  countries  that  they  actually  conceive  it  to  be 
unthinkable to follow a line different from the one the state has drawn151, give out a hint about the 
media accepting their role as “consent manufacturers” in the foreign policy formulation framework 
in both countries. Having seen the complexity of their relationship with both the state and their 
owners though, we can also find some other ways that the media get involved in this procedure as 
well.
Another view of the media's role within foreign policy formulation is their being thought of as 
“lapdogs”; as tools of the ruling class (Marxist view)152. This statement suggests that every context 
has  a  “dominant  class  /  class  alliance”153 and  that  dominant  class  have  the  power  to  develop 
mechanisms  ensuring  that  the  ideas  and  worldviews  in  circulation  “are  appropriate  to  the 
reproduction of the existing social order”154.
This is also depicted in Herman and Chomsky's work. While presenting their propaganda model, 
they  state  that,  by  being  used  several  ways,  at  times  obvious  (such  as  being  the  subject  of 
censorship), at times less obvious (when the state bureaucracy uses news “filters”155), “media serve 
the ends of a dominant elite”156.
149 Louw, 2005, p. 259
150 Tılıç, 2000, p. 394
151 Ibid., pp. 404 and 415
152 Louw, 2005, p. 260
153  Louw, 2005, p. 260
154  Ibid.
155  Noam and Chomsky, 1994, p. 2
156  Ibid., p. 1
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When Tılıç interviewed journalists from both sides of the Aegean, they revealed that, whereas they 
did not think of themselves as propagandists, they believed that many of their colleagues were.157 
However, Tılıç suggests, the people of the media have predefined views of the world, especially in 
matters of foreign policy; and that one of these predefined views is that they are not to write or 
publish anything that would harm the national interests of their country, even if what they have 
learned and decided not to publish is true.158
Media  can  also  undertake  the  role  of  the  “watchdog”,  not  only  in  foreign  policy  formulation 
process, but in any form of political discourse. This role presupposes that journalists do not just 
accept what they are being told by government officials, but dig in deeper in search of the real 
circumstances,  acting  as  “critical  eyes  and  ears”  of  the  masses159.  This  independent  watchdog 
notion, however often it might be met in liberal democracies, is often seen in Greece and Turkey 
under  the  circumstances  of  crises  or  wide  public  disapproval  of  the  policy  followed  by  the 
government.  Liberal  journalists  usually  believe  that  they  can  challenge  the  authority  of  the 
governing  elites  and  become  actors  within  the  policy  process,  especially  by  placing  the  mass 
public's  views  onto  the  agenda  and  by making  the  decision  –  makers  pay attention  to  public 
opinion160.
In their search for truth, the journalists in Greece and Turkey do not forget that they cannot, or will 
not, make news any event -truthful as that may be- they come across. What makes it to the front 
page, or even what makes it to being published, has to do with what the public wants to or expects 
to see published and fits its beliefs and values161; and, as we saw earlier in this essay, with the lines 
that both the governing elites and the owners of the mass media have drawn, and are expected to be 
followed by the media workers. However, in times of crises or of controversial attitudes within the 
157  Tılıç, 2000, p. 416
158  Ibid., pp. 419 - 420
159  Louw, 2005, p. 261
160  Ibid.
161  Tılıç, 2000, p. 529
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governing elite, or in times of denial on behalf of the public to support the governing elite's policies, 
there  lies  a  chance  for  the  Greek  and Turkish media to  take a  break  from being  “lapdogs”  or 
“consent manufacturers”, and become what their workers appear to be having in mind about their 
occupations: reveal the truth162 and become “watchdogs”. 
Media can also play the role of diplomatic channels in the rare cases -in Greek – Turkish relations 
framework at least-  of interruption of diplomatic relations and communications. Even though being 
the replacement for the diplomatic channels themselves is a crucial and delicate role, the media 
could succeed in this  role.  In  such cases  “(the media)  become conduits  for official  exchanges,  
reluctant  publicists  for  the  actors,  and  valuable  sources  for  information  for  governments”163. 
However, this proposal can work only in extraordinary cases, when all other means fail to produce 
an  outcome,  since  this  “megaphone  diplomacy”164 ignores  the  fact  that  diplomacy  involves 
compromises the media are not in position to make.
Louw has described the next role of media in foreign policy formulation as “morality play”165. This 
perspective role suggests that the media indeed have an effect in the procedure for two reasons; the 
first being that policy makers are personally influenced by emotive stories, and the second that the 
media assumed, due to the fact of the mass public being a part of democratic policy making, to be 
able to shift public opinion.166 
Media can also be seen as powerless in the formulation of foreign policy, as having no effect in the 
procedure at all. Since all the official information and considerations on foreign policy matters lie 
on the hands of the governing elites, and the media can only use the public's considerations on 
matters of foreign affairs, and so much as the information they have obtained by the state officials, 
162  Ibid, p. 521
163  Mowlana, “The Media and Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis”, in A. Malek (ed), News Media and Foreign 
Relations. A Multifaceted Perspective, Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1998, p. 36
164  Louw, 2005, p. 262
165  Louw, 2005, p. 262
166  Ibid.
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their stories can only provoke “moral outcries”167, upon which alone the design of foreign policy 
cannot be based. Mowlana suggests that policy elites, professional foreign policy makers, are the 
ones that lead on this “dance”168, with the mass media following the path that has been paved for 
them.  Ironically  enough,  they  are  also  used  as  “convenient  scapegoats”,  with  policy  makers 
implying that the media influenced a policy that failed, adds Louw.169
Within the framework of information sources examined earlier, this pattern seems to fall into place 
when we speak of Greek and Turkish media. It is a pattern we shall examine more thoroughly in the 
next chapter, among others.
A feature  of  the  media  we  should  not  forget  when  examining  their  relation  to  foreign  policy 
formulation,  and the importance of which cannot be denied,  is the fact that  the media help the 
governing elites to keep the mass public in broad agreement with government foreign policy – 
should the foreign policy change, the media will shift the position, which they had up to that point 
supported,  to  fit  the  government's  foreign  relation  agenda,  thus  enabling  the  government  to 
implement a legitimized by the public foreign policy.170 In other words, the government need the 
support of its population if it is to proceed to a foreign policy initiative. And it also needs the media 
coverage to be sympathetic towards this initiative, so as to gain the support it needs by the public to 
proceed with its workings. 
The media can influence foreign policy formulation in all the above – mentioned ways. But the 
question remains: are the media always able of influencing the foreign policy formulation? Louw, 
adopting some of Robinson's criteria171, supports that in order for the media to have some kind of 
impact  on the  foreign  policy formulation,  the  following criteria  have  to  be  met:  firstly,  policy 
167  Ibid., pp. 265 - 266
168  Mowlana, 1998, p. 31
169  Louw, 2005, pp. 265 - 266
170  Louw, 2005, p. 269
171  Robinson, 2002, p. 31
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makers have to gain in some way from “using” the stories of the media; secondly, policy makers 
have to be divided over a matter172.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined the way the media function, the mass media ownership pattern in 
Greece and Turkey, the relationship of the media with the state, the power of the media and its 
expressions  and  some  models  concerning  the  roles  the  media  can  have  on  foreign  policy 
formulation.
After mixing and matching media theories with media realities in Greece and Turkey, it would be 
useful,  I  believe,  to sum up some observations before proceeding to the next chapter,  to  avoid 
confusion in the matter in question.
The mass media ownership status follows a pretty much alike pattern in both Greece and Turkey, 
which is not change to the rest of the world either. After having seen in detail what the ownership 
situation of the mass media is like, the following have been observed:
1. media in both countries are basically owned by conglomerates or cross groups;
2. owners of the mass media are involved and have a saying on what is being published;
3. each media company follows a special pattern of ideas, a specific political line; usually that of the 
owner or the group's the interests of which the owner supports;
4. owners of conglomerates that have been involved in the media business, gain solid profit from 
activities other than the media; had formerly not any particular knowledge of how the media world 
works, and entered this sector for reasons other than profit,  once they realized that media were 
capable to influence those in power. 
As  far  as  the  relationship  of  the  media  with  the  state is  concerned,  we  have  to  focus  on  the 
172  Louw, 2005, pp. 262 - 263
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following points:
• In Greece and Turkey the relationship of the media with the state applies to the “carrot and 
stick” policy;173
• in both countries, at least as far as foreign policy is concerned, state officials are one of the 
primary sources of information for the media workers – a relationship of dependence of the 
state, on behalf of the media, is observed;
• usually the media support the system174;
• generally  there  is  a  symbiotic  relationship  between  mass  media  and  the  state,  due  to 
reciprocity of interests and economic necessity;
• media  workers  in  both  Greece  and  Turkey  refuse  to  appear  being  opposed  to  the 
government's position in national matters.175
In chapter 1, the ways in which media power is expressed have been examined:
• the  media  have  the  power  to  set  the  agenda.  They can  provoke  people's  thinking  and 
discussing specific matters, while they can ignore or suppress other matters from being on 
the public agenda;
• power of the media lies in their popularity as means of obtaining information. They have 
become inseparable part of individuals' daily lives;
• the media have the power to help the state legitimize the policies followed by it,  or  to 
provoke de – legitimization in the eyes of the public, thus preventing a policy from being 
implemented – therefore, have the power to put pressure on the government;
• they have the power (and the responsibility) to express the diversity existing in society;
173 Tılıç, 2000, see earlier in this chapter.
174  As we have seen, generally the media company's owner supports a political party or ideology or view attached to 
the system. Since, however, they have the power to put pressure on the journalists / meaning makers working for 
them, they support the same view. This is not to say that they are forced, since most of them know that when 
working in, for instance, a newspaper supporting the opposition party, they are expected to report on how bad the 
government is doing. Most of the media workers indeed share the same political beliefs as the medium they work at 
supports.
175 Tılıç, 2000, chapter 10
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• media function as inter-mediators between the mass public and the governing elite;
• the media have the power to cultivate certain worldview's in audiences' ways of thinking and 
acting;
• they have the power of constructing reality;
• the power of the media is  rooted in their  functions  and depends on whether  the public 
believes what they publish.
Last, we have seen several models of the  role the media can play in the formulation of foreign 
policy:
1. media as “consent manufacturers”;
2. media as “lapdogs”;
3. media as “watchdogs”;
4. media as diplomatic channels;
5. media as “morality play”;
6. media as powerless.
Keeping all those observations in mind, we shall proceed to the next step of the media's role in the 
formulation of foreign policy in Greece and Turkey, since 2004.
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III. Greek – Turkish Relations
Formulation of Foreign Policy within the Media Framework
Introduction
Greeks and Turks share more similarities than differences. The members of the two nations look 
very much alike physically, share the same way of life, eat the same foods, entertain themselves 
with the same ways, share the same mentality and current culture. It is thus hard to imagine them 
criticizing each other; and yet they do176. Historically, Greece and Turkey have perceived each other 
as enemies. Why that is, has been studied again and again; the issues they have to settle between 
them may not be much, yet they are not insignificant either. 
This perception of the neighbor as a “historical and national enemy”177 seems to be changing over 
the  past  12  years.  1999  was  the  decisive  point  in  the  relations  between  Greece  and  Turkey. 
Following years  of  tension between the  two countries  in  several  occasions,  such as  the  Imia / 
Kardak crisis or the veto on behalf of Greece on Turkey's running for candidate member in the EU, 
it ended up being the year mostly studied by all those interested in Greek – Turkish relations. After 
the disastrous earthquakes that struck both Turkey and Greece, the neighbor immediately responded 
by sending help to the other, the enemy. It was the beginning of what later came to be known as the 
“earthquake  diplomacy”,  and  led  the  two  governments  to  proceed  towards  cooperation  and 
improvement of their relations. During the same year, the Greek government abandoned the veto to 
the candidacy of Turkey for full membership in the European Union178, a veto that was blocking any 
positive development for Turkey – EU perspective, thus promoting the improvement both countries 
had sought to bring about to their relations.
176 Sunar, Meanings Beyond Words: How Turkish Media Reflect the Greek Media – A Study of News Reports, Istanbul: 
Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2007, pp. 36 - 37
177 Ibid., p. 1
178 Keep in mind that in Greece the veto was always presented as a great achievement on behalf of the Greek 
government, while in Turkey was seen as the main problem in its accession in the EU.
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Even though the rapprochement managed to be achieved in a political context, there are still some 
voices, in both sides of the Aegean, considering the other party as the “aggressor” and the “threat”, 
while  at  the same time,  assuming itself  to be “the positive,  solution oriented,  constructive side 
which is also too intrepid to shy off the aggressive or provocative moves of the other”179.
For understanding whether the media can or cannot have an effect on the formulation of foreign 
policy concerning the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey, news reports will be examined, in 
selected dates preceding and following the events chosen; the tone those reports were written under, 
the words and idioms used, as well as the official reaction to the events and to the news reports will 
be researched, in order to get to a logical explanation of the media role on the matter in question. 
The newspapers selected to be examined are Greek  Eleftherotypia and  Kathimerini, and Turkish 
Hürriyet and Zaman. Apart from being mainstream media, they are also very popular (in circulation 
and reading terms), and get published online as well. In addition, many of the journalists working 
for those newspapers also write on blogs, expressing more or less the same ideas they express when 
writing for the newspapers; thus, by checking the reports of those communication channels, another 
new medium will indirectly be examined: that of the internet.
Before  proceeding  to  examine  the  media's  role  in  foreign  policy formulation,  concerning  their 
bilateral relations, we first need to know what the official positions  Greece and Turkey stand upon 
as far as “the neighbor” is concerned.
Official stances of Greece and Turkey about each other
The official position of the two countries, concerning the neighbor, as this is displayed by official 
channels, such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both parties shall now be examined.
179 Sunar, 2007, p. 38
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Greece
Greece's foreign policy is formulated based on a set of principles related with stability in the region, 
inviolability of the borders,  peaceful settlement of disputes according to International Law, and 
respect of human rights. Greece's foreign policy towards Turkey is designed and implemented on 
the basis of this framework.
Greece recognizes the Cyprus issue as a great parameter in Greek – Turkish relations. It supports 
that the Cyprus issue and any progress or set-back concerning the matter always influences the 
bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. It is its belief that a possible solution of the Cyprus 
issue would contribute to the improving of the relations between the two parties as well.
Greece  identifies  as  points  of  friction between the  two parties  the  following:  Turkey has  been 
contesting the sovereign rights of Greece in the Aegean; specifically Greece's sovereignty over a 
number of islands, islets and atolls in the Eastern Aegean, the Greek jurisdiction over the Athens 
FIR, Greek air space; it also questions Greece's right to extend its territorial waters and is seeking to 
achieve the general  demilitarization of the islands of Eastern Aegean;  and there is  the issue of 
delimitation of the Continental Shelf, a dispute that Greece recognizes as the “only legal difference” 
between Greece and Turkey.  On those matters,  Greece's  official  stance is  that  the status of the 
Aegean  is  non  –  negotiable,  since  it  has  been  clearly  determined  by  International  Law  and 
International  Agreements,  and  that  the  only  matter  that  needs  to  be  solved,  according  to 
International Law, is the delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Aegean.
As far  as  the EU prospects  of  Turkey are  considered,  Greece  supports  the  prospect  of  Turkey 
becoming a full member of the EU, under the presupposition that all terms and conditions applying 
to all other members should have been met before Turkey's full accession to the EU. It is the strong 
belief  of  Greece  that  Turkey's  adoption  of  the  acquis  communautaire  as  the  procedure  of  its 
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accession  moves  along,  and  the  Greek –  Turkish  rapprochement  on  issues  of  soft  policy,  will 
contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations.
Representatives of every aspect of society have managed to bring closer than ever the two countries, 
improving steadily their bilateral relations and widening the spectrum of collaboration between the 
two countries on issues of mutual interest that are not politically sensitive. Since the earthquakes 
that hit both countries in 1999, and the assistance provided by both nations to each other, there have 
been many contacts between the countries, not only in official / state level, but in so many other 
levels as well; contacts that led to the reduction of the information gap existing in public opinions in 
both countries.180
Turkey
Turkey holds  it  that  the  relations  between Greece  and Turkey are  fundamentally based  on  the 
Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and the balance of mutual rights and interests is set up by this Treaty. 
After a long – lasting period of tension and mistrust between Greece and Turkey, Greek – Turkish 
relations entered a totally new era in July 1999. Regarding the rapprochement starting in 1999, 
Turkey,  along with Greece have begun bilateral  meetings  and exchanges  of  views between the 
respective Prime Ministers  and Foreign Affairs  Ministers,  laying down the political  ground for 
promoting and reinforcing ongoing dialogue and cooperation process. High level contacts and visits 
have also been instrumental in keeping the momentum of this process. 
The  following  mechanisms  have  been  established  in  the  course  of  dialogue  and  cooperation 
process:  exchange  of  regular  visits  between  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs;  exploratory  contacts 
180 All data about Greek foreign policy have been retrieved by the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Greece http://www.mfa.gr/ . (accessed April 1, 2011)
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regarding  the  Aegean  issues;  regular  political  consultations;  and  talks  on  Confidence  Building 
Measures (CBM). The establishment of this mechanism signals the beginning of a “structured” and 
“institutionalized”  phase  in  Greek  –  Turkish  relations,  so  that  they  could  be  upgraded  from 
“rapprochement” to “partnership”. 
The exploratory contacts, launched in May 2002, paved the way for the first time, for substantial 
talks on the whole range of Aegean issues and on possible means of their  peaceful settlement. 
Political consultations enable Greece and Turkey to explore out each other's views and positions on 
various regional and international issues. 
The prevailing constructive atmosphere has also positive implications on the development of closer 
ties and achievement of concrete results in various fields such as trade, energy and transportation.
The friendly relations between Greece and Turkey based upon mutual respect, understanding and 
trust are important, not only for the economic welfare and political stability of the two countries, 
but also for the enhancement of the peace, stability and security in the region.181
The official stance of Turkey as far as the Aegean is concerned, is that there are unresolved issues 
between Greece and Turkey in the area, involving the Continental Shelf,  air space, jurisdiction of 
FIR operating in the area, disarmament of the islands and the jurisdiction over the islands, islets and 
atolls of the Aegean182. 
181 All data for the Turkish Foreign Policy have been retrieved from the official website of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Turkey http://www.mfa.gov.tr (accessed April 2, 2011)
182 Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008 p. 268
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The Media in the Formulation of Foreign Policy : 3 Cases
Cyprus as a full member of the EU, “Dogfight” over the Aegean, Papandreou's visit to Erzurum
Three cases have been chosen to be examined in this thesis, for an explanation about the role of the 
media and the influence  they might  have  on the foreign  policy of  Greece  and Turkey in  their 
bilateral  relations  to  be  given:  the  EU accession  of  Cyprus,  as  the  island  has  always  been  an 
important factor in the bilateral relations of the two countries; the “dogfight” of 2006, that took 
place over the Aegean, leading to a plane crash that caused a Greek pilot to lose his life; and the 
ongoing procedures of “secret” talks between Greece's and Turkey's officials (Prime Ministers and 
Foreign Affairs Ministers specifically).  
These three cases have been chosen for several reasons. First, every situation is rather different 
from the next. Secondly, they are features included in the daily reality of Greek – Turkish bilateral 
relations. 
The first case, although all the facts and parameters behind the event are not directly examined in 
this thesis, reflects  an issue that has never left the minds of foreign policy makers in both sides of 
the Aegean. Officials of both countries have spent a great amount of time and effort for the Cyprus 
issue to be solved – what the solution should be, however, does not coincide in Greece and Turkey, 
since the views on the matter are different. In any case, the Cyprus issue has been a leverage to any 
effort for the two countries to approach each other up until 1999, and a ghost over their shoulders 
up until today – an issue which has not stopped bothering any Prime Ministers or Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs that ever came to office, a problem the solution of which is yet to be found. Both 
Greek and Turkish administrations  have  supported  the  Greek – Cypriot  and Turkish – Cypriot 
populations  respectively,  on  the  grounds  of  being  the  “motherland”  of  those  populations,  and 
protecting their rights and their decisions. In Ahmet Davutoğlu's words: “In keeping with its legal  
and moral rights and responsibilities stemming from the 1960 treaties on Cyprus,  Turkey,  as a 
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guarantor power and motherland, has always stood by the Turkish-Cypriot people in their decades-
long struggle to uphold their inherent rights on the island. It goes without saying that Turkey’s  
unwavering solidarity and political, economical and moral support for the Turkish-Cypriot people  
shall continue in the future.”  183 Same declarations exist in the Greek side as well, showing the 
important place Cyprus holds on their foreign policy agendas, and why, even though it is not an 
issue of bilateral relations, it is a problem that affects those relations.
The  second  case  involves  an  incident  that  occurred  under  very  common  circumstances:  the 
“dogfights” among aircraft of both Air Forces of Greece and Turkey, which, over the years, have 
become a usual and daily practice between the two countries, rather than threats, even at times when 
their relations are not in crisis. Moreover, this is not considered as big a problem by the Turkish side 
while it  seems to be of high importance for the Greek side,  and hence,  there is   a problem of 
definition of the problems this situation evokes. Even though in “dogfight” incidents officials avoid 
to  make  statements  in  general,  in  this  case  former  Foreign  Minister  Bakoyannis  showed  the 
dissatisfaction of the Greek government, not only about the incident itself, that cost the country with 
the loss of a pilot, but also about the intensity and the commonness of such practices: “in situations 
like this  the culprit  is  the mass military activity –  beyond all  reason – of our  neighbor  in  the 
Aegean”184.
The third case is the Prime Minister of Greece having being invited and attended the “Visionary 
Diplomacy” conference, held in Erzurum on January 2011. This case can be seen as an example of 
the on-going procedure of meetings between Greek and Turkish officials, in an effort to build a 
strong  and  friendly  relationship  through  exploratory  talks.  Even  though  it  is  this  case  that  is 
183 This part has been taken from an interview of Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, to Alexis Papachelas, 
for newspaper Kathimerini, 06 March 2011 and presented in the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Turkey as well. You can read the full interview here: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/ENFORMASYON/Turkish
%20FM%20sets%20out%20terms%20for%20Aegean.pdf (accessed April 3, 2011)
184 In her speech at the Meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs, 30 May 
2006. You can read the whole speech at http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/31052006_McC1932.htm 
(accessed April 4, 2011)
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examined on this thesis, one must not forget that this kind of procedures have been going on for 
years. As former Foreign Minister Bakoyannis put it185 “the so called 'low – policy' issues are being  
worked out steadily and effectively. But are they 'low policy' issues? Are economic cooperation,  
energy,  tourism, and other kinds of  cooperation between the two peoples – cooperation that is  
developing rapidly – 'low policy' issues? Do these not help effectively in our broader pursuit, which  
is none other than the improvement and normalization of our relations with Turkey?”. It is within 
this framework that nowadays Greek and Turkish administration representatives of all fields come 
together and visit each other's country, and this has become an aspect of Greek – Turkish relations 
that cannot be ignored.
All three cases represent both the foreign policy agenda of the two countries, and the ups and downs 
their  relationship  have  had.  The  Cyprus  issue  is  a  fundamental  issue  always  taken  under 
consideration in the formulation of foreign policy in Greece and Turkey, even though it is not an 
issue of their bilateral relations, since it involves a third party; the “dogfights” represent an every 
day reality, and a constant reminder of the situation in the Aegean; the rapprochement through talks 
and meetings and official  or unofficial  visits of state representatives shows the will  of  the two 
countries to resolve the issues between them and become more than just “neighbors”, to become 
“friends” - all three are expressions of the Greek – Turkish relations, as they have evolved through 
the years.
• Cyprus as a Full Member of the EU
Cyprus became a full  member of the EU in May 1st,  2004. The country joined the Union as a 
divided island.186 Turkey was opposed to the idea of Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU 
185 In her speech at the Meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs, 30 May 
2006. You can read the whole speech at http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/31052006_McC1932.htm 
(accessed April 4, 2011)
186 For more information on Cyprus becoming full member of the EU and the situation on the divided island, visit 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/index_en.htm (accessed April 4, 2011)
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while the division of the island was still in place; Greece would definitely like to see Cyprus in the 
Union, even without the problem having been solved187, and perhaps with the hope that the issue 
would be solved within the EU framework. The accession of Cyprus into the EU is the starting 
point of this research, which seeks to find media's influence in Greek – Turkish relations.
For  this  purpose,  newspaper  reports  are  going  to  be  examined,  starting  from  the  day  the 
Referendum in  Cyprus  was voted  for,  on the Turkish-Cypriot  side,  and against,  on the  Greek-
Cypriot side, on the 1st of May 2004, and the week after the Cyprus becoming full member of the 
EU, along with the official visit of Prime Minister Erdoğan on 6-8 May 2004. Those reports will be 
examined in  this  chapter  in  order  to realize if  the media in both countries have associated the 
procedures taking place in Cyprus with the foreign policy designed by the two countries, and how 
much have their articles influenced or reflected the foreign policy followed by the representatives of 
Greece and Turkey. 
On the  24th of  April  the  populations  of  north  and  south  Cyprus  had  to  vote  in  a  Referendum 
concerning the Annan Plan and its enforcement on the island before Cyprus entered the EU. The 
Annan Plan had been the hope of the UN and the EU for a solution that would reunite the island, so 
that Cyprus would enter the EU as a united island.  Such a chance for union was not provided 
however, since the Greek – Cypriots voted an emphatic “No” to the Annan Plan, as opposed to the 
Turkish – Cypriot side, which voted for the Annan Plan to be enforced to the island. The “solution” 
was never applied and was left behind, as Cyprus entered the Union on the 1st of May, 2004.188
The outcome of  the  Referendum in  Cyprus  was anticipated  by Athens  and Ankara;  the  Greek 
government  of  Karamanlis  expected  the  Greek  –  Cypriots  to  vote  “No”,  even  though  at  first 
187 Öztürk, Sertoğlu and Kaptan, “Cyprus – EU relations: Possible Scenarios for the Future”, Pakistan Journal of  
Applied Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2002, p. 239 - 240
188 All  information  taken  from  the  newspapers  “Kathimerini”,  “Eleftherotypia”  (Greece),  “Hürriyet”  and 
“Zaman”(Turkey). Please see Appendix for the articles used in this thesis.
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supported the Annan Plan, and the Turkish government was certain that the Turkish – Cypriot side 
would vote “Yes”. The next morning found the media of the two countries commenting on the result 
of the Referendum, counting losses, wondering what would be the next step for Cyprus, what the 
EU and the UN would do about the Annan Plan, which never made it to being the solution that 
would reunite the divided island.
Kathimerini dealt with the issue in its articles “The first diplomatic moves of Athens”, “The next 
day demands bold solutions”, and many others; mainly supporting the decision made by the Greek 
– Cypriot population, while, at the same time, underlining the difficult position to which Greece had 
been put in the EU. The policy that the Greek government had followed the last days before the 
Referendum took place was that “Cyprus decided, Greece supports the decision”, as opposed to the 
support to the Annan Plan, before it was made clear that the Greek – Cypriot population would not 
accept the Plan189. Other than the expressed satisfaction of Ankara about the way the Turkish – 
Cypriots had responded to the Annan Plan, Turkey was not further mentioned on the paper of 25 
April 2004.
This can be explained by both countries' efforts to disconnect the Cyprus issue from the dimensions 
having to do with their bilateral relations, and connecting the issue with the EU itself. The press 
release of Turkey of May 1st, 2004, regarding the EU enlargement stated clearly and in a bitter tone 
that the Cyprus issue was now a problem of the EU: “The Turkish Cypriot people have exercised  
their inherent constitutive power and expressed, through transparent and democratic process of  
referendum, their wishes for their political future within the EU as constituent partner of a united 
Cyprus.  It  is  now  incumbent  on  the  EU  to  acknowledge  and  act  upon  the  free  and  genuine 
expression of the will of the Turkish Cypriot people in this regard. (...). In view of these facts and 
circumstances, it is only the Greek Cypriots who will enter the EU on 1 May 2004 under the terms  
189 Kathimerini 25/04/2004 – full article retrieved from 
http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_25/04/2004_101786 (accessed April 5, 2011)
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of the Accession Treaty of 16 April 2003, which was based on a political and legal situation of a  
divided Island and consequently does not allow for accession of a united Cyprus to the EU. Thus,  
an international conflict is inevitably being imported into the European Union.”190 Thus, the Cyprus 
issue appeared to  be disconnected from any influence from the Greek's  administration  policies 
(besides, Karamanlis seemed to be supportive of the Annan Plan before it was made clear that the 
Greek – Cypriots would not have agreed to it) in the eyes of the Turkish administration. It had 
become an issue involving only the two communities inhabiting the island, and the EU. Naturally, 
as seen before, the support of Turkey to the Turkish – Cypriot population is taken for granted.
Even though the same declaration of Cyprus issue now being the Union's problem was not made on 
behalf of Greece, at least not officially, it was not connected with Turkey and its bilateral issues 
with Greece either. In his speech “Principles and Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy”, at the “Eighth 
Roundtable”  organized  by  The  Economist,  Foreign  Minister  Molyviatis  spoke  of  the  Cyprus 
becoming a  full  member of the EU as such:  “The accession of  the Republic  of  Cyprus  to the  
European Union is at once a milestone and a point of departure, a new starting point for a better  
tomorrow of stability and prosperity for all Cypriots, Greek - Cypriots and Turkish - Cypriots. The  
reunification  of  Cyprus  remains,  following  the  results  of  the  recent  referenda,  our  great  and 
unwavering  goal  -  that  all,  Greek  Cypriots  and  Turkish  Cypriots,  might  enjoy  the  benefits  of 
participation in Europe. To this end, all of us in Athens and Nicosia will continue to work and  
cooperate so as to  sustain the intense interest  of  the international community  -  and Europe in  
particular - in a truly functional and viable solution in the environment of cooperation and stability  
provided  by  the  European  Union.  Because  it  is  a  common future,  and  it  must  be  won by  all  
Cypriots. I have said recently, and I firmly believe, that there are no last chances in life. What may 
have seemed impossible yesterday, may have ripened in our hearts and minds, and, by extension, in  
the dynamic of things. In any case, the Cyprus issue remains at the core of our foreign policy.”191;  
190 Press Release by the Turkish MFA, regarding the EU enlargement. For full text, see  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_73---
press-release-regarding-the-eu-enlargement_-1-may-2004.en.mfa (accessed April 4, 2011)
191 Translation of the text of the speech of Foreign Minister Mr. Petros Molyviatis at the “Eighth Roundtable” organized 
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remains at the core of Greece's foreign policy, but has been completely disconnected from Turkey.
This official effort to put Greece and Turkey at a distance from what had happened to Cyprus could 
have affected the way media responded to the event itself, eventually. During the following days of 
the Referendum, however, Greek newspapers transmitted to the public the belief of Ankara that the 
Turkish – Cypriot “Yes” to the Annan Plan had been “the greatest diplomatic success of Turkey in 
the  past  50  years”192;  of  the  responsibility  for  a  solution  to  be  found  being  now  left  to  the 
governments of Cyprus (Greek administration) and Greece, and Ankara's belief that the situation 
that had developed in Cyprus was “unfair” to the Turkish – Cypriots, who had voted for the solution 
of  the  problem and  of  the  government  of  Turkey having  the  desire  to  proceed  to  the  further 
development of Greek – Turkish relations, since its goal was “to be a full member of the EU, and its 
relations with its neighbors is important to Turkey”193. 
What should be pointed out at this point is that, especially after the official visit of Erdoğan was 
announced, the majority of articles written on the Cyprus issue, the Referendum and its accession to 
the EU, mentioned the European track of Turkey, as well as Greece's support to this cause, without, 
many times, an obvious explanation as to why the writers were doing so. The same thing happened 
with  official  statements,  such  as  the  one  Molyviatis  made,  mentioned  earlier.  Right  before 
mentioning Greece's position on the accession of Cyprus in the EU, Molyviatis spoke of Greek – 
Turkish relations and their connection to the European track of Turkey: “We are working towards  
the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations. It is the conviction and position of our foreign policy  
that the normalization of these relations will prove to be in the interests of both peoples. It will  
contribute to the creation of conditions of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. An integral  
by The Economist, entitled “Principles and Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy”. Full text can be found at 
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/oldNewsDetails.aspx?UICulture=en-US&articleID=2733  (accessed April 4, 2011)
192 Eleftherotypia 26/04/2004 http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=260&id=4572452 (accessed April 6, 2011)
193 Eleftherotypia 26/04/2004 http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=260&id=4572452 (accessed April 6, 2011)
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part  of  this  policy is  the  sincere  and active support  of  Turkey's  European perspective.”194.  So, 
indirectly, the Cyprus entering the EU and Turkey having been wanting to enter the EU became 
interrelated and appeared as  the new point  to  which the media focused their  attention.  As this 
research proceeds, one can observe that instead of relating the Erdoğan visit to Greece, which was 
made right after Cyprus became full member to the EU, to the fact that the island entering the 
Union divided, it was primarily connected to Turkey's European track and certain bilateral issues.
 
The  articles  published  in  both  Greek  newspapers  examined,  Eleftherotypia and  Kathimerini  
emphasized the importance of the decision of the two communities in Cyprus, as well as the next 
steps that should be taken by Greece and Cyprus from that moment on, and the impact its decision 
could have on the Greek – Cypriot population. They also transmitted the general feeling in Turkey 
and the Turkish – Cypriot community, as well as Turkey's hopes and wishes for its future in the EU. 
However, there was not a direct linkage between the Cyprus issue and Greek – Turkish relations. In 
every article studied, there were no “questions” or comments about what would the next day be like 
in Greek – Turkish relations, with the exception of some opinion pieces published, for which both 
newspapers mentioned that the writers were only expressing their own opinions.195 
Hürriyet and Zaman's articles spoke of “a unique opportunity that was lost” in Cyprus196; they also 
mentioned the same idea of diplomatic success of Turkey, since it avoided being  blamed once more 
by the international organizations as the one not wanting a solution to the Cyprus issue. Again, 
direct  linkage  to  the  Greek  –  Cypriot  connection  with  the  Greek  government  was  avoided.  A 
reference  to  possible  future  setbacks  in  Greek  –  Turkish  relations,  because  of  the  situation  in 
Cyprus, was also avoided. 
194 Translation of the text of the speech of Foreign Minister Mr. Petros Molyviatis at the “Eighth Roundtable” organized 
by The Economist, entitled “Principles and Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy”. Full text can be found at 
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/oldNewsDetails.aspx?UICulture=en-US&articleID=2733  (accessed April 4, 2011)
195 See Appendix.
196 Hürriyet 24/04/2004 http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/04/24/448126.asp (accessed April 8, 2011)
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Thus, the issue of Cyprus not being able to have solved the problem existing there before it became 
a member of the EU got disconnected from the Greek – Turkish relations framework and was faced 
as a matter that had to be considered under the scopes of the EU, the communities on the island, and 
the relationship of the Turkish government with the northern side of the island, and of the Greek 
government with the southern.
It  would seem that foreign policy makers in both countries  had been wishing that the bilateral 
relations between the two countries would not be overshadowed by the Cyprus issue once more, 
and that the media either respected the officials' choice, or they themselves thought that the policy 
followed by Greece and Turkey had nothing to do with their bilateral relations, but strictly with 
their relations with the respective communities in Cyprus. In any case, the reports examined for this 
case showed that the line the media followed did not deviate much from the official line drawn by 
the two governments. In fact, one could say, since (apart from the occasional implied accusation of 
not wanting a solution towards the Greek – Cypriot population, and the efforts to justify the Greek – 
Cypriot side's choice) no obvious connection with the Greek and Turkish governments was made to 
the  decision  -  making of  both sides  of  the  island  respectively,  the  media  tried,  and succeeded 
through the avoidance of mentioning the relationship of the other party to the decision made in 
Cyprus, or of using any harsh or strong words, to balance the disappointment of the northern side of 
the island to the opposition of the southern, the EU accession of Cyprus to its being left with an 
unresolved problem – much like the officials of Greece and Turkey would do.
However,  it  was  mentioned  both  in  Greek  and  in  Turkish  media  that  the  Turkish  –  Cypriot 
population's  vote  for  the  Annan  Plan  and  the  solution  it  proposed  for  the  Cyprus  issue,  was 
benefiting Ankara's administration and that the climate created for Turkey within the EU was a 
positive one197. Again, this can be considered as an indirect linkage of Turkey to the result of the 
Referendum, even though it  did  not  seem to affect  the  Greek – Turkish relations.  However,  it 
197 See Appendix.
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seemed to be consistent with the Greek policy of supporting Turkey within the EU framework.
Only six days after Cyprus became a full member of the EU, an official visit of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan to Athens took place. In the echo of the EU accession of Cyprus, the media of the two 
countries were, in their majority, supportive of this event. The media in Greece and Turkey saw this 
visit as a “crash test”; its importance was seen on the heads of the press before and after the visit 
was realized. Before Erdoğan's arrival in Athens, the press connected the visit to Turkey's European 
track;  Kathimerini published an article under the title “The crucial December”198, referring to the 
support  Turkey  needed  from  Greece  in  order  to  get  accession  date  from  EU  in  December; 
Eleftherotypia went down the same road with heads like “The difficult road towards December”199. 
 
In  “The  crucial  December”,  one  of  Kathimerini's  columnists  praises  the  steps  taken  by  the 
Karamanlis administration on the Cyprus issue, mentioning the friendly personal relationship of the 
Prime Ministers of the two countries, which “was not in the least disturbed by the complications of 
the Cyprus issue” and continues by explaining that the goal of Karamanlis  administration is to 
support fully Turkey in the EU, and that Erdoğan might have to face internal crisis he came back 
from the Summit “empty handed”.200
Before  it  even  took  place,  the  media  shared  the  belief  that  this  visit  was  within  Erdoğan's 
administration's  gaining support  for the EU framework,  and Greek administration was ready to 
provide it. The meeting took place in Athens, on 6-8 May 2004, and it obviously went well. The two 
leaders left the impression to the media of both countries that this official visit to Athens – the first 
of a Prime Minister since 1952 – was a constructive procedure, something showed on the heads of 
the press in both Greece and Turkey.
198 Kathimerini, 29/04/2004 http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_2_29/04/2004_102116 (accessed 
April 7, 2011)
199 Eleftherotypia, 04/05/2004, http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=100&id=8547828 (accessed April 6, 2011)
200 Kathimerini, 29/04/2004 http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_2_29/04/2004_102116 (accessed 
April 6, 2011)
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“Athens and Ankara in a new era – the two leaders spoke of 'stability oasis' and 'sea of peace' when 
they met”201, “A loose agenda for serious matters”202, “From Athens to Ankara: a suggestion for 
strategic cooperation”203, “A new page in Greek – Turkish relations”204, “Let's leave the past behind, 
Erdoğan said”205, are only few of the headlines published the day after Erdoğan arrived in Athens. 
Once more the Greek government, as well as the Turkish, had spread the word that the visit in 
Athens would be friendly and productive, through the press conferences before the visit, and after. 
The  common  declaration  of  friendship  and  effort  towards  a  new  approach  between  the  two 
countries was spread all over the media as well. For instance, when the Foreign Ministry spokesman 
was  asked  whether  the  visit  of  Erdoğan  is  attributed  with  a  symbolic,  positive  characted,  he 
answered: “Let me say this. The Turkish Prime Minister's visit to Athens confirms that the course of  
Greek-Turkish relations has reached, and is continue towards, a climate of continually improved  
and strengthened bilateral relations.” 206 Only  Eleftherotypia 207 seemed to be suspicious of the 
event and claimed that the Greek government was only “friends” with the Turkish one because they 
both refused to speak of the “difficult issues” between the two countries.
The friendly climate and the personal relationship of  Erdoğan and Karamanlis were highlighted, 
the hopes for a fruitful  meeting were really high,  the content  of the dialogue between the two 
leaders  was  all  over  the  news:  “Eyes  on  the  future  –  New  dynamics  by  Karamanlis  - 
201 Kathimerini, 07/05/2004, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_07/05/2004_102931 (accessed 
April 7, 2011)
202 Eleftherotypia, 07/05/2004, http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=60&id=7460828 (accessed April 6, 2011)
203 Hürriyet, 07/05/2004, http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/05/07/455179.asp (accessed April 8, 2011)
204 Zaman, 07/05/2004, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45245 (accessed April 9, 2011)
205 Zaman, 07/05/2004, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45267  (accessed April 9, 2011)
206 Briefing of diplomatic journalists by Foreign Ministry spokesman Mr. George Koumoutsakos, 04/05/04 
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/oldNewsDetails.aspx?UICulture=en-US&articleID=2730 (accessed April 4, 2011)
207 Eleftherotypia, 07/05/2004, http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=60&id=7460828 (accessed April 6, 2011)
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Erdoğan”208,“Without  turbulence”209,  “Erdoğan's  historical  meeting”210,  “Historical  dialogue  in 
Athens”211 are only some of the headlines met in the examined papers of the press of those days.
The positive words and expressions used by on the news reports and on official statements showed 
that both governments and the media shared an optimistic view of the visit, which was not at all 
connected to the Cyprus issue. The attention given to the personal relationship between Erdoğan 
and Karamanlis was almost as much as that the media gave to what they discussed. The “historical” 
dimension of the visit was met in all published articles; in most of them having a positive meaning.
Of  course,  the  visit  of  Erdoğan  in  Eastern  Thrace,  where  the  Muslim minority  exists  in  large 
numbers, and the way Erdoğan would approach those population, was met sceptically by the Greek 
media;  even though the Greek government  had no objections in  Erdoğan's  visit  to  Thrace (for 
personal reasons), the opposition party (PASOK) was against it. The Greek media expressed their 
belief that the Prime Minister of Turkey would not do anything to jeopardize the good relations 
between Greece and Turkey, which would guarantee the support of Greece in the EU track of the 
country. The media began to speak of the possibility that the Muslim minority of Thrace would be 
characterized  as  “Turkish”  by certain  circles,  with  the  occasion  of  the  Turkish  Prime  Minister 
visiting the area.  Such a thing,  however,  never  happened,  and the Greek press,  along with the 
Turkish, seemed to be rather satisfied with the overall outcome of the visit, even though distrust on 
the good will of the Turkish delegation was sometimes obvious. For example, it was mentioned that 
“the Prime Minister of Turkey has no reason to cause trouble (in Thrace) to his friend (Karamanlis). 
After all, Erdoğan needs him (Karamanlis) at least until December, when the EU will decide on the 
date of accession in the organization.”212 
208 Kathimerini, 08/05/2004, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_08/05/2004_103083 (accessed 
April 7, 2011)
209 Eleftherotypia, 08/05/2004, http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=20&id=87781372 (accessed April 6, 2011)
210 Hürriyet, 08/05/2004, http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/05/08/455739.asp (accessed April 8, 2011)
211 Hürriyet, 08/05/2004, http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/05/08/455740.asp (accessed April 8, 2011)
212 Eleftherotypia, 08/05/2004, http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%D4%EF%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1&dt1=25/04/2004&dt2=10/05/2004&r=0&p=20&id=87781372 (accessed April 6, 2011)
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The Turkish media applauded the visit of the Prime Minister of their country as well as his visit to 
Thrace.  They  wrote  of  “new  dynamics”213 in  Greek  –  Turkish  relations  and  “strategic 
cooperation”214 between the two states, of the “historical meeting in Athens”215. Emphasis was also 
given to the promise by the leaders of the two states to continue searching for a solution on the 
Cyprus  issue,  and  their  efforts  to  make  Aegean  a  “sea  of  peace”;  again  the  personal  friendly 
relations  between the  two Prime Ministers  was  highlighted.  Also,  as  Zaman exposed,  Erdoğan 
“surprised”216 the Greek government with his desire to go to Thrace – the Greek government then, 
in a move of good will gave its permission. Whereas no official comment was made on behalf of the 
Turkish administration before the visit in Thrace, Greek officials had to answer the questions of the 
media as to whether this visit of  Erdoğan's to Thrace could be a provocative event; the officials 
kept stating that “the visit to Thrace is private” without further comment.217 
The general impression one can get from examining the reports of the media in Greece and Turkey 
at the time of Cyprus accession in the EU and shortly after, is that the media were trying to create a 
climate of balance – not between the two governments, since, as it was shown with the visit of 
Erdoğan in  Athens they did not need it – but between the facts of the Cyprus accession and the 
responsibilities burdening each one of them. The Cyprus issue was not related with the Greek – 
Turkish relations, at least not on the press of the two countries; the only relation to it, that was 
mentioned  on  the  Greek  –  Turkish  media,  was  made  by  reports  by  the  foreign  (EU  member 
countries') press, which were reproduced on the Greek and Turkish newspapers. 
What was often mentioned was the European track of Turkey, after the Referendum in Cyprus had 
not  become the  solution  of  the  Cyprus  issue  and Cyprus  became a  full  member  of  the  Union 
anyway. That Turkey wanted Greece to support it inside the EU was evident; Greece's support in the 
213 Zaman, 09/05/2004, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=45838 (accessed April 9, 2011)
214 Hürriyet, 07/05/2004, http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/05/07/455179.asp (accessed April 8, 2011)
215 Ibid.
216 Zaman, 04/05/2004, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=43955 (accessed April 9, 2011)
217 For more information, visit http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/oldNewsDetails.aspx?UICulture=en-
US&articleID=2730 (accessed April 4, 2011)
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same framework was thought of as granted. The Greek – Cypriot side of Cyprus voting against the 
Referendum had something to do with these positions – that the Turkish – Cypriot population had 
voted for the solution was thought to have given the “upper hand” for such discussions (concerning 
its  European track)  to  Turkey.  Besides,  Turkey in  the EU would have helped Greek – Turkish 
relations by granting them yet another option and framework to solve their issues; thus the support 
of Turkey within the EU had been on the foreign policy agenda of Greece ever since 1999218. All 
those facts and notions were expressed by the media during April – May 2004.
Apart from a few voices showing mistrust towards the other side, as far as their motives for the two 
countries' to have a dialogue (with the occasion of the official visit of Erdoğan in Athens, after the 
invitation of Karamanlis) were concerned, there was a positive response on behalf of the media in 
both countries to this event. It is possible that some media workers were suspicious of the motives 
and outcomes of this visit. However, both governments used the media to express their enthusiasm 
for this meeting; the notion of “new dynamics in Greek – Turkish relations” was everywhere on the 
media, even before the visit took place.
2. “Mortal Combat”: what happens when a common practice leads to death
In both sides of the Aegean a common practice, as the Greek governments traditionally claim,  is 
taking place ever  since 1974219;  a “dogfight”  tradition which involves virtual war (without  real 
firearms) among aircraft from both Greek and Turkish air forces. Why this tradition has evolved 
into  a  daily part  of  the  air  forces  of  both countries  will  not  be discussed here,  since it  is  not 
important for the subject of this thesis; the implications following an accident, while this “tradition” 
was taking place, the media response to that accident and whether this response caused an effect on 
218 See official foreign position of Greece in the beginning of this chapter.
219 Eleftherotypia, 24/05/2006, 
http://archive.enet.gr/online/online_text/c=110,dt=24.05.2006,id=95383388,13761692,74032556,79694636,215127
32,35695516,43725084,57902748,65727516,72185244,86367004,94118044,7219548,13024988,28902492 
(accessed April 11, 2011)
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the foreign policy designed for the bilateral relations of the two states are examined.  
On the 23rd of May 2006, during a “dogfight” taking place over the Aegean, a Greek and a Turkish 
fighter crashed. The “accident”, as it was characterized in Greece, or “incident” as it was mentioned 
in Turkey220, or episode, as it shall be called for the purposes of this research, caused the Greek pilot 
to lose his life, and the two countries to face one of the most serious incidents after the Imia / 
Kardak crisis in 1996, according to the media221.
However, the crisis only lasted a few hours after the episode, as the Greek and Turkish governments 
decided not to let it evolve into a big conflict, since it would jeopardize their, up until then, friendly 
and balanced relations. The Foreign Ministers of both countries, Bakoyannnis and Gül, released a 
report  the same day of the episode, with which they stated that they had immediately after  the 
episode  (characterized  by both  as  “incident”).  Specifically,  the  Greek  announcement  “The two 
Foreign Ministers expressed their regret at today's incident and agreed that this incident should not  
affect the pursuit by the two countries of improvement in their relations”222, and the Turkish one 
“Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Abdullah Gül called Greek Minister of  
Foreign Affairs Ms. Dora Bakoyanni immediately after the incident and expressed our sorrow and  
extended his condolences. The two Foreign Ministers reached a common understanding to examine  
all  aspects  of  the  incident  and  that  it  should  not  effect  bilateral  relations  between  the  two  
countries.”223 are almost the same, not only in meaning, but also in expression. The intention of both 
administrations  was clearly not  to  disturb the relations between the two states by this  episode. 
Naturally, neither of the official statements refers to the episode or the circumstances under which it 
happened as “dogfight” (an unofficial, illegal and meaningless activity, the pronouncement of which 
would have brought more tension).
220 Zaman, 25/05/2006, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=288171 (accessed April 14, 2011)
221 See Appendix.
222 http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/230506_F1543.htm   (accessed April 5, 2011)
223 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_no_80---23-may-2006_-press-release-regarding-the-collision-of-turkish-and-greek-  
aircrafts-_unofficial-translation___p_.en.mfa (accessed April 5, 2011)
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The Greek media used headlines like the following: “Greek and Turkish fighter aircraft  collide 
while on air”, “Reaction under fear of conflict”, “Lethal acquisition over the Aegean”, “Bakoyiannis 
and Gül agreed to prevent tension”, “Dangerous ally”224, and so on, not only clearly identifying 
Turkey as being responsible for the episode, but recognizing also the efforts made on behalf of both 
states to avoid an episode that had the potential to involving into a crisis – after all, it involved 
aircraft, a “dogfight” over the Aegean, and a dead pilot, put together were more than enough to 
initiate and escalate a crisis. The Greek media limited their references to the episode itself and dealt 
more with the reaction of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which passed the message to the public 
as well that the crisis was to be avoided, and that the steps which had been taken up until then were 
not to be forgotten. The journalists mentioned that Turkey had been acting in a “provocative and 
hostile” way and again raised the question of the Turkish claims in the Aegean225, but under no 
circumstances acted in a way that could invoke increase of tension.
The Turkish media kept a moderate position during the first hours the news was spread, only giving 
out  information  about  the  “incident”.  Indicatively,  a  few heads  that  appeared  on  Hürriyet and 
Zaman are the following: “Turkish and Greek aircraft crash in 'dogfight'”226, “Turkish and Greek 
fighters crash over the Aegean”227, “Gül communicated with Bakoyiannis”228, “Search for the Greek 
pilot”229, “This time the 'dogfight' over the Aegean ended with death”230.
On the days that followed the episode, even though the government officials had decided that they 
would not let the episode evolve into a crisis, had stated so to the media, and had undertaken all 
actions towards the direction of relieving the crisis, while expressing their grief for the lost pilot, the 
224 Data taken from Eleftherotypia and Kathimerini archives. 
225 Kathimerini, 24/05/2006, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_24/05/2006_185064  (accessed 
April 12, 2011)
226 Hürriyet, 23/05/2006, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4459697&tarih=2006-05-23 (accessed 
April 13, 2011)
227 Zaman, 23/05/2006, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287639 (accessed April 14, 2011)
228 Zaman, 23/05/2006, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287676 (accessed April 14, 2011)
229 Zaman, 23/05/2006, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287700 (accessed April 14, 2011)
230 Zaman, 24/05/2006, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=287795 (accessed April 14, 2011)
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media went into a different kind of “incident”. Of course they had let the public know that their 
representatives had no intention of letting the episode reach a point that would remind the Imia / 
Kardak crisis; they however started raising questions about who was responsible for the episode, the 
circumstances under which it took place; the sovereign rights of both countries, who is provoking 
whom, and so on. For example, Hürriyet used the headline “A New Crisis Risk in the Aegean”. But 
the media did all these, while at the same time showing the governments' position and explaining 
why the reaction after the episode had been so calm. For instance, media in both countries decided 
to report on the calmer attitudes of the neighboring country231. 
It was a difficult situation in both countries, that raised questions about the status of the Aegean and 
the common “dogfight” practice that has been in place for a long time. It was also a matter which 
seemed at first that could put at risk the good relations that had evolved between Greece and Turkey 
over the past seven years. The danger was only avoided because the media 'dropped' the case once 
they realized that both governments  had a common line on the matter.  The episode was being 
mentioned on the press for less than a week. 
The fact that the political front of Greece and Turkey appeared immediately united on the matter 
prevented conflict of the Greek and Turkish media as well. Had the political front been divided, 
throwing accusations to each other, showing that they validated less their cooperation, the media 
would have started a “whose fault was it” campaign, which would end a lot later, as has happened 
in the past. In this case, the fact that the administrations of both Greece and Turkey decided to be 
united in the face of the media, and stayed that way, concluded the 'media circus' early and the 
media showed no intention, through the published material examined, to put pressure towards a 
231 Except Hürriyet,  as  Sunar,  2007, pp. 92 – 93, suggests:   “Hürriyet  stated that  Greek press mostly accused the 
Turkish side while some reported that Greek and Turkish authorities acted calmly. Hürriyet carried the reports of the 
Greek press, some of which were critical toward Turkey (…). Hürriyet also cited news from the Greek press which 
can be viewed as examples of a calm attitude in Greek – Turkish relations (…). Nevertheless, the hostile Greek 
reports were announced more readily by Hürriyet, rather than the calmer ones. In addition, concerning news texts 
cited from the media of third countries, Hürriyet preferred to cover those which implied that the dog-fight crisis 
between Turkey and Greece was serious and it might have even turned into a clash.”
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different reaction.
• Papandreou attends the “Visionary Diplomacy” Conference in Erzurum
Papandreou was invited by Erdoğan to the Conference of the Ambassadors taking place in Erzurum 
on January 2011 within the framework of the improvement of Greek – Turkish relations, an effort 
on behalf of both countries that has been going on for years. 
The invitation and the possibility that Papandreou would attend the Conference was firstly met on 
the Greek media at the end of November 2010, along with suspicions that Papandreou has been 
having “secret discussions”232 with Erdoğan, during which they would come up with a solution for 
the issues on the Aegean – what many media were afraid of was that Papandreou would retreat 
under the Turkish government's pressure to a solution that would hurt the sovereign rights of Greece 
in the area.
Some of the Greek media, like Eleftherotypia, would spend pages and ink explaining their fears and 
low expectations of this meeting in Erzurum, and asking the Prime Minister for inside information 
on what was being discussed during the unofficial meetings between the two Prime Ministers. Both 
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece have repeatedly denied that there 
are “secret negotiations” between the officials of Greece and Turkey; in turn, a proportion of the 
Greek press would carry on emphasizing on the “Dangerous suspensions”233 left in the Aegean. 
Those worries expressed by the Greek press, about any kind of agreement on the Aegean that might 
have “stolen” Greek sovereignty, were mounted after officials of Turkey and the Foreign Affairs 
Minister Davutoğlu himself stated that “we (Turkey) are already in business with the Greeks in the 
Aegean”234. 
232 Eleftherotypia, 30/12/2010, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=237271 (accessed April 15, 2011)
233 Eleftherotypia, 31/12/2010, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=237373 (accessed April 15, 2011)
234 Eleftherotypia, 31/12/2010, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=237373 (accessed April 15, 2011)
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But  this  worried  stance  was  not  the  only one  met  on  the  media  reports.  The  two newspapers 
examined, Eleftherotypia and Kathimerini, show, through their reports, the division existing in the 
media as to whether Papandreou should attend the meeting or not, and under what circumstances. 
Kathimerini,  even though it  shared the same “low expectations” belief with  Eleftherotypia,  was 
more  positive  as  to  why Papandreou should  and would  attend  the  conference:  “The choice  of 
Papandreou  to  attend  the  annual  Conference  of  Ambassadors  in  Erzurum is  indicative  of  the 
decision he has made to proceed into smoothing Greek – Turkish relations”235. 
The interesting part of comparing the way media covered this story in Greece and Turkey, is that 
while in Greece the press was swarming with speculations about what Papandreou would say or do 
in the Conference,  or what the ulterior motives of Erdoğan were, for about a month before he 
actually got to Erzurum, the Turkish media found the visit of Papandreou not worth mentioning 
before the Conference.  The first  reference to his  imminent arrival was made on January 3rd on 
Zaman236,  mainly emphasizing  the  symbolic  meaning  of  a  Greek  Prime  Minister  attending  the 
Conference being held in the place where Atatürk had started to rise in power in 1919.
After  Papandreou  had  reached  Erzurum,  he  attended  the  inauguration  of  the  city's  new sports 
facilities, where his speech was observed to be “full of messages of unity and friendship”237, as 
Erdoğan mentioned. Papandreou spoke of the “prejudice of the past” that “must be left behind, we 
must  forget the antagonism of the past.  I  am looking today and I  am optimistic,  (…) the next 
generation is embracing the same values on this matter (ie. The matter of respect to emulation, 
unity)”.238Which is nothing but normal, since he had been invited for this exact same reason: to 
show the progress made in the relation of the two countries.  
235 Kathimerini, 06/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_2_06/01/2011_427708 (accessed 
April 16, 2011)
236 Zaman, 03/01/2011, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1073651 (accessed April 18, 2011)
237 Hürriyet, 07/01/2011, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16708282 (accessed April 17, 2011)
238 Hürriyet, 07/01/2011, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16708282 (accessed April 17, 2011)
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Right before the inauguration of the stadium, Papandreou and Erdoğan met in a working breakfast, 
during which a lot of bilateral issues were discussed. The meeting was later attended by the Foreign 
Affairs Ministers of the two countries, and it lasted four hours. What was said in this meeting was 
not exposed to the media, however Erdoğan described it as “fruitful”.239
No matter how fruitful the meeting between the two leaders had been, Papandreou's address to the 
ambassadors “sent some unexpected shock waves to many diplomats in the room”240. His speech 
created many reactions and discontent in Turkey. The Prime Minister of Greece, while participating 
the  Conference,  spoke  of  almost  all  issues  of  bilateral  relations.  Papandreou  called  Turkey an 
occupier in northern Cyprus, while speaking of the EU track of Turkey, and added that the EU will 
never  embrace as a member an “occupier” state.  He also criticized Ankara for violating Greek 
airspace, and underlined that “peace comes under specific preconditions, trust is built in a difficult 
way”.  It  should be stated here that  two days  before Papandreou's  visit  to Erzurum, Athens and 
Ankara had to be faced with an episode over the Aegean, involving overflights of eight Turkish 
fighters over Greek islands. Papandreou even thought of not attending the Conference because of 
this episode, but Davutoğlu intervened and the crisis was relieved241. 
This incident, however, seemed enough for the Greek Prime Minister to take a more firm stance on 
the situation over the Aegean in the Conference, calling the Turkish government to stop those kinds 
of  actions,  since  they  will  not  change  the  status  in  the  Aegean.  He  also  mentioned  that  the 
continental shelf issue cannot remain unresolved for long; he saluted the progress made during the 
exploratory talks  between  the  two countries,  but  suggested  that  the  matter  be  resolved  by the 
International Court of Hague, if the talks produce no result in reasonable time. 
239 Eleftherotypia, 11/01/2011, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239780 (accessed April 15, 2011)
240 Zaman Daily News, 09/01/2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey8217s-visionary-diplomats-
shape-visionary-diplomacy-2011-01-09 (accessed April 18, 2011)
241 Kathimerini, 08/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_08/01/2011_427979 (accessed 
April 16, 2011)
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Papandreou  also  referred  to  the  need  for  a  solution  on  the  Cyprus  issue,  the  Ecumenical 
Patriarchate,  underlined  the  need  for  cooperation  of  the  two countries  on  the  matter  of  illegal 
immigration; he finished his speech by once more declaring the support of Greece to the European 
track of  Turkey and by inviting Erdoğan to  making decisions  and acting in  a  way that  would 
promote the substantial progress of Greek – Turkish relations.
Naturally,  Papandreou's  speech  left  the  audience  in  surprise.  And Erdoğan later  said  that  “our 
private discussion was very fruitful, the speech he (Papandreou) gave during the inauguration was 
full of messages of unity and friendship; however, his speech to the ambassadors was not what I had 
expected, but he claimed that he had no intention of his words to be interpreted the way they did. 
And as you saw, he corrected it during the press conference”242.
Prime Minister Erdoğan, dodged the bullet of answering to what Papandreou had said in front of the 
180 participants of the Conference; he later mentioned that “some things should not have been 
said”, referring to Papandreou's use of the word “invasion” in Cyprus.
A few headlines and leads presented on the Greek media, showing the tendencies prevailing in the 
media world, as far as the participation of Papandreou to the Erzurum Conference is concerned, are 
the following: “Overflights and casus belli posed by Giorgos (Papandreou) to Ankara”243, “3 – hour 
meeting of Papandreou with Erdoğan in Erzurum – 'we either find a solution (for the Aegean), or go 
to  Hague'”244,  “Erzurum is  far  away from Hague245”,  “Turkish  Media  Surprised”246,  “Erdoğan: 
'fruitful  discussion,  ungraceful  speech'”247.  Kathimerini showed  a  more  optimistic  view  of 
Papandreou's visit: “Smiles in Erzurum”248, “Expostulation for the overflights – those acts will not 
242 Eleftherotypia, 11/01/2011, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239780 (accessed April 15, 2011)
243 Eleftherotypia, 07/01/2011, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=238899 (accessed April 15, 2011)
244 Eleftherotypia, 08/01/2011, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=238979 (accessed April 15, 2011)
245 Eleftherotypia, 09/01/2011, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239138 (accessed April 15, 2011)
246 Eleftherotypia, 10/01/2011, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239416 (accessed April 15, 2011)
247 Eleftherotypia, 11/01/2011, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=239780 (accessed April 15, 2011)
248 Kathimerini, 08/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_08/01/2011_427976  (accessed 
April 16, 2011)
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change  the  status  in  the  Aegean”249,  “The  differences  remain,  only  the  'climate' 
changes”250,“Erdoğan's late disturbance”251.
Some of the heads the Turkish media used, are as such: “EU friction in Erzurum”252, “Meeting 
(caused)  skipping  Friday  prayer”253,  “Papandreou's  message  in  Turkish”254,  “Erdoğan  and 
Papandreou's  common press conference”255,  “8 showed aggression before Papandreou's  visit”256, 
“Greek Foreign Minister: The status in the Aegean will not change”257, “The Greek government is 
happy about the visit in Erzurum”258, “Papandreou changed the text of his speech”259. The headlines 
presented here are indicative of the surprise Papandreou provoked with the tough language he used. 
Before the arrival of the Greek Prime Minister in Erzurum, they are full of optimism about the 
event; an optimism which gradually falls after he touched the issue of the Aegean.
If we take a closer look at the texts of  the reports about Erzurum in Greece, a mistrust about the 
motives of both the Erdoğan government's invitation made to Papandreou and the Greek Prime 
Minister's decision to attend the Conference. The reason why is that throughout 2010 the Greek and 
Turkish sides have been thought of as having preparing “secret agreements” concerning the status 
of the Aegean and common operations on it. There has been this notion of this government being 
ready to give up on the sovereign rights of the country, and of the Turkish side being ready to take 
over in the Aegean.
249 Kathimerini, 08/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_08/01/2011_427979 (accessed 
April 16, 2011) 
250 Kathimerini, 09/01/2011, http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_09/01/2011_428125 (accessed 
April 16, 2011) 
251 Kathimerini, 11/01/2011,  http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_11/01/2011_428258 (accessed 
April 16, 2011)
252 Hürriyet, 07/01/2011, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=16709762&tarih=2011-01-07 (accessed 
April 17, 2011)
253 Hürriyet, 07/01/2011, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16704889 (accessed April 17, 2011)
254 Hürriyet, 07/01/2011, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16708282 (accessed April 17, 2011)
255 Hürriyet, 07/01/2011, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16711406 (accessed April 17, 2011)
256 Hürriyet, 08/01/2011, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16711824 (accessed April 17, 2011)
257 Hürriyet, 09/01/2011, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16720848 (accessed April 17, 2011)
258 Zaman, 08/01/2011, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1076133 (accessed April 18, 2011)
259 Zaman, 10/01/2011, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1076661 (accessed April 18, 2011)
94
When Papandreou finally got to Erzurum and used a language stricter than usual about Greek – 
Turkish relations, he also defended the stance of Greece on the Aegean, and asked from the Turkish 
government to join forces with him towards a common future of mutual trust, in which there is not 
space for actions that would jeopardize this trust (ie. Overflights). Such a position was not expected 
by the Greek media. 
The Greek media also reported mainly on the reactions of their colleagues on the other side of the 
Aegean as to what the Greek Prime Minister had said. Obviously the Turkish media were not happy 
about what Papandreou had said – they felt “threatened” and offended, as were the officials of the 
country.  The feeling that Papandreou had arrived to the Conference spreading words of peace and 
friendship, which ended up in a speech that was perceived as a “threat”, was only soothed by the 
assurances of Erdoğan after the Conference had finished its workings that Papandreou “had not 
meant what he had said the way it was heard” - which, in turn, was perceived in Greece as a part of 
Erdoğan's efforts not to lose the upcoming elections of July 2011.
The one thing one can say is that the friendly approach of the two countries has not been destructed 
by what Papandreou said to the Erzurum Conference.  The rhetoric of Erdoğan became slightly 
different to reassure the media and the public that the relations between the two countries were still 
friendly;  other  than  that  no  obvious  shift  in  policy was  observed.  The  perspective  of  Greek  – 
Turkish collaboration and friendly relations is still there; and the media, even though at times might 
find ways to challenge it and its motives or outcomes, most of the time follow the pattern of the 
states' will to work out their problems.
95
Conclusions
This thesis's aim is to search for a framework under which the media and their relation to foreign 
policy formulation in Greece and Turkey can be better understood. 
After the literature review on the theoretical framework of media relations to foreign policy and 
decision making process was provided, and a more “local color” was given to the features of these 
theories, so that they could be applied in the realities of Greece, Turkey and the media operating in 
their  territories.  In  this  manner,  a  relationship  between the  way the  news  coverage  in  the  two 
countries  and  the  foreign  policy  formulation  in  their  bilateral  relations  was  searched  for.  The 
realities of the Greek and Turkish media companies were revealed, in order for a more explicit 
pattern to be in place, so that the way the media work in the two neighboring countries would give a 
hint about the influence they can have on foreign policy and decision making process.
The observed influence the media can have on foreign policy is that they are capable of influencing 
the rhetoric of the followed foreign policy by the state. This influence they might have derives from 
the power they have over the public opinion, which, for the purposes of this study, has been left 
unexamined, even though it is the reason why the media are taken so much under consideration in 
foreign policy matters.
The three cases examined in the third chapter have represented three different, yet constantly met, 
features of Greek – Turkish bilateral relations. What has been observed, as far as media influence on 
the foreign policy formulation is considered, is that, generally, there is a pattern in both countries of 
not challenging the foreign policy designed by the government officials. This does not mean that the 
foreign policy formulation process is not being evaluated or commented upon by the media – on the 
contrary, both Greek and Turkish media (perhaps this evaluation pattern is more often met in the 
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Greek media rather than the Turkish) evaluate the foreign policy designed and followed by the state 
officials. 
Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU, even after the Annan Plan was not voted for by the 
Greek  –  Cypriots,  while  it  was  voted  for  by  the  Turkish  –  Cypriots,  was  faced  with  strong 
disappointment by the Turkish media – the disappointment expressed by the media focusing on the 
outcome of the Referendum, not on the policy Turkey followed on the matter; while the Greek 
media presented it as the result they had been waiting for. In both countries, media did not make 
direct comments on the Greek or Turkish parties, but more on the relationship of the parties with the 
Greek – Cypriots and the Turkish – Cypriots respectively; and the matter they focused upon, as far 
as their bilateral relations are concerned, was the European track of Turkey.  At some point, the 
Greek media workers seemed to be believing, and presented it that way, that Turkey was exploiting 
Greece to gain its support within the EU; a belief which soon afterward changed and was referred to 
as a relationship of, one could say, mutual exploitation by Greece and Turkey of each other. In any 
case, the decisive position of Greece and Turkey on the matter of the preservation of their good 
relations has worked here, as in all cases examined, as a uniting factor and the media have not 
sought to provoke a shift of policy. 
The fact that the media in both countries have the capacity to evaluate and share their writers' (and, 
at  times,  their  owners')  beliefs  with the wide public,  though it  makes them powerful,  does not 
necessarily make them influential in the foreign policy formulation, as the examination of the cases 
has shown. 
For instance, the second case examined in this thesis, the “dogfight” over the Aegean, during which 
a pilot lost his life, shows clearly a situation that did not grow into a crisis because the governments 
of the two countries did not want it to. Should it have left just on the hands of the media people, the 
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episode could have evolved in a second Imia – Kardak crisis. However, the media stopped paying 
attention to the subject the moment they realized that the Greek and Turkish administrations had 
decided to follow a common line on the issue, and that the objective of Greece and Turkey sharing 
good  relations  was  more  important.  They  did  continue  seeking  and  commenting  upon  the 
relationship, the objectives of the two governments, as well as the reasons why this specific policy 
had been chosen, but only for a short period of time, and by analyzing the facts within the peaceful 
framework  both  administrations  had  provided  the  media  with  (which  was  expressed  by  their 
commonly decided actions).
Papandreou was “strongly advised” by the Greek media not to go to Erzurum when his decision to 
attend the meeting was first  announced.  Then,  he was expected “to give the Aegean up to the 
Turks”.  Neither  happened.  Though it  is  suspected  that  the  reaction  of  the  Greek  media  to  the 
overflights  of Turkish aircraft  over the Aegean could be what changed the,  up until  then,  calm 
rhetoric  of  Papandreou regarding issues  of  bilateral  relations  of  Greece  and Turkey,  the media 
coverage did not actually influence the Greek – Turkish relations foreign policy formulation. Same 
applies to the Turkish media as well. 
Thus, an overall conclusion of this thesis is that the media  alone cannot influence foreign policy 
formulation, but they can influence the way this foreign policy is explained and supported by state 
officials executing it, to the public. A shift of the foreign policy according to the material published 
on the media has not been observed; however, revising the presentation of a policy according to this 
published material, or in a way that would not raise questions or reactions by the media, has been a 
common practice in both countries.
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Appendix
Published material on the case studies
*the translation of the titles of articles and the content of the texts have been done by me, and I bear 
responsibility for any mistakes or misinterpretations.
2. Cyprus becoming a full member of the EU and Erdoğan's visit in Athens
Eleftherotypia – Greek newspaper
Date Title of article Translation Key words Translation Source
26/04/04 'Αγκυρα: Στοπ 
στην 
απομόνωση
Ankara: Stop 
to isolation
Επιτυχία της Τουρκίας  
στο διπλωματικό τομέα,  
Κυπριακό, άρση 
πολιτικής απομόνωσης 
της ΤΔΒΚ, Γκιούλ,  
Ερντογάν, υπέρ της  
λύσης, ελληνοτουρκικά
Diplomatic success 
of Turkey, Cyprus 
issue, arsis of the 
political isolation of 
TRNC, Gül, 
Erdoğan, pro-
solution, Greek-
Turkish relations
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=260&id
=4572452 
26/04/04 Ορθώς 
“μίλησαν” στην 
Κύπρο και οι  
δύο κάλπες
Both ballots 
“spoke” 
correctly in 
Cyprus
Καλύτερα δυνατά 
αποτελέσματα, κλίμα (...)  
εκβιασμών (...) απειλών 
και πιέσεων,  
εκτρωματική λύση, 
ορθώς οι Τουρκοκύπριοι  
υπερψήφισαν “ναι”, 
συγκλονιστικό “όχι”,  
ενδοτική Αθήνα, τα 
δύσκολα αρχίζουν τώρα
Best possible 
outcome, climate of 
(…) blackmail (…) 
threats and pressure, 
monstrous solution, 
Turkish-Cypriots 
rightly voted for 
“yes”, sensational 
“no”, yielding 
Athens, the difficult 
part begins now
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=260&id
=63019236 
27/04/04 Το γενναίο 
“ΟΧΙ” του 
Κυπριακού 
Ελληνισμού
Greek – 
Cypriots' 
brave “NO”
Απώτερες επιδιώξεις  
Τουρκίας, ορθή 
τοποθέτηση ελληνικής 
κυβέρνησης για 
αποδέσμευση Κυπριακού 
από το πλέγμα 
ελληνοτουρκικών 
προβλημάτων, Τουρκία,  
όχι περιθώρια για 
νεοσουλτανικές  
επιδιώξεις, γεφύρωση 
χάσματος με 
Τουρκοκυπρίους
Ulterior intentions of 
Turkey, correct 
position of Greek 
government for 
disconnection of the 
Cyprus issue from 
Greek – Turkish 
problems, Turkey, no 
room for new-sultan 
intentions, bridge 
differences with 
Turkish-Cypriots
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=240&id
=92333220 
27/04/04 Οι ευθύνες  
τώρα στις  
κυβερνήσεις  
Ελλάδας και  
Κύπρου για μια 
άλλη λύση
The 
responsibility 
is now in the 
hands of the 
governments 
of Greece and 
Cyprus for  
another 
solution
Νέα δεδομένα, διεθνής  
κοινότητα, δυσφορία,  
δυσαρέσκεια, συμπάθεια 
προς τους  
Τουρκοκύπριους, ΕΕ 
δυσφορεί, άμεση 
εμπλοκή της Τουρκίας  
(στο Κυπριακό), Άγκυρα 
σε πλεονεκτική θέση,  
διχαστική αντιπαράθεση 
προ του δημοψηφίσματος
New facts, 
international 
community, 
discomfort, 
discontent, empathy 
towards Turkish – 
Cypriots, direct 
engagement of 
Turkey (in Cyprus 
issue), Ankara in 
advantageous 
position, divisive 
debate before the 
Referandum 
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=240&id
=10967012 
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27/04/04 Για άδικη 
κατάσταση 
μιλάει η Άγκυρα
Ankara speaks 
of unfair 
situation
Τουρκία, στρατηγικός 
στόχος η ένταξη στην 
ΕΕ, σημασία στη σχέση 
με τους γείτονες, άρση 
των περιορισμών στην 
ΤΔΒΚ
Turkey, the EU 
accession is a 
strategic objective , 
attention to the 
relations with the 
neighbors, arsis of 
the restriction 
towards TRNC
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=240&id
=48462436 
27/04/04 Προς νέα 
δεδομένα
Towards new 
Facts
Απόρριψη του σχεδίου 
Ανάν, ψήφισαν “όχι” 
επειδή φοβούνται για την 
ασφάλειά τους
Rejection of the 
Annan Plan, they 
voted “no” because 
they are afraid for 
their security (the 
Greek - Cypriots)
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=240&id
=67364740 
27/04/04 Οι 
Τουρκοκύπριοι  
σηκώνουν 
κεφάλι
Turkish – 
Cypriots lifted
Τουρκοκύπριοι,  
διεκδικούν επιβράβευση,  
περιμένουν ανταμοιβή,  
αμηχανία
Turkish-Cypriots, 
claim for reward, 
waiting for 
gratification, 
awkwardness 
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=220&id
=98230628 
28/04/04 Όλα στον 
Ερντογάν από 
Σρέντερ
All (said) to 
Erdoğan by 
Schreder 
Η Γερμανία θα είναι στο 
πλευρό της Τουρκίας,  
Τουρκική κυβέρνηση 
βελτιώνει συνεχώς τη 
θέση της, ειρηνική 
μουσουλμανική κοινωνία
Germany will be on 
the side of Turkey, 
Turkish government 
improving its 
position constantly, 
peaceful Muslim 
society
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=200&id
=62230628 
28/04/04 Ικανοποίηση 
δηλώνουν και  
οι Τούρκοι  
στρατηγοί
Turk generals 
state (their) 
satisfaction
Kατάσταση εξασφαλίζει  
στην τουρκική πλευρά 
διπλωματική υπεροχή,  
αποτέλεσμα των 
δημοψηφισμάτων «πιο 
ευνοϊκή περίπτωση»
The situation 
provides Turkey with 
diplomatic 
advantage, the 
outcome of the 
Referendum “the 
most favorable case” 
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=180&id
=25321444 
03/05/04 Μετέωρη η 
προσέγγιση με 
την Τουρκία
Approach with 
Turkey 
pending
Πρόθεση κυβερνήσεων 
Ελλάδας – Τουρκίας να 
μη διαταραχθούν οι  
σχέσεις (...) από το 
“όχι”, ευρωπαϊκή 
πορεία Τουρκίας,  
Intention of the 
Greek and Turkish 
governments for the 
relations not to be 
disturbed (…) by 
“no”, Turkey's 
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
100
κινητήρια δύναμη 
ελληνοτουρκικής 
προσέγγισης
European track, 
driving force of 
Greek-Turkish 
approach
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=120&id
=3017012 
04/05/04 O δύσκολος 
δρόμος προς  
τον Δεκέμβριο 
(γνώμη)
The difficult 
road towards 
December 
(opinion 
piece)
Ελλάδα, Δεκέμβριος, η 
απόφαση για την έναρξη 
διαπραγματεύσεων 
ένταξης με την Τουρκία 
Greece, December, 
decision about 
Turkey's EU 
accession
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=100&id
=8547828 
05/05/04 Εξετάζει  
εναλλακτικές σε  
πιθανό ευρω-
όχι
Examining 
alternatives to 
possible “no” 
from EU
Εκδημοκρατισμός της 
χώρας, στήριξη στις  
φιλοδοξίες από ΗΠΑ
Democratization of 
the country (Turkey), 
ambitions supported 
by the USA
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=100&id
=37555932 
05/05/04 Μεταξύ 
Κύπρου,  
ημερομηνίας  
και  
υφαλοκρηπίδας-
H συνάντηση
In between 
Cyprus, date 
and 
continental 
shelf – The 
meeting
Επανεξέταση λύσης 
Κυπριακού, όχι εμπόδια 
για ένταξη Τουρκίας,  
συστηματικές επαφές
Re-examination of a 
solution for Cyprus 
issue, no obstacles to 
Turkey's EU 
accession, systematic 
contacts
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=80&id=
69830204 
06/05/04 Κυπριακό 
“τόσο κοντά”,  
Τουρκία “τόσο 
μακριά” 
Cyprus issue 
“so close”, 
Turkey “so 
far”
Τουρκία, ένταξη στην 
ΕΕ, Σιράκ, ένταξη 
βραχυπρόθεσμα δεν είναι  
εφικτή
Turkey, EU 
accession, Chirac, 
accession not 
possible in the short-
run
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=80&id=
35426460 
06/05/04 Στη Ραφήνα, οι  
δυο τους
At Rafina, just 
the two of 
them
Κρίσιμες συνομιλίες,  
ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις,  
προοπτική Κυπριακού,  
“ιδιωτική” επίσκεψη στη 
Θράκη
Crucial discussions, 
Greek – Turkish 
relations, “private” 
visit to Thrace
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=60&id=
88366428 
101
07/05/04 “test event” η 
επίσκεψη στη 
Θράκη
Visit to Thrace 
– a “test 
event”
Προώθηση 
ελληνοτουρκικής 
προσέγγισης
Promotion of Greek 
– Turkish approach
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=60&id=
31102172 
07/05/04 Χαλαρή ατζέντα 
βαρέων 
θεμάτων
Loose agenda 
for important 
issues
Επίσκεψη καλής 
θέλησης, να μετατραπεί  
το Αιγαίο σε λίμνη 
ειρήνης (Ερντογάν),  
ειλικρινής σχέση 
συνεργασίας  
(Καραμανλής),  
“αμηχανία”  στο 
Κυπριακό
Good will visit, 
Aegean should turn 
into a peace lake 
(Erdoğan), honest 
relation of 
cooperation 
(Karamanlis), 
“awkwardness” for 
the Cyprus issue
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=60&id=
7460828 
08/05/04 Καρντάσια,  
αλλά στα 
εύκολα
Brothers, but 
only on the 
easy parts
Απέφυγαν να θίξουν 
Κυπριακό και Αιγαίο,  
συμφώνησαν σε 
τουρισμό, ναυτιλία,  
κατασκευές, Ελλάδα 
υπέρ Ευρωπαϊκής 
προοπτικής Τουρκίας
Avoided Cyprus and 
Aegean, agreed in 
tourism, shipping, 
infrastructure, 
Greece pro EU 
accession of Turkey
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=20&id=
1014204 
08/05/04 Χωρίς  
αναταράξεις
Without 
turbulence
Επίσκεψη στη Θράκη Visit to Thrace http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=20&id=
87781372 
08/05/04 Γιαβάς Γιαβάς Slowly Αμοιβαία κατανόηση, 
θετικό αποτέλεσμα,  
προσεκτικά 
διατυπωμένες δηλώσεις,  
“δύσκολα” θέματα το 
Κυπριακό και το Αιγαίο,  
θα δοκιμαστεί ο  
Ερντογάν στην επίσκεψη 
στη Θράκη
Mutual 
understanding, 
statements carefully 
chosen, Cyprus and 
Aegean: “difficult” 
issues, Erdoğan will 
be tested in the visit 
to Thrace
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=20&id=
65646844 
08/05/04 Προσέγγιση 
ουσίας...
Approach of 
essence...
Φιλική και ειρηνική 
συνύπαρξη, 
ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις 
Friendly and 
peaceful co-
existence, Greek – 
Turkish relations
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
102
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=20&id=
50289020 
10/05/04 “Δουλέψτε για  
ισχυρή Ελλάδα” 
“Work for a 
powerful 
Greece”
Νέα κατάσταση, δεν 
προκάλεσε ο Eρντογάν 
με τη στάση του, Θράκη
New situation, 
Erdoğan was not 
provocative, Thrace
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=20&id=
54006476 
10/05/04 Ο Τ. Ερντογάν 
και ο “χαλβάς 
της ειρήνης” 
T. Erdoğan 
and the “candy 
of peace”
Επίσκεψη στην Αθήνα,  
ειρηνική συνύπαρξη και  
δημιουργική συνεργασία,  
επιτάχυνση πολιτικής 
προσέγγισης από τότε 
που ανέλαβε 
Καραμανλής, ειδυλλιακό 
κλίμα
Visit to Athens, 
peaceful co-
existence and 
productive 
cooperation, 
acceleration of 
political approach 
procedure ever since 
Karamanlis came to 
office, idyllic climate
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=0&id=7
9735500 
10/05/04 “Πρώτα η 
φιλία, μετά τα 
ντέρτια” 
“Friendship 
first, then the 
troubles”
Σε σωστό δρόμο για το 
Αιγαίο (Ερντογάν),  
θερμή υποδοχή (στη 
Θράκη)
On the right track on 
the Aegean 
( Erdoğan), warm 
welcome (Thrace)
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/ss3?
q=%D4%EF
%F5%F1%EA
%25&a=&pb=1
&dt1=25/04/2004
&dt2=10/05/2004
&r=0&p=0&id=6
7879372 
Kathimerini – Greek newspaper
25/04/04 Τολμηρές λύσεις  
θέλει η επόμενη 
μέρα
The next day 
needs bold 
solutions
Κυπριακό, Σχέδιο Ανάν,  
αναγκαία η αλλαγή 
πολιτικής
Cyprus issue, Annan 
Plan, change of 
policy needed
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_25/04/2004_
101788
25/04/04 Οι πρώτες  
διπλωματικές 
κινήσεις από 
την Αθήνα
The first 
diplomatic 
moves of 
Athens
Η Κύπρος αποφασίζει, η 
Ελλάδα συμπαρίσταται,  
μέτρα πολιτικής υπέρ 
Τουρκοκυπρίων,  
βελτίωση 
ελληνοτουρκικών 
σχέσεων
Cyprus decides, 
Greece supports, pro 
Turkish – Cypriots 
political measures, 
improvement of 
Greek – Turkish 
relations 
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_25/04/2004_
101786   
25/04/04 Καταλυτικό 
“όχι” 
Ελληνοκυπρίων
Greek – 
Cypriots' “no” 
catalytic
Ελληνοκύπριοι,  
Τουρκοκύπριοι,  
ψύχραιμη η Αθήνα, λύπη 
ΗΠΑ και ΕΕ
Greek – Cypriots, 
Turkish – Cypriots, 
calm Athens, USA 
and EU sad
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_25/04/2004_
101787 
25/04/04 Η διαχείριση The Δημοψήφισμα,  Referendum, results, http://news.kathi
103
του “όχι” management 
of “no” 
αποτέλεσμα, λύπη 
εκφράζουν ΗΠΑ και ΕΕ
USA and EU sad merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_25/04/2004_
101795 
25/04/05 Όταν οι 
“ανθέλληνες” 
πληθύνονται
When the 
“anti-Greeks” 
become more 
Δημοψήφισμα, ΗΠΑ, 
δεξιά, αριστερά
Referendum, USA, 
right-wing, left-wing
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_colum
ns_2_25/04/2004
_101763
25/04/05 Νέα στρατηγική 
για την Κύπρο
New strategy 
for Cyprus
Ελλάδα, Κύπρος, μετά το 
δημοψήφισμα, στόχοι να 
είναι ειρηνικοί και  
δίκαιοι
Greece, Cyprus, 
post-Referendum, 
peaceful and fair 
objectives
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_colum
ns_2_25/04/2004
_101790
27/04/05 Ζωντανή η 
ελπίδα λύσης
Hope for 
solution still 
exists
Ήπια σταση ΕΕ,  
Λευκωσία,  
Τουρκοκύπριοι,  
επανενοποίηση του 
νησιού
Mild EU position, 
Lefkosia, Turkish-
Cypriots, 
reunification of the 
island
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_27/04/2004_
101923 
27/04/04 Η Τουρκία 
στέκει  
απορημένη μετά 
τις εξελίξεις  
(Burak Bekdil)
Turkey 
surprised after 
the events
Τουρκία, Κύπρος, ΕΕ,  
ευθύνες για διχοτόμηση
Turkey, Cyprus, EU, 
responsibility for the 
partition of Cyprus
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_27/04/2004_
101908 
28/04/04 Η Τουρκία δεν 
θα πρέπει να 
αγνοεί τον 
Παπαδόπουλο 
(Mehmet Ali Birand)
Turkey must 
not ignore 
Papadopoulos
Κύπρος, πολιτικές  
ηγετών, Τουρκία, Σχέδιο 
Ανάν, Παπαδόπουλος
Cyprus, leaders' 
policies, Turkey, 
Annan Plan, 
Papadopoulos
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_28/04/2004_
102027 
29/04/05 Ο κρίσιμος  
Δεκέμβριος
The crucial 
December
Κύπρος, ΕΕ, Τουρκία,  
συνεργασία Αθήνας με 
Κύπρο,ΗΠΑ,Ερντογάν
Cyprus, EU, Turkey, 
Athens-Cyprus 
cooperation, USA, 
Erdoğan
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_colum
ns_2_29/04/2004
_102116
30/04/04 Χωρίς  
αντίρρηση η 
επίσκεψη
No objections 
to the visit
Ερντογάν, Θράκη Erdoğan, Thrace http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_30/04/2004_
102318
30/04/04 Θα περιμένει  
πολύ η Τουρκία 
για την ένταξη,  
λέει ο Σιράκ
Turkey will 
have to wait 
for EU 
accession, says 
Chirac
ΕΕ, δηλώσεις Σιράκ EU, Chirac's 
statements for 
Turkey
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_world
_2_30/04/2004_1
02293 
02/05/04 Ευρωπαϊκές  
Συμπληγάδες 
Τουρκίας
Turkey's 
European 
obstacles
Τουρκία, ΕΕ, Κύπρος,  
σχέση Τουρκίας με ΗΠΑ
Turkey, EU, Cyprus, 
Turkey-USA 
relationship
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_02/05/2004_
104
102426 
02/05/04 Καραμανλής – 
Ερντογάν “σαν 
δυο φίλοι που 
γνωρίζονταν 
από παλιά” 
Karamanlis- 
Erdoğan “like 
two old 
friends”
Προσδοκίες Αθήνας,  
επίσκεψη, ΕΕ,  
μειονότητα, βελτίωση 
επικοινωνίας
Athens' expectations, 
visit, EU, minority, 
improvement of 
communication
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_02/05/2004_
102427 
02/05/04 Στρατηγική 
“εξημέρωσης 
του θηρίου” 
“domestication 
of the beast” 
policy
Διπλωματικό παζλ,  
Θράκη, απόφαση 
Ελσίνκι
Diplomatic puzzle, 
Thrace, Helsinki's 
decision
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_02/05/2004_
102428 
04/05/04 Συζήτηση για 
όλα με τον 
Ερντογάν
Conversation 
about 
everything 
with  Erdoğan
Επίσκεψη, συζήτηση 
διμερών θεμάτων,  
υποστήριξη Ελλάδας 
στην ευρωπαϊκή πορεία 
της Τουρκίας,  
ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις
Visit, discussion 
about bilateral 
issues, Greece's 
support to Turkey's 
European track, 
Greek – Turkish 
relations
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_04/05/2004_
102547
05/05/04 Ευρεία ατζέντα 
με Ερντογάν
Wide agenda 
with Erdoğan  
Επίσκεψη, πρόγραμμα,  
αντίδραση ΠΑΣΟΚ στην 
επίσκεψη στη Θράκη
Visit, program, 
PASOK's reaction to 
the visit to Thrace
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_05/05/2004_
102659 
06/05/04 Με ιδιωτικό 
δείπνο στη 
Ραφήνα αρχίζει  
η επίσκεψη 
Ερντογάν 
Erdoğan's visit 
begins with 
private dinner 
at Rafina
Επίσκεψη Ερντογάν,  
θετικό κλίμα, φιλικές  
διαθέσεις, πρόγραμμα 
επίσκεψης
Erdoğan's visit, 
positive climate, 
friendly mood, 
program of the visit
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_06/05/2004_
102779
07/05/04 Αφετηρία για  
μια νέα εποχή η 
επίσκεψη
The visit as a 
starting point 
for a new era
Νέα εποχή στις  
ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις,  
ειρήνη, σταθερότητα,  
ασφάλεια, στόχοι
New era in Greek – 
Turkish relations, 
peace, stability, 
security, objectives
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_07/05/2004_
102931
07/05/04 Αθήνα και  
Άγκυρα σε νέα 
εποχή
Athens and 
Ankara enter a 
new era
Νέα εποχή, σχέσεις  
Αθήνας – Άγκυρας, 
επίσκεψη Ερντογάν
New era, Athens-
Ankara relations, 
Erdoğan's visit
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_07/05/2004_
102950
08/05/04 Πολύ καλό 
κλίμα, θετική 
δυναμική
Very good 
climate, 
positive 
dynamics
Ενίσχυση συνεργασίας,  
θέματα συζήτησης,  
δηλώσεις 
πρωθυπουργών,  
Κυπριακό
Cooperation 
enhancement, issues 
of discussion, Prime 
Minister's 
statements, Cyprus 
issue
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_08/05/2004_
103068 
08/05/04 Κανένα χρονικό 
όριο προσφυγής  
για την 
υφαλοκρηπίδα
No time limit 
for appeal for 
the continental 
shelf
Επίσκεψη Ερντογάν,  
συνομιλίες, Αιγαίο,  
αισιοδοξία
Erdoğan's visit, 
discussions, Aegean, 
optimism
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_08/05/2004_
103069 
08/05/04 Με το βλέμμα Eyes on the Επίσκεψη Ερντογάν, νέα Erdoğan's visit, new http://news.kathi
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στραμμένο στο 
μέλλον
future δυναμική, Καραμανλής,  
Χάλκη, Χάγη, στήριξη σε 
Τουρκία για ΕΕ, 
συνεργασία στη 
μεταφορά πετρελαίου
dynamic, 
Karamanlis, Chalki, 
Hague, (Greece's) 
support to Turkey in 
the EU, cooperation 
in transferring oil
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_08/05/2004_
103083 
08/05/04 Μετρημένες στα 
δάχτυλα οι  
επισκέψεις τα 
τελευταία 50 
χρόνια
Only a few 
visits over the 
last 50 years
Επισκέψεις Τούρκων 
επισήμων, Ερντογάν στη 
Θράκη
Visits of Turkish 
officials, Erdoğan in 
Thrace
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_08/05/2004_
103070 
08/05/04 Τα δύο κρίσιμα 
90λεπτα στην 
Κομοτηνή
(article  
referring to 
the private 
parts of  
Erdo  ğ  an's   
visit in  
Thrace)
Επίσκεψη Ερντογάν στη 
Θράκη, ελεύθερος 
χρόνος του
Erdoğan's visit to 
Thrace, his free time
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_08/05/2004_
103067 
08/05/04 Τί συζήτησαν 
στο παρασκήνιο 
οι δύο ηγέτες
The two 
leaders 
lobbying
Θέμα παραβιάσεων από 
Καραμανλή, ΕΕ,  
Ερντογάν
Karamanlis set issue 
of transgression, EU, 
Erdoğan
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_08/05/2004_
103073 
09/05/04 Οι προσδοκίες  
της Αθήνας και  
το εσωτερικό 
ρίσκο Ερντογάν
The 
expectations 
of Athens and 
Erdoğan's 
internal risk
Επίσκεψη, Τουρκία, ΕΕ Visit, Turkey, EU http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_09/05/2004_
103189 
09/05/04 Όσα έγιναν 
μακριά από 
τους προβολείς
What 
happened 
away from the 
lights
Επίσκεψη, επιβεβαίωση 
θετικής ατμόσφαιρας
Visit, confirmation 
of positive 
atmosphere
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_09/05/2004_
103182 
09/05/04 Τώρα το καλό 
κλίμα, τα 
δύσκολα 
αργότερα...
Good climate 
now, 
difficulties 
later...
Επίσκεψη, ΕΕ, Αιγαίο,  
υφαλοκρηπίδα, Χάγη
Visit, EU, Aegean, 
continental shelf, 
Hague
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_09/05/2004_
103183 
09/05/04 “Εργαστείτε για 
μια ισχυρή 
Ελλάδα” 
“Work for a 
powerful 
Greece”
Δηλώσεις Ερντογάν,  
επίσκεψη στη Θράκη
Erdoğan's 
statements, visit to 
Thrace
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politic
s_2_09/05/2004_
103181 
Hürriyet and Hürriyet Daily News – Turkish newspapers
*in the parts of Hürriyet Daily News, there is no translation, since they were published in English
24/04/04 Greek Cypriot  
voted No, Turks  
Yes
- Cyprus, Annan Plan,  
Referendum, Results
- http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/24/448237.a
sp 
24/04/04 Historical Seal - Cyprus, Referendum, - http://webarsiv.hu
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Annan Plan rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/24/448238.a
sp 
24/04/04 Rumlar 'Hayır',  
Türkler 'Evet'  
dedi 
Greek – 
Cypriots “No”, 
Turkish-
Cypriots “Yes”
Kıbrıs, çözüm planı,  
kesin sonuçlar,  
referandum, Avrupa 
Birliği   
Cyprus, solution 
plan, elections 
results, referendum, 
EU
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/24/448121.a
sp 
24/04/04 Muhtemel  
senaryolar 
Possible 
scenarios
Kıbrıs, Türklerin Annan 
Planına dayalı çözümü 
desteklediğini  
gösteriyor, AB, Kimse de 
Türkiye’yi işgalci olarak 
suçlayamaz, Amerika,  
Ege sorunları 
Cyprus, Turks show 
their support to a 
solution by 
supporting the 
Annan Plan, EU, no 
one can blame 
Turkey for being an 
invader, America, 
Aegean issues
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/24/448123.a
sp 
24/04/04 Referandum 
sonrası senaryo 
Post – 
Referendum 
scenario
Kıbrıs Cyprus http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/24/448124.a
sp 
24/04/04 Gül: KKTC'ye 
ambargo sona 
ermeli 
Gül: the 
embargo to 
TRNC must 
come to an 
end
Dışişleri Bakanı 
Abdullah Gül, Kıbrıs,  
ambargo kaldırılmalıdır 
Foreign Minister 
Gül, Cyprus, 
embargo must be 
lifted
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/24/448125.a
sp 
24/04/04 AB: Ada'daki  
tek fırsat 
kaçırıldı 
EU: the only 
chance (for a 
solution) on 
the island was 
lost
Avrupa Birliği, "Rum 
halkı çözüm yolundaki  
tek fırsatı kaçırdı",  
Türkler çözüm 
konusunda iyi bir çaba 
gösterdi 
EU, “the Greek-
Turkish people lost 
the only chance 
towards a solution”, 
the Turks showed a 
good effort towards a 
solution 
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/24/448126.a
sp 
24/04/04 Rum Yönetimi  
Sözcüsü:  
Çözüm istiyoruz 
Greek-Cypriot 
administration'
s 
representative: 
we want a 
solution
Kıbrıs, Rum, Çözüm Cyprus, Greek – 
Cypriots, solution
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/24/448127.a
sp 
24/04/04 Erdoğan:  
Güney Kıbrıs  
kaybetti
Erdoğan: 
North Cyprus 
lost
Referandumların 
sonuçları, ''TAVRIMIZ 
AYNI ŞEKİLDE DEVAM 
EDECEKTİR'' 
Referendum results, 
“our attitude will 
continue in the same 
way”
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/24/448134.a
sp
24/04/04 Papadopulos:  
Çözüme karşı  
değiliz 
Papadopoulos: 
we are not 
opposed to a 
solution
Kıbrıs'ta çözüme karşı  
olmadıklarını, Annan 
planının bu versiyonuna 
karşı olduklarını söyledi. 
(Papadopoulos) said 
they are not opposed 
to a solution in 
Cyprus, they are 
opposed to this 
version of the Annan 
Plan
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/24/448135.a
sp
25/04/04 ‘Rumlar barışı  
torpilledi’
Greek-
Cypriots 
wrecked peace
Kıbrıs, referandum Cyprus, referendum http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/25/448586.a
sp
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25/04/04 Papadopulos:  
Çözüm için 
çabalar sürecek 
Papadopoulos: 
the efforts 
towards a 
solution will 
go on
KIBRISLI TÜRKLER 
İÇİN 'AB İMKANLARI',  
Kıbrıs Rum, AB
Turkish-Cypriots' 
'EU potential', 
Greek-Cypriots, EU
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/25/448587.a
sp
25/04/04 KKTC 
tanınmayacak 
ama ambargo 
kalkacak 
TRNC will not 
be recognized, 
but the 
embargo will 
be lifted
Kıbrıs Cyprus http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/25/448590.a
sp
25/04/04 Yeni Kıbrıs için 
Evet 
Yes to a new 
Cyprus
Kıbrıs’ta referandumda 
beklenen oldu
The expected 
happened in Cyprus 
referendum
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/25/448594.a
sp
26/04/04 İlk karar 
AB'den 
The first 
decision from 
EU
Avrupa Birliği,  
ekonomik yardım
EU, economic aid http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/26/449090.a
sp
28/04/04 Karamanlis'ten 
Papadopulos'a 
tam destek 
Karamanlis 
supports 
Papadopoulos 
completely
Yunanistan, Karamanlis,  
aldığı karara saygı,  
desteğini tüm gücüyle 
sürdüreceği
Greece, Karamanlis, 
respect to the 
decision made (by 
Greek -Cypriots), 
support will continue 
with all their power
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/28/450292.a
sp
29/04/04 Annan'dan 
Türklere övgü 
Rumlara yergi
Turkish-
Cypriots 
praised by 
Annan
Annan, Kıbrıs  
Türkleri’ni kutladı 
Annan congratulated 
Turkish-Cypriots
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/04/29/450896.a
sp
01/05/04 "Biz  
tanımıyoruz  
anlamsız" 
'we're not 
recognizing' 
does not make 
sense
AB, Rum kesimin 
sonuçları
EU, results of Greek-
Cypriots' elections
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/05/01/452030.a
sp
01/05/04 Rum basını:  
Günaydın 
Avrupa
Greek-
Cypriots' 
headlines: 
Goodmorning 
Europe
AB, Kıbrıs Rum basını EU, Greek-Turkish 
headlines
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/05/01/452023.a
sp
03/05/04 Atina'dan 
Ege'de taciz  
iddiası 
Athens' claims 
harassment in 
the Aegean 
Ege, Türk savaş uçakları Aegean, Athens, 
Turkish aircraft
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/05/03/452894.a
sp
06/05/04 Erdoğan 
Atina'da 
 Erdoğan in 
Athens
Erdoğan,  Karamanlis'in 
davetlisi olarak,  Atina 
ve Batı Trakya'yı ziyaret  
ediyor
Erdoğan, invited by 
Karamanlis, visiting 
Athens and Eastern 
Thrace
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/05/06/454628.a
sp
07/05/04 Atina'dan 
Ankara'ya 
stratejik  
ortaklık önerisi
The 
suggestion for 
strategic 
cooperation 
from Athens to 
Ankara
Yunanistan, Türkiye,  
stratejik ortaklık, AB,  
Kıbrıs
Greece, Turkey, 
strategic 
cooperation, EU, 
Cyprus
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/05/07/455179.a
sp
07/05/04 'Küçük The future of Erdoğan, Ege Denizi'nin  Erdoğan, the Aegean http://webarsiv.hu
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hesaplarla 2 
ülkenin 
geleceği  
kararmasın' 
the 2 countries 
shall not be 
overshadowed 
by small 
disputes
barış denizi haline 
getirilmesi gerektiğini  
kaydetti, Karamanlis
must be brought to 
be a peace sea, 
Karamanlis
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/05/07/455181.a
sp
07/05/04 Erdoğan'ın  
ziyareti dünya 
basınında yankı  
buldu 
The visit of 
Erdoğan on 
the 
international 
press
Ziyaret, Daily  
Telegraph, Le Monde,  
YUNAN BASINI:  
İLİŞKİLERDE YENİ 
BİR SAYFA
Visit, Daily 
Telegraph, Le 
Monde, Greek 
headlines: new page 
in the relations 
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/05/07/455181.a
sp
08/05/04 Erdoğan’a 
tarihi karşılama 
The historic 
welcome to 
Erdoğan
Yunanistan, ziyaret,  
Gümülcine’de Batı  
Trakyalı Türkler 
Greece, visit, 
Komotini, Turks of 
East Thrace
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/05/08/455739.a
sp
08/05/04 Atina’da tarihi  
diyalog 
The historic 
dialogue in 
Athens
Erdoğan: Geçmişi  
geçmişe bırakıp 
geleceğe bakalım,  
Karamanlis: Stratejik  
ortaklık  
Erdoğan: Let's leave 
the past behind, look 
towards the future, 
Karamanlis: strategic 
cooperation
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/05/08/455740.a
sp
08/05/04 Yunan basını:  
İkili ilişkilerde 
yeni dönem 
Greek 
headlines: the 
new era in 
bilateral 
relations 
Erdoğan'ın Atina 
ziyareti, Türk-Yunan 
ilişkilerine yeni bir  
dinamik
The visit of Erdoğan, 
new dynamics in 
Greek-Turkish 
relations 
http://webarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/200
4/05/08/455741.a
sp
Zaman and Today's Zaman  – Turkish newspapers 
25/04/04 Rumlar Kıbrıs'ı  
böldü
The Greek-
Cypriots 
divided 
Cyprus
Kıbrıs, referandum, 
Annan Planı, Rumlar,  
Avrupa Birliği, Amerika 
Cyprus, referendum, 
Annan Plan, Greek-
Cypriots, EU, 
America
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=40862 
25/04/04 Sonuçtan 'derin 
üzüntü' duyan 
AB, tutum 
belirliyor
The “deep 
regret” of EU 
for the result, 
define the 
procedure 
AB, Türk tarafını 'sıcak'  
bir şekilde tebrik etti
EU 'warmly' 
congratulated 
Turkish-Cypriot side 
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=40864 
25/04/04 Yunanistan 
tepkilerden 
endişeli
Greece 
stressed by the 
reactions
Referandum, Kıbrıs, 
Atina'nın çabalarına 
devam edeceğini
Referendum, 
Cyprus, the efforts of 
Athens will go on
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=40866 
25/04/04 Erdoğan:  
Kıbrıs  
Türklerine 
tecrit politikası  
artık bitmeli
Erdoğan: the 
isolation of 
Turkish-
Cypriots must 
end
Erdoğan, Kıbrıs,  
referandumların 
sonuçları, farklı bir  
dönem, AB 
Erdoğan, Cyprus, 
results of 
referendum, different 
era, EU
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=40871 
25/04/04 Bakan Gül:  
Annan Planı  
öldü barış  
istemeyen taraf  
belli oldu
Minister Gül: 
the Annan 
Plan died, the 
side which 
does not want 
peace was 
exposed
Dışişleri Bakanı 
Abdullah Gül, Rum 
Kesimi, referandum, 
hayır
Foreign Minister 
Gül, Greek-Cypriots' 
elections, 
referendum, no
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=40870 
25/04/04 Rumlar 'hayır'  
dedi Türkler  
kurtuldu! 
Greek-
Cypriots said 
'no' the Turks 
were saved!
Annan Planı, sonuç,  
"işgalci"
Annan Plan, result, 
“invader”
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=40872 
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26/04/04 Karamanlis  
kıskaçta
Karamanlis 
under pressure
Yunanistan,  
anamuhalefet partisi  
PASOK, Avrupa 
Greece, opposition 
party PASOK, 
Europe
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=41007 
26/04/04 Annan Planı  
öldü; ama 
'ruhu'  
yaşayacak
Annan Plan 
died; but its 
'spirit' will live
Referandum sonucu,  
Denktaş
Results of the 
Referendum, 
Denktaş
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=41012 
28/04/04 Erdoğan, Batı  
Trakya'ya giden 
ilk başbakan 
olacak
Erdoğan will 
be the first 
Prime Minister 
to visit Eastern 
Thrace
Erdoğan, Yunanistan'a 
resmi ziyaret, Batı  
Trakya 
Erdoğan, the official 
visit to Greece, 
Eastern Thrace
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=41776 
29/04/04 Karamanlis ve 
Papadopulos  
tek yürek: Plan 
masada
Karamanlis 
and 
Papadopoulos 
one heart: the 
Plan on table
Saygı, Karamanlis,  
Papadopulos 
Respect, Karamanlis, 
Papadopoulos
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=42252 
30/04/04 Erdoğan'dan 
'birlik' mesajı
Erdoğan's 
message of 
'unity'
Talat, Denktaş, Gül,  
Erdoğan 
Talat, Denktaş, Gül, 
Erdoğan 
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=42585 
01/05/04 'Türkiye'nin AB 
üyeliği  
güvenliğimiz 
için kazanç'
'Turkey earned 
our trust for 
EU 
membership'
Schröder, Fischer Schröder, Fischer http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=43041 
02/05/04 Erdoğan:  
Rumları  
tanımıyorum 
demek çare 
değil
Erdoğan: to 
say 'I do not 
recognize 
Greek-
Cypriots is not 
going to make 
things better'
Erdoğan, Avrupa Birliği,  
Rumlar AB'de Türkleri  
temsil edemez 
Erdoğan, EU, the 
Greek-Cypriots 
cannot represent the 
Turkish-Cypriots in 
the EU
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=43357 
03/05/04 Rumlar AB'de 
Türkleri temsil  
edemez 
The Greek-
Cypriots 
cannot 
represent the 
Turkish-
Cypriots in the 
EU
Ege, Kıbrıs, AB Aegean, Cyprus, EU http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=43898 
04/05/04 'Erdoğan gafil  
avladı'
'Erdoğan 
surprised'
Yunanistan, Erdoğan'ın 
Batı Trakya ziyareti
Greece,  Erdoğan's 
visit to Eastern 
Thrace
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=43955 
04/05/04 "Erdoğan'ın 
Yunanistan 
ziyareti  
ilişkilerin 
kalıcılığı  
mesajını verir"
“Erdoğan's 
visit to Greece 
passes the 
message of 
stability in the 
relations”
Erdoğan: iki ülke 
arasındaki iyi ilişkilerin  
kalıcı olduğu mesajını,  
Erdoğan'ın Yunanistan 
ziyaretinin resmi ve özel  
olmak 
Erdoğan: there are 
good and stable 
relations between the 
two countries, the 
official and private 
parts of the visit
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=44152 
04/05/04 Türk-Yunan 
dostluk ilişkileri  
tarımsal alana 
taşındı
The friendly 
Greek-Turkish 
relations 
transferred to 
the 
Türkiye, Yunanistan, son 
yıllarda artan dostluk 
ilişkileri 
Turkey, Greece, over 
the last years the 
friendly relations 
grow
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=44167  
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agricultural 
sector
06/05/04 Erdoğan ve 
Karamanlis,  
Atina'da 
'kazan-kazan'  
düğmesine 
basıyor 
Erdoğan ve 
Karamanlis a 
'win-win' 
situation in 
Athens
Erdoğan: üç günlük 
tarihî Yunanistan 
ziyareti, Atina,  
Karamanlis
Erdoğan: 3-days visit 
to Greece, Athens, 
Karamanlis
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=44734 
06/05/04 Rusopulos: 
Gündemde, ikili  
ilişkiler, Kıbrıs,  
AB ve 
Ortadoğu var
Rousopoulos: 
bilateral 
relations, 
Cyprus, EU 
and Middle 
East on the 
agenda
Yunanistan ziyaretinin 
gündeminde ikili ilişkiler 
ve uluslararası konular 
Bilateral relations 
and international 
issues on the agenda 
of the visit to Greece
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=44987 
07/05/04 Özal'dan sonra 
Atina'da ilk  
Türk başbakan
The first PM 
after Özal to 
visit Athens
Erdoğan, ziyaret, Batı  
Trakya Türkleri 
Erdoğan, visit, Turks 
of Eastern Thrace
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45127 
07/05/04 'Kapı komşumla 
dost olmazsam 
yolda kalırım'
'if I cannot be 
friends with 
my neighbor I 
will stay on 
the street' (old 
saying)
Erdoğan, Yunanistan ,  
Yunanistan ve Türkiye 
arasındaki ilişkilerin  
geliştirilmesi 
Erdoğan, Greece, 
bilateral relations 
evolving
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45128 
07/05/04 Yunan basını:  
İlişkilerde yeni  
bir sayfa açıldı
Greek 
headlines: a 
new page to 
the relations 
Erdoğan, ziyaret,  
gazeteler 
Erdoğan, visit, 
newspapers
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45245 
07/05/04 Başbakan 
Erdoğan:  
Geçmişi 
bırakalım 
PM Erdoğan: 
let's leave the 
past behind
Erdoğan, Karamanlis,  
açıklama 
Erdoğan, 
Karamanlis, 
statement 
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45267 
07/05/04 Karamanlis:  
Erdoğan ile  
yapıcı bir  
görüşme yaptık
Karamanlis: a 
fruitful 
meeting with 
Erdoğan
Yunanistan, Karamanlis,  
Erdoğan, görüşme 
Greece, Karamanlis, 
Erdoğan, meeting
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45268 
07/05/04 Erdoğan,  
Yunanistan 
Cumhurbaşkanı  
tarafından 
kabul edildi
Greek 
President of 
Democracy 
received 
Erdoğan 
Ziyaret, Türk-Yunan 
ilişkilerini geliştirme ,  
Stefanapulos 
Visit, Greek-Turkish 
relations evolving, 
Stefanopoulos
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45272 
07/05/04 Erdoğan:  
Yunanistan ile  
ilişkileri  
geliştirmeye 
çalışıyoruz
Erdoğan: we 
are trying to 
improve our 
relations with 
Greece 
Erdoğan, Yunanistan,  
ikili ilişkileri, işbirlik
Erdoğan, Greece, 
bilateral relations, 
unity
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45294 
07/05/04 Erdoğan: Ege 
sorununun 
çözüm süreci  
olumlu devam 
ediyor
Erdoğan: the 
procedure 
towards a 
solution to the 
Aegean issue 
continues 
Erdoğan, Ege 
sorununun çözümü 
konusu
Erdoğan, solution to 
Aegean issue
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45344 
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positively
08/05/04 İki lider eski  
hesapları  
bıraktı stratejik  
ortaklığa adım 
attı
The two 
leaders left the 
old issues 
behind and 
spoke of 
strategic 
cooperation
Erdoğan, Atina,  
Karamanlis, tarihî  
ziyaret, güvenli ortak 
Erdoğan, Athens, 
Karamanlis, 
historical visit, 
strong cooperation
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45460 
08/05/04 Erdoğan, Batı  
Trakya'ya 
hareket etti
Erdoğan 
towards 
Eastern Thrace
Erdoğan, Batı Trakya Erdoğan, Eastern 
Thrace
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45650 
09/05/04 52 yıl sonra 
Batı Trakya'da 
duygu yüklü 
buluşma
The visit in 
Eastern Thrace 
after 52 years 
was full of 
emotions
Yunanistan ziyareti, Batı  
Trakya 
Visit to Greece, 
Eastern Thrace
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45836 
09/05/04 Türkler,  
Erdoğan için  
Gümülcine 
kentine akın etti
Turks filled 
Komotini for 
Erdoğan
Batı Trakyalı Türkler,  
Gümülcine, ziyaret
Turks of Eastern 
Thrace, Komotini, 
visit
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45837 
09/05/04 Yunan basını:  
İki ülke 
ilişkilerinde 
yeni dinamik
Greek 
headlines: new 
dynamic of the 
bilateral 
relations 
Yunan basını,  
Erdoğan'ın Atina 
ziyareti 
Greek headlines, the 
visit of Erdoğan to 
Athens
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?haberno=45838 
• The “Dogfight” of 2006
Eleftherotypia
23/05/06 Σύγκρουση στον 
αέρα
Collision in 
the sky
Παραβίαση, εθνικός 
εναέριος χώρος 
Transgression, 
national airspace
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/online
_text/c=112,dt=2
3.05.2006,id=305
08956
24/05/06 Ο μοιραίος  
ελιγμός και η 
διάσωση -  
θρίλερ
The fatal 
manoeuvre 
and the rescue-
thriller 
Δυστύχημα στο Αιγαίο,  
ήταν μαθηματικά βέβαιο
Accident over the 
Aegean, was going 
to happen at some 
point
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/online
_text/c=110,dt=2
4.05.2006,id=953
83388,13761692,
74032556,79694
636,21512732,35
695516,4372508
4,57902748,6572
7516,72185244,8
6367004,941180
44,7219548,1302
4988,28902492
24/05/06 Αναψαν τα 
τηλέφωνα,  
Αθήνα - Παρίσι  
Telephones 
ringing, 
Athens – Paris 
- Helsinki
Ψυχραιμία, Τούρκοι,  
τηλεφώνημα Γκιουλ στην 
Ντόρα 
Cool, Turks, Gül 
called Dora 
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/online
_text/c=110,dt=2
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- Ελσίνκι 4.05.2006,id=953
83388,13761692,
74032556,79694
636,21512732,35
695516,4372508
4,57902748,6572
7516,72185244,8
6367004,941180
44,7219548,1302
4988,28902492
24/05/06 ΗΠΑ: Μην το 
ξανακάνετε...
USA: “Don't 
do it again...”
«λύπη», κρατώντας  
αποστάσεις, αποφυγή 
παρόμοιων μελλοντικών 
επεισοδίων 
“sadness”, keeping 
distance, avoid 
similar incidents in 
the future
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/online
_text/c=110,dt=2
4.05.2006,id=953
83388,13761692,
74032556,79694
636,21512732,35
695516,4372508
4,57902748,6572
7516,72185244,8
6367004,941180
44,7219548,1302
4988,28902492
24/05/06 Πολύ χαμηλοί  
τόνοι στο 
ΝΑΤΟ
Low tones 
within NATO
Ηπια στάση, ΝΑΤΟ, 
Αιγαίο, χαμηλοί τόνοι
Mild position, 
NATO, Aegean, low 
tones
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/online
_text/c=110,dt=2
4.05.2006,id=953
83388,13761692,
74032556,79694
636,21512732,35
695516,4372508
4,57902748,6572
7516,72185244,8
6367004,941180
44,7219548,1302
4988,28902492
24/05/06 Αγκυρα: Νομικό 
το θέμα, ήταν 
ενήμερο το 
ΝΑΤΟ
Ankara: legal 
matter, NATO 
was informed
Τουρκία, ΝΑΤΟ Αιγαίο Turkey, NATO, 
Aegean
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/online
_text/c=110,dt=2
4.05.2006,id=953
83388,13761692,
74032556,79694
636,21512732,35
695516,4372508
4,57902748,6572
7516,72185244,8
6367004,941180
44,7219548,1302
4988,28902492
24/05/06 «Διενέξεις» BBC, CNN 
predict 
Διένεξη στο Αιγαίο,  
CNN, BBC
Conflict, Aegean, 
CNN, BBC
http://archive.ene
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βλέπουν BBC, 
CNN
“conflict” t.gr/online/online
_text/c=110,dt=2
4.05.2006,id=953
83388,13761692,
74032556,79694
636,21512732,35
695516,4372508
4,57902748,6572
7516,72185244,8
6367004,941180
44,7219548,1302
4988,28902492
24/05/06 Γιώργος κατά 
Αγκυρας και  
κυβέρνησης
Giorgos 
against Ankara 
and 
government
Παπανδρέου,  
Κατηγόρησε την 
κυβέρνηση, προκλήσεις  
της Τουρκίας 
Papandreou, blamed 
the government, 
challenges by Turkey
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/online
_text/c=110,dt=2
4.05.2006,id=953
83388,13761692,
74032556,79694
636,21512732,35
695516,4372508
4,57902748,6572
7516,72185244,8
6367004,941180
44,7219548,1302
4988,28902492
24/05/06 Μισή ώρα 
πετούσε ο Αρης 
στο Αιγαίο
Mars was 
flying over the 
Aegean for 
half an hour
Στα πρόθυρα 
σύγκρουσης, για περίπου 
μισή ώρα 
Brink of conflict for 
about half an hour
http://archive.ene
t.gr/online/online
_text/c=110,dt=2
4.05.2006,id=953
83388,13761692,
74032556,79694
636,21512732,35
695516,4372508
4,57902748,6572
7516,72185244,8
6367004,941180
44,7219548,1302
4988,28902492
Kathimerini
24/05/06 «Παιχνίδι  
ποντικού και  
γάτας»,βλέπουν 
τα ξένα ΜΜΕ 
Foreign  media 
“cat-mouse 
game”
Αιγαίο, διεθνής Τύπος Aegean, foreign 
press
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_24/05/2006
_185081
24/05/06 Αντίδραση υπό 
τον φόβο 
«θερμού 
επεισοδίου» 
Fear of “hot 
episode” 
caused 
reaction
Εμπλοκή, Πολεμική 
Αεροπορία, πολιτικές 
παρενέργειες, ένταση 
Engagement, Air 
force, political 
implications, tension
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_24/05/2006
_185064
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24/05/06 Η έκρηξη 
ακούστηκε 
μέχρι την 
Κάρπαθο 
The explosion 
was heard in 
Karpathos
'Ελληνας πιλότος,  
αγανάκτηση των 
κατοίκων 
Greek pilot, 
residents' indignation 
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2  _24/05/2006  
_185062
24/05/06 Μπακογιάννη -  
Γκιουλ 
συμφώνησαν σε 
αποτροπή 
έντασης 
Bakoyannis-
Gül agreed on 
prevention of 
tension
γεγονός στο Aιγαίο,  
αντιδράσεις Ελλάδας - 
Τουρκίας
Incident in the 
Aegean, reaction of 
Greece and Turkey
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_24/05/2006
_185083
24/05/06 Στα άκρα 
οδηγεί ο  
«επικίνδυνος 
σύμμαχος» 
The 
“dangerous 
ally” pushes to 
the limits
Σύγκρουση ελληνικού 
και τουρκικού F-16 
εντός του FIR Αθηνών 
Greek and Turkish 
F-16 collide within 
Athens FIR 
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_24/05/2006
_185065
24/05/06 «Kόκκινη 
γραμμή» 
Xηνοφώτη-
Oζκιόκ 
“Hotline” 
between 
Chinofotis – 
Özkök
Eλλάδα, Tουρκία, πολύ 
κοντά σε μια κρίση, 
άμεση επικοινωνία των 
δύο αρχηγών
Greece, Turkey, very 
close to crisis, 
immediate 
communication 
between the two 
leaders
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_24/05/2006
_185085
24/05/06 Φονική 
εμπλοκή στο 
Αιγαίο 
Lethal 
engagement 
over the 
Aegean
Απέφυγαν τη μεγάλη 
κρίση Αθήνα και Αγκυρα 
Athens and Ankara 
avoided major crisis
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_24/05/2006
_185094
24/05/06 Xαμηλοί τόνοι  
από την 
'Aγκυρα 
Low tones 
from Ankara 
Xαμηλοί τόνοι,  τουρκικά 
μέσα ενημέρωσης 
Low tones, Turkish 
media
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2  _24/05/2006  
_185084
25/05/06 Προκλητικές  
τουρκικές  
ερμηνείες  
ενοχοποιούν 
την Aθήνα 
Provocative 
Turkish 
interpretations 
blame Athens
Δυστύχημα, ευθύνη της  
μοιραίας σύγκρουσης 
στην Ελλάδα, τουρκικές  
εφημερίδες 
Accident, 
responsibility of the 
fatal collision on 
Greece, Turkish 
newspapers
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_25/05/2006
_185217
25/05/06 Τέλος στις  
αυταπάτες 
No more 
illusions
Τουρκία, ανοχή της  
ελληνικής κυβερνήσεως,  
πλαίσιο ΕΕ
Turkey, Greek 
government's 
tolerance, EU 
framework
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_colum
ns_2_25/05/2006
_185230
Hürriyet and Hürriyet Daily News 
23/05/06 Türk ve Yunan 
savaş uçakları  
it dalaşında 
çarpıştı 
Greek and 
Turkish 
aircraft 
collided during 
dogfight
Ege Denizi,  NATO'ya 
bildirilmiş bir uçuştu
Aegean, NATO was 
informed about the 
flight
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/haber.aspx?
id=4459697&tari
h=2006-05-23 
24/05/06 Hava 
kuvvetleri:  
Air forces: the 
Greek aircraft 
Kaza, Türk Hava 
Kuvvetleri, Açıklama 
Accident, Turkish 
Air Force, statement
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
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Yunan uçakları  
uçaklarımızı  
taciz etmiştir 
annoyed our 
aircraft
er/haber.aspx?
id=4467585&tari
h=2006-05-24 
24/05/06 Ege Denizi'nde 
yeni kriz riski 
Risk of new 
crisis in the 
Aegean
 Kardak krizinden sonra 
'en ciddi' çatışma,  
Yabancı basın
The most serious 
conflict after the 
Kardak crisis, 
foreign press  
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/haber.aspx?
id=4465695&tari
h=2006-05-24 
25/05/06 Uluşlararası  
sahada oldu 
It happened in 
international 
territory 
Ege, çarpışma, NATO 
raporu 
Aegean, collision, 
NATO report
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/haber.aspx?
id=4469889&tari
h=2006-05-25 
25/05/06 Türk pilot  
tabanca çekti  
mi ?
Did the 
Turkish pilot 
draw a gun?
Yunan gazeteleri, Yunan 
kurtarma ekibi
Greek newspapers, 
Greek rescue team
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/haber.aspx?
id=4469890&tari
h=2006-05-25 
26/05/06 Çarpışma kaydı  
NATO'ya 
gönderildi 
The paper 
about the 
collision is 
sent to NATO
Çarpışma, NATO Collision, NATO http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/haber.aspx?
id=4475710&tari
h=2006-05-26 
27/05/06 Karamanlis,  
Türkiye'ye 
yüklendi 
Karamanlis 
blamed Turkey
Karamanlis, Ege, F-
16'larının çarpışması 
Karamanlis, Aegean, 
collision of F-16 
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/haber.aspx?
id=4482092&tari
h=2006-05-27 
Zaman and Today's Zaman
23/05/06 Türk ve Yunan 
savaş uçakları  
Ege'de çarpıştı
Greek and 
Turkish 
aircraft 
collided
Ege Denizi, 'it dalaşı' Aegean, 'dogfight' http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=287639 
23/05/06 Gül, Bakoyanni  
ile telefon 
görüşmesi yaptı
Gül had a 
phone meeting 
with 
Bakoyannis
Gül, Bakoyannis, Ege'de 
çarpışma, telefon 
görüşmesi  
Gül, Bakoyannis, the 
collision over the 
Aegean, phone 
meeting
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=287676 
23/05/06 Düşen Yunan 
savaş uçağının 
pilotu aranıyor
In search for 
the pilot of the 
Greek aircraft
uluslararası hava 
sahası, Türk Hava 
Kuvvetleri, Yunan Hava 
Kuvvetleri 
International 
airspace, Turkish Air 
Forces, Greek Air 
Forces
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=287700 
23/05/06 Yunan Savunma 
Bakanlığı'ndan 
Türkiye'ye 
suçlama
Greek Defense 
Ministry 
blames Turkey
Açıklama, Atina FIR ,  
Uçuş planı , NATO 
Statement, Athens 
FIR, Flight Plan, 
NATO
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=287722 
24/05/06 Ege'de 'it  This time the 
'dogfight' in 
Ege Denizi, it dalaşı Aegean, dogfight http://www.zama
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dalaşı' bu kez  
ölümle bitti
the Aegean 
ended with 
death
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=287795 
24/05/06 Yunan basını.  
Havada 
çarpışma yerde 
serinkanlılık
Greek 
headlines. 
Collision in 
the air, 
calmness on 
the ground
Yunan basın, ciddi olay Greek headlines, 
serious incident
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=287947 
24/05/06 Karamanlis  
Türk-Yunan 
uçağı  
çarpışmasını  
değerlendirdi
Karamanlis 
evaluated the 
collision of the 
Greek-Turkish 
aircaft
Karamanlis, Ege, savaş 
uçaklarının çarpışması,  
komşuluk ve dostluk, AB 
Karamanlis, Aegean, 
aircraft collision, 
neighborhood  and 
friendship, EU
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=288077 
24/05/06 Bakoyanni: iyi  
ilişkiler krizin 
büyümesini  
engelledi
Bakoyannis: 
the good 
relations 
restrained 
crisis
Bakoyannis, iyi atmosfer Bakoyannis, good 
atmosphere
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=288213 
25/05/06 İt dalaşı değil,  
Yunan uçağı  
arkadan 
çarpmış
Not a dogfight, 
the Greek 
plane crashed 
behind (the 
Turkish)
Ege sorunu, Çarpışma,  
Ankara, Karamanlis 
Aegean issue, 
collision, Ankara, 
Karamanlis
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=288171 
• Papandreou Attends the “Visionary Diplomacy” Conference in Erzurum
Eleftherotypia
29/11/10
Στο Ερζερούμ 
καλεί ο  
Ερντογάν τον 
Παπανδρέου
Erdoğan invites 
Papandreou to 
Erzurum
Πρόσκληση,  
Παπανδρέου, Ερντογάν 
Invitation, 
Papandreou, Erdoğan
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=227182 
30/12/10
Το σιωπηλό 
2010 Το 
ανελέητο 2011
The silent 
2010, the 
merciless 2011
ελληνοτουρκικά θέματα,  
Ερζερούμ, ελληνική 
εξωτερική πολιτική
Greek-Turkish 
issues, Erzurum, 
Greek foreign policy
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=237271 
31/12/10
Αιγαίο:  
Επικίνδυνες 
εκκρεμότητες
Aegean: 
dangerous 
suspenses 
Παπανδρέου, Ερζερούμ,  
θαλάσσιες ζώνες,  
Κύπρος, Ισραήλ
Papandreou, 
Erzurum, sea zones, 
Cyprus, Israel
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=237373 
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04/01/11
Με το βλέμμα 
στο 
Αιγαίο η 
συνάντησ
η στο 
Ερζερούμ
Meeting in 
Erzurum, eyes 
on the Aegean
Αιγαίο, Παπανδρέου 
δέχτηκε την πρόσκληση,  
Τουρκία 
Aegean, Papandreou 
accepted invitation, 
Turkey 
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=237922 
07/01/11
Στην Τουρκία ο 
Γ.  
Παπανδρ
έου για 
την 
«Οραματι
κή 
Διπλωματ
ία»
Papandreou in 
Turkey for the 
“Visionary 
Diplomacy”
Ένδειξη βελτίωσης των 
ελληνοτουρκικών 
σχέσεων 
Sign of the 
improvement of 
Greek – Turkish 
relations 
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=238648 
07/01/11 Υπερπτήσεις 
και casus belli  
έθεσε ο 
Γιώργος στην 
Άγκυρα
Giorgos put 
overflights and 
casus belli on 
the table 
Παπανδρέου,  
διπλωματία, Συνάντηση 
Papandreou, 
diplomacy, meeting
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=238899 
08/01/11
Ο τουρκικός 
Τύπος για  
την 
επίσκεψη 
του 
Έλληνα 
πρωθυπο
υργού
The Turkish 
press on Greek 
PM's visit
Αντιδράσεις, τουρκικός  
τύπος 
Reactions, Turkish 
press
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=239296 
08/01/11 ΤΡΙΩΡΗ 
ΣΥΝΑΝΤΗΣΗ 
ΠΑΠΑΝΔΡΕΟΥ-
ΕΡΝΤΟΓΑΝ 
ΣΤΟ 
ΕΡΖΕΡΟΥΜ
3-hour meeting 
of Papandreou 
-Erdoğan in 
Erzurum
Χάγη, Παπανδρέου, 
καθεστώς στο Αιγαίο 
Hague, Papandreou, 
status in the Aegean
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=238979 
09/01/11
Το Ερζερούμ 
είναι  
μακριά 
απ' τη 
Χάγη
Erzurum is far 
from Hague
Φιλικό κλίμα στις  
δηλώσεις, σχεδόν 
μηδενική πρόοδος στις  
συζητήσεις
Friendly climate on 
the statements, zero 
progress during 
discussion
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=239138 
10/01/11
Στροφή προς το  
Κυπριακό 
επιχειρεί  
ο  
Davutoğlu 
turns to the 
Cyprus issue
Έκπληξη, τουρκικά 
ΜΜΕ, Ερζερούμ, 
δηλώσεις Παπανδρέου
Surprise, Turkish 
media, Erzurum, 
Papandreou's 
statements
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=239416 
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Νταβούτο
γλου
11/01/11
«Αποδοτική η 
συνομιλίa,  
άκομψη η 
ομιλία»
Fruitful 
discussion, 
impolite speech
Παπανδρέου, Ερντογάν,  
συνομιλία, αντιδράσεις
Papandreou, 
Erdoğan, discussion, 
reactions
http://www.enet.
gr/?
i=news.el.article
&id=239780 
Kathimerini
05/01/11 Χωρίς υψηλές 
προσδοκίες στο 
Ερζερούμ
Without high 
expectations in 
Erzurum
Παπανδρέου, Ερζερούμ,  
Ερντογάν , ελληνο-
τουρκικές σχέσεις
Papandreou, 
Erzurum, Erdoğan, 
Greek-Turkish 
relations 
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_05/01/2011
_427629
06/01/11 Ο κ. 
Παπανδρέου 
στο Ερζερούμ 
Mr. 
Papandreou in 
Erzurum
Παπανδρέου,  
ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις
Papandreou, Greek – 
Turkish relations 
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_colu
mns_2_06/01/20
11_427708
08/01/11 Χαμόγελα 
περίσσευαν 
παντού στο 
Ερζερούμ
Smiles in 
Erzurum
Ερζερούμ, αλλαγή 
κλίματος 
Erzurum, change of 
climate
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2  _08/01/2011  
_427976 
08/01/11 Διάβημα από 
Παπανδρέου 
για τουρκικές 
υπερπτήσεις
Papandreou's 
step fpr 
Turkish 
overflights
καθεστώς στο Αιγαίο,  
Παπανδρέου, τουρκικές 
υπερπτήσεις στο Αιγαίο 
Aegean status, 
Papandreou, 
overflights in the 
Aegean
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_08/01/2011
_427979 
08/01/11 Δημόσια αιχμή 
Παπανδρέου 
για τις  
υπερπτήσεις
Public 
comment by 
Papandreou on 
overflights
Αιγαίο, υπερπτήσεις Aegean, Overflights http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_08/01/2011
_427998 
09/01/11 Οι διαφορές  
παραμένουν, το 
«κλίμα» μόνο 
αλλάζει
The differences 
remain, the 
“climate” 
changes
Συμπεράσματα ,  
συνάντηση Παπανδρέου 
– Ερντογάν  
Conclusions, 
Papandreou – 
Erdoğan meeting
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_09/01/2011
_428125
11/01/11 Ετεροχρονισμέν
η «όχληση» 
από τον 
Ερντογάν
Erdoğan's late 
“disturbance”
ομιλία του  Παπανδρέου,  
Ερζερούμ, αντίδραση 
Ερντογάν  
Papandreou's speech, 
Erdoğan's reaction
http://news.kathi
merini.gr/4dcgi/_
w_articles_politi
cs_2_11/01/2011
_428258
Hürriyet and Hürriyet Daily News
07/01/11
Erzurum'da AB 
EU conflict in 
Erzurum
sert mesajlar veren 
Yunanistan Başbakanı 
PM Papandreou gave 
harsh  messages
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
119
atışması
Papandreu er/haber.aspx?
id=16709762&ta
rih=2011-01-07 
07/01/11
Cuma 
namazını  
kaçırtan 
görüşme
The meeting 
(for which 
Erdoğan) 
skipped the 
Friday prayer
Erdoğan, Papandreu,  
görüşme 
Erdoğan, 
Papandreou, meeting
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/ShowNew.asp
x?id=16704889 
07/01/11
Papandreu'dan 
Türkçe mesaj
Papandreou's 
message in 
Turkish
Papandreu, ziyaret Papandreou, visit http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/ShowNew.asp
x?id=16708282 
07/01/11
Erdoğan ile  
Papandreu'da
n ortak basın 
toplantısı
Erdoğan and 
Papandreou's 
common press 
conference
Erdoğan, Papandreu, 
Basın toplantısı  
Erdoğan, 
Papandreou, press 
conference
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/ShowNew.asp
x?id=16711406 
08/01/11
Yorgo’ya 
‘Dadaş’lı AB 
ayarı
Erdoğan, Papandreu 
,AB, Kıbrıs  
Erdoğan, 
Papandreou, EU, 
Cyprus
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/ShowNew.asp
x?id=16711823 
08/01/11
Papandreu’nun 
ziyaretine 8 
sorti
Papandreou's 
visit – 8 raids
Papandreu’nun ziyareti  
öncesinde Ankara-Atina 
arasında ciddi bir kriz 
yaşandı 
Before Papandreou's 
visit, there was a 
serious crisis 
between Ankara and 
Athens
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/ShowNew.asp
x?id=16711824 
09/01/11
O konuşurken 
helikopterinde
n 5 ihlal
While he was 
speaking 5 of 
their 
helicopters 
violated 
(airspace)
Papandreu, Erzurum Papandreou, 
Erzurum 
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/ShowNew.asp
x?id=16718495 
09/01/11
Yunan Dışişleri  
Bakanı:  
Ege'deki  
statü 
değişmez
Greek FM: the 
status in the 
Aegean does 
not change
Ege, Yunanistan 
Dışişleri Bakanı, Türk-
Yunan ilişkileri  
Aegean, Greece, 
Foreign Minister, 
Greek – Turkish 
Relations 
http://hurarsiv.hu
rriyet.com.tr/gost
er/ShowNew.asp
x?id=16720848 
Zaman and Today's Zaman
03/01/11 Papandreu'nun 
Erzurum 
ziyareti Rum 
basınında
Papandreou's 
visit to 
Erzurum on the 
Greek 
headlines
Papandreu, Erzurum ,  
Rum basın, güçlü 
sembolik önemi 
Papandreou, 
Erzurum, Greek 
headlines, strong 
symbolic meaning
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=107365
1 
06/01/11 Atina'dan ihlal  
iddiası
Claims of 
violations from 
Athens
Atina, Türk savaş 
uçaklarının Yunan hava 
sahası 
Athens, Turkish 
aircraft in Greek 
airspace
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=107509
120
7 
07/01/11 Muhalefet,  
Papandreu'yu,  
Türkiye ile  
"gizli  
diploması  
yapmakla" 
suçladı
The opposition 
accused 
Papandreou for 
“secret 
diplomacy” 
with Turkey
Papandreu, Erzurum, 
konuşma, muhalefet
Papandreou, 
Erzurum, speech, 
opposition
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=107591
7 
08/01/11 Yunan 
hükümeti,  
Erzurum 
ziyaretinden 
memnun
Greek 
government 
pleased with 
Erzurum visit
Yunan televizyonları ,  
Papandreu , Erzurum 
Greek television, 
Papandreou, 
Erzurum
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=107613
3 
10/01/11 Papandreu'nun 
Erzurum 
ziyaretinin 
yankıları  
sürüyor
The impression 
of Papandreou 
in Erzurum 
continues
Papandreu, Erzurum ,  
ziyaret 
Papandreou, 
Erzurum, visit
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=107646
2 
10/01/11 'Papandreu,  
konuşma 
metnini  
değiştirdi'
'Papandreou 
changed the 
text of his 
speech'
Papandreu, Erdoğan,  
Erzurum, görüşme,  
konuşma 
Papandreou, 
Erdoğan, Erzurum, 
meeting, speech
http://www.zama
n.com.tr/haber.do
?
haberno=107666
1 
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